114

Atyeo to Evatt

Cablegram 36, ATHENS, 16 June 1949

TOP SECRET

UNSCOB realising the futility of being unable to get agreement with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is preparing to write its report without attempting any conciliatory moves on its own behalf.

2. Based on the assumption that the Greek Army is slowly winning and that there is a slackening of guerrilla morale, the following draft resolution now seems to be the only course open, if we wish to stop the war and prevent the massacres which would take place after a military victory.

3. I have therefore put up this draft resolution for informal and secret discussion. First comment has not been unfavourable, and we may be able to get some form of agreed text for the Greek Government to consider.

4. Cordier, who was here for one day, says it looks to him as the only way out.

5. The preamble to the operative part of the resolution (Chapter I) stresses the need for speeding up the end of the war and then continues - ‘the United Nations, through its Special Committee, calls upon (1) all those Greek guerrillas now fighting the Greek National Forces to lay down their arms and deliver themselves to the protection and supervision of the United Nations who will ensure their safe conduct; (2) the Greek Government to lend every assistance to the United Nations in furthering the promotion of a peaceful settlement through this appeal: the prerequisites for the success of which are the grant of a general political amnesty to all guerrillas and the guarantee, under United Nations supervision, of free and democratic elections in Greece (in accordance with the Greek Government’s repeatedly expressed wishes); (3) all governments to respect and facilitate this appeal.’ 6. Chapter II - Initial Implementation.

‘The United Nations requests (a) that the Greek Government make available for a temporary period an adequate area of land with extra-territorial rights appropriate for the reception and maintenance of all Greek guerrillas who place themselves under United Nations protection; (b) that a personal representative of the Secretary-General with adequate staff and facilities be made available to supervise the safe conduct, transport and settlement within the area defined of all these guerrillas responding to the appeal utilizing to the full the expert services existing in the Observation Groups of the Special Committee; (c) that the personal representative of the Secretary-General enlist the aid of all Specialised Agencies and non-governmental organisations competent to assist him in his task.’ 7. Chapter III deals with the long term measures of guerrilla readjustment and resettlement.

8. Would appreciate your urgent comments. Whole matter is absolutely secret.[1]

_[1] A draft cablegram dated 20 June 1949 indicates that Evatt thought Atyeo should not take any action. In a letter dated 7 July 1949 Atyeo told Evatt that although he had taken no action in the matter, some delegations were interested and it was possible that the committee might act on the lines he had suggested.

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[AA : A6530, 49/10/8]