Canberra, 20 February 1964
126. Secret Immediate
For Cutts1
Please pass following message to President Macapagal2 from the Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies.
Begins:
I have asked our Ambassador, Mr. Cutts, to deliver this letter to you as I am conscious of the many and varied developments in the South East Asian region which are of vital, mutual concern to our two countries. I hope that I may explore my thoughts with you and so add to the useful discussion which the Australian Ambassador regularly has with your Foreign Minister3 and his officials. I take this opportunity to express the Australian Government’s appreciation for the frankness of your authorities in their dealings with the Australian Embassy.
I was much struck by your very forthright public statement of 22nd January on the decision of the French Government to recognise Peking.4 Our own position is very close to your own and will be given further public expression on suitable occasions. In this matter we are, of course, continually mindful not only of our own interests, but those of our neighbours—including your own country. Under these circumstances you will understand that we have been much disturbed by some of General de Gaulle’s5 pronouncements on South East Asia. He has talked about the neutralisation of South East Asia and has referred to a Treaty of Neutrality. Although the French say that their ideas are no more than broad generalities for the future, it is clear that they are likely to colour French policy and might have demoralising effects in the region. I should like to inform you confidentially that we are seeking with the French such close consultation as to their thinking on these matters as we feel our status as a S.E.A.T.O. ally and our stake in the region warrants. We have reminded them that what happens in South East Asia touches the future of Australia very directly. The risk of Chinese Communist encroachment in South East Asia is great and because of it we have put considerable effort and resources into giving support to the independent countries in the area.
We have also sought precise clarification from the French as to the nature of their thinking; what countries they propose should be ‘neutralised’ how would these countries be serviced for arms and training; what form would the guarantee take; would S.E.A.T.O. have a role in guaranteeing the integrity of the neutralised states; if not what continuing role would be envisaged for S.E.A.T.O.; in what way could subversion be prevented and other related questions.
We are indeed deeply sceptical of dealing with the problem of Communist China other than on the basis of countervailing power; and we are concerned that ideas of neutralisation, widely conceived, could undermine the balance that has been achieved. We are mindful, too, that if bases and conventional forces were withdrawn from countries in South East Asia, the possibility of the limited containment of China might disappear. Further, if the guarantee of neutrality (supposing it to exist) were ruptured, there would be no course left but to use nuclear weapons. We have drawn the attention of France to a recent public expression of our views by Sir Garfield Barwick in the course of a major speech. As they are concisely expressed I take the liberty of reproducing them for your examination.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38, iii]
CHINA AND THE BOMB
On 16 October 1964, China successfully detonated a nuclear device for the first time. A world sensation, the event had, to an extent, taken even the most informed observers by surprise. In a top secret report to President Johnson, Robert Johnson of the US State Department had reported in August that aerial photography taken early in the month showed that a ‘previously suspect facility’ in Western China was in fact ‘a nuclear test site which could be ready for use in about two months’—and yet he argued that the Chinese would ‘not have sufficient fissionable material for a test . . . in the next few months’. Later intelligence enabled Rusk to predict publicly on 29 September that a detonation was imminent, but US policy-makers, beginning in the 1950s, had consistently misjudged the sophistication of the PRC’s approach to nuclear development.
In a public relations sense, Peking’s achievement was an undoubted coup. Chinese prestige was raised considerably in Africa, while in Europe a number of Scandinavian countries joined the chorus of developing countries calling for China’s immediate admission to the United Nations. In Asia, general sentiment was one of pride, even among anti-communists—as was graphically demonstrated by the crowds of mainlanders who celebrated in the streets of Taipei (President Chiang, on the other hand, was described by an American diplomat as suffering ‘intense … anxiety’).
1 T.W. Cutts, Australian Ambassador to the Philippines.
2 Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines.
3 Salvador P. Lopez, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
4 Not found, but newspaper reports indicate that French recognition of China was widely condemned by Government leaders in the Philippines.
5 General Charles de Gaulle, President of France.