Canberra, 21 December 1967
Confidential
Relations with the Republic of China
You said that we should ask Mr Cooper to substantiate some of the views expressed in his attached despatch on relations with the Republic of China. The attached memorandum has been prepared, but it was inadvertently typed for my signature. However, it occurs to me that rather than write to Taipei, you may prefer to discuss the matter with Mr Cooper who is in Australia on leave and will be coming to the Department for consultations late in January.2
Attachment
MEMORANDUM BY INGRAM
Canberra, 21 December 1967
Secret
Relations with the Republic of China
In the last sentence of your despatch No. 5 dated 14th November, 1967, on Australian relations with the Republic of China,3 you suggest that ‘as Taipei’s international position weakens, ROC–Australian relations are likely to be subjected to increasing strains as it becomes more and more difficult to reconcile narrow and potentially dangerous aims of Nationalist policy’. This proposition seems to us to require a good deal of further substantiation and we should be grateful if you could develop your views at greater length.
2. In particular, we should like to know in what respect you believe Taipei’s international position will weaken. Do you distinguish in this respect between Taiwan and the Republic of China? We should like to know what specific strains you consider are likely to develop between Australia and the Republic of China and what particular Chinese policies are irreconcilable with our ‘wider political interests’. What are Nationalist China’s ‘potentially dangerous aims’ apart from its ambition to recover control of the mainland?
3. Whilst it is of course difficult to predict the future course of our relations with the Republic of China, on present indications it does not seem likely that our relations with them will worsen seriously, even given that the Nationalist Chinese are always likely to remain touchy and to require careful handling. They are shrewd enough to know that our policy is based on the assumption that Taiwan will remain separate from China and this is unlikely to cause a ‘worsening’ in our relations. For the rest, there are considerable advantages in their relationship with us in ASPAC,4 in the United Nations and on trade matters. They also appreciate that in some respects—especially in supporting their international position—we treat them better than does the United States.
4. Even if the prospect was for a decline in relations, it seems to us that this would be very much a long-term matter. We have judged that it is in our interest to sustain the Republic of China as an alternative focus of Chinese loyalty. In support of that policy we must continue to strive to make relations as good as possible, even if this is not always easy because of aberrations in Chinese policy.
[NAA: A1838, 519/3/1, ix]
1 J.C. Ingram, Assistant Secretary, Pacific and Americas Branch, Department of External Affairs.
2 A handwritten note by Ingram indicates that the points raised below were discussed with Cooper.
3 Document 122.
4 In June 1966, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the Republic of Vietnam and Australia had recommended the establishment of an Asian and Pacific Council (AS PAC) in view of the ‘urgent need for continuing consultations among participating countries, with a view to forging better international understanding, promoting closer and more fruitful regional cooperation and further strengthening Asian and Pacific solidarity’.