Canberra, 13 August 1968
474. Confidential
For Bailey
Your Telegram 502.1
Canadian Attitude to China
In your discussion with Mr Sharp2 you may wish to draw on the following in regard to the question of recognition of Communist China.
(a) Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the communist regime in China has behaved even more irresponsibly in its international dealings than in the previous period.
(b) It has maintained an attitude of open contempt towards the United Nations and as recently as June last refused to receive an invitation from the Secretary-General to attend the conference of non-nuclear countries which is to meet in Geneva to consider the problems of nuclear armaments. The Chinese Communists have also made it clear that they will not become parties to the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
(c) The Chinese Communists continue actively and openly to direct and support subversion and armed infiltration in neighbouring countries. There is in particular recent evidence of this in Thailand, Burma and in the Naga areas3 in India.
(d) Any accession of prestige to the Peking regime will increase its ability to influence and overawe its neighbours.
(e) If Communist China is admitted to the United Nations, it would, as indicated by its own declarations, pursue policies hostile to the interests of the West and of the free countries of Asia.
(f) A Canadian move to recognise Peking would not be welcome in Asia even by those countries whose official attitude is one of favouring recognition, and to some countries at least it would have the appearance of being a Canadian action carried out without adequate regard to the interests of the countries most affected.
(g) The argument that recognition is necessary to bring Communist China into the world community is not well founded, first because of Peking’s own expressed contempt for the world community and also because political recognition is not necessary to enable practical dealings, especially in commercial matters, to go forward. Contacts of the latter kind do not produce the adverse consequences which would result from political recognition.
2. In regard to the position of the Republic of China you might make the following points.
(a) It is assumed from Mr Trudeau’s4 public statements that the Canadian Government does not contemplate action which would result in sacrificing the interests of the people of Taiwan to Communist China.
(b) We therefore assume that Canadian policy will continue to be based on the principle that the right to independence of the people of Taiwan should be safeguarded.
(c) In this respect the position in the United Nations is crucial. If the Republic of China were expelled from the United Nations this would seriously damage the prospects for the continued separate existence of Taiwan, and its readmission as a member would be subject to the veto of Mainland China.
(d) The danger that Taiwan would be expelled would become acute if the matter were decided on the basis of a simple majority. We therefore attach great importance to continued Canadian support for the ‘Important Question’ resolution.
(e) The disappearance of Taiwan would disturb the developing equilibrium in Asia and the Pacific. As a country with political stability and an expanding economy, Taiwan has an important part to play in the development and ultimately the security of the region.
(f) Taiwan is becoming an increasingly important alternative to Communist China as a focus for the loyalties and commercial interests of the overseas Chinese. If Taiwan were to be absorbed into Communist China the pressure which Peking could apply to the overseas communities would be greatly increased.
3. With reference to the last sentence of paragraph four of your telegram no. 5025 we appreciate that this has relation to the point often made by the Canadians that we should produce concrete evidence of our view that the overseas Chinese communities would be adversely affected by the recognition of Peking by further countries. In our view however this question must be seen as related to broader questions such as the extent to which the international position of Taiwan would be undermined, the extent to which the overseas Chinese would thereby be deprived of an alternative focus for their loyalties and commercial interests, and the extent to which an increase in the prestige and influence of Peking would lead to increased political and economic pressure by the Communist Chinese on the overseas communities. In these respects much would of course depend upon the nature and timing of any Canadian move.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xix]
1 8 August. It reported that the Canadian Department of External Affairs had prepared a voluminous brief on the China question for ministers but without a fixed date for discussion in Cabinet. It added that the following week would be a good time for Australian views about the recognition of the People’s Republic of China to be conveyed to the Canadian Government.
2 Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.
3 The Naga are a Tibeto-Burman people who inhabit parts of northeast India.
4 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.
5 It read: ‘I would be glad to get any information or views you may have on the significance of a Canadian move in relation to the Chinese Communists in places like Singapore’.