Taipei, 19 November 1968
Australia and China
After two years in the Republic of China, and at a time when many people in the United States and elsewhere are becoming disenchanted with American policy in Asia, I have the honour to offer some reflexions on Australia’s relations with Taiwan and our approach to the China problem.
2. To take the latter point first, our trade relations with Peking and our cultural contacts with Mainland China (however minimal) are at least partly a reflection of the fact that we accept the need to live with Communist China, and that we would not be slow to respond to any signs that Peking is prepared to live with the West on terms of co-existence and mutual respect. Meanwhile our support for Taiwan in the United Nations and elsewhere is based on the premise that two Chinas are better than one (notwithstanding that diplomatically we recognise only one China) and also that we are not prepared to abandon thirteen million people to Communism.
3. Incidentally the idea that the population of Taiwan consists of thirteen million fervent anti-Communists is, of course, quite unrealistic. The only real antiCommunists on Taiwan are the mainland Chinese, who were forced to make the agonising choice between communism and exile nearly twenty years ago. As for the Taiwanese (who probably comprise about three-quarters of the population) they have no deep rooted political loyalties. They have not experienced a period of protracted struggle with the Communists and consequently they do not have the emotional and personal commitment to an anti-Communist position which is found amongst some sections of the mainland community. Apart from a few Taiwanese capitalists, the bulk of the Taiwanese would probably find it no more difficult to adapt themselves to a Communist regime than to the present Nationalist one. Their recent history is one of authoritarian rule, first under the Japanese and more recently under the Nationalists. In short, so far as one can judge, the Taiwanese are equivocal in their attitude towards both the Chinese and the Japanese and have no marked loyalty towards either. The only political prospect that would be likely to gain overwhelming support would be an independent Taiwan free of both Chinese and Japanese overlordship. Since this is not attainable the Taiwanese, like the Hong Kong Chinese, are for the most part content to go on making money.
4. But if we (and the Americans) hope eventually to learn to live with China, we shall never succeed so long as we cling (in practice) to a two China policy. In saying this, I am not, of course, suggesting that we should join the ranks of those countries who favour simply handing Taiwan over to the Communists. My belief is that in the long run the West will have no say in the matter anyway, and that eventually there will be an accommodation reached between Peking and Taipei, probably after Chairman Mao and President Chiang are no longer on the scene. After all, in some respects the basis for an accommodation exists already. Both accept that Taiwan is a province of China, both want China to be a Great Power—that is to say neither side wants a weak and dismembered China (which incidentally we may feel it is in our interests to try to preserve), and both sides would give a good deal to preserve the unity of China. (The Nationalists are just as concerned about foreign encroachments on ‘Chinese’ territory as the Communists.) In addition there are a number of other factors which reinforce my belief in an eventual accommodation between Peking and Taipei. First of all, I have yet to meet a Chinese who thinks of Taiwan as ‘China’. Their roots and their families are either in China or (if they are wealthy) in the United States; they are certainly not in Taiwan. Most of them (including the President) simply want to go ‘home’. Secondly, the glorification of things Chinese, as expressed in the KMT’s ‘cultural renaissance’, is largely a reflexion of the longing of a group of exiles to be reunited with the motherland. Thirdly, there is the ambivalent attitude of the Chinese (on Taiwan) towards the Americans. The Chinese of all people do not enjoy their present dependent status and their reliance on the U.S. for their security. Fourthly, G.R.C. officialdom derives little pride and satisfaction from ruling Taiwan and most of them are contemptuous of the Taiwanese. Finally, there is the enigma of Chiang Chiang-kuo, who is reputed to have contacts on the mainland and whose ambitions (like his father’s) are not centred in Taiwan. Thus, given the Chinese genius for face-saving compromise, it is not too difficult to envisage an arrangement which could benefit both sides. The Nationalists have negotiated with the Communists in the past, and I believe that the ties of family, clan, and race will in the long run prove stronger than the present ideological and political barriers to a unified China.
5. If then a two China policy is unlikely to succeed as a long term aim, and since there is nothing much that the West can do about the Peking Government in its present mood, what sort of policy would we pursue meanwhile towards Taiwan? Before attempting to suggest any answers to that question, perhaps we should first of all consider what the G.R.C. itself wants. Leaving aside the Nationalist dream of recovering the mainland, the G.R.C. is at present very preoccupied with the question of collective security in Asia. Faced with the possibility of an American withdrawal from Vietnam, fearful that this might be the first step in a general American retreat from Asia (at least in the military sense), contemptuous of SEATO as an effective barrier to Communist expansion, and mindful of Peking’s growing nuclear capability, the G.R.C. is actively propagating in the press, and behind the scenes, President-elect Nixon’s idea of an Asian collective security system within the framework of ASPAC. The difficulty of persuading Japan to join is recognised, but the suggestion is that the other countries should go ahead if necessary without Japan.
6. I think we could agree that, quite apart from the Japanese attitude, a viable collective security system could not be developed from the present ASPAC membership. Many countries (presumably including Australia) would have misgivings about entering into a military alliance with the R.O.C., which might seek to use such an alliance to further KMT objectives in respect of the China question. Nor would an alliance of Asian and Pacific countries be any substitute for SEATO (by which the United States is committed to resist Communist aggression on the Asian mainland) unless the United States were prepared to underwrite it. In the present and foreseeable political climate in the United States, it is probably safe to say that the American commitment to SEATO is unlikely to be matched let alone exceeded by any comparable undertaking to an alternative Asian security system.
7. It is not the purpose of this despatch to canvass possible alternatives to SEATO, but since there is already considerable speculation on the subject, and not least in Taipei, we need to consider our attitude towards the inclusion of the R.O.C. in an Asian collective security system. My own view is that our present relationship, which is confined to diplomatic support, trade, and limited aid and cultural exchanges, is the most we should contemplate, and that our desire to contain Chinese Communism should not blind us to the dangers of entering into any military or security relationship with the R.O.C. In any event, even if we were so disposed, I do not believe we could carry our Asian neighbours (except South Korea) along with us. It would complicate our political relations with other Asian countries whose fear of Peking does not thereby make them admirers of the Nationalists.
8. In short, we should not in my view give any encouragement to the idea that the R.O.C., despite its considerable military potential, has a role to play in any Asian collective security system. Whereas the philosophy of SEATO is essentially defensive, the G.R.C. is committed to undertake offensive action against the mainland whenever such an opportunity presents itself. Nor should we forget that Peking is equally committed to ‘liberating’ Taiwan. President Chiang has often said that the Chinese problem can only be solved by the Chinese people themselves, and we would do well to respect his point of view.
9. It will be apparent from the foregoing that I subscribe to Professor Albinski’s thesis* 1 that, on the whole, our China policy has served Australia pretty well. It is more flexible than American policy towards China, without being any the less firm in resisting Chinese aggression. Our relations with Taiwan are good, but we will never be close allies, and, given our disparate political outlook, perhaps this is just as well. Taiwan is a country that is progressing economically but stagnating politically. Our trade with the R.O.C. is expanding (currently about $25 million per annum) and the prospect is that it will continue to do so. Thus, while fostering trade, and encouraging the concept of regional economic cooperation, we should nevertheless be chary of developing a close political relationship with the R.O.C., and recognise that the more involved we become with Taiwan politically, the more difficult it may be ultimately to reach an accommodation with Peking. This, after all, is the primary long term aim of our diplomacy in Asia, and there can be no true peace in the region without it. It is, however, unrealistic to contemplate an accommodation with Peking on the basis of two Chinas (or one China one Taiwan) which both sides specifically reject. President Chiang says he is prepared to do business with any Communist who is opposed to Mao Tse-tung. If the Nationalists are willing in certain circumstances to sup with the devil, we have to consider whether it is in our interests to try to prevent them. In other words we have to assess the consequences of seeking to maintain the two Chinas concept, which thereby precludes any hope of an accommodation with Peking. On the other hand we obviously could not support any arrangement which amounted to a forcible take over of Taiwan by the Communists. But the real question is whether there is any prospect of the Nationalists patching up their twenty-year old quarrel with the Communists (the Taiwanese will have no say in the matter anyway). As I have suggested earlier, my experience in Taiwan leads me to believe that this is a very real possibility in the post-Mao and post-Chiang period. I would also believe that a general détente with Peking is more in our interests than the maintenance of tension arising out of a divided China. On the other hand the accretion of power to Peking which the acquisition of Taiwan would represent would have major strategic implications. It would extend Chinese power into the Pacific and breach the existing off-shore chain of American bases in the Western Pacific. So far as Australia is concerned it would also enable the Chinese to interdict our sea and air communications with Japan. In terms, however, of military capability, an increase of another half million men to China’s armed forces loses a good deal of its significance in the context of a country with virtually unlimited manpower. Moreover, as the Americans have been careful to provide the R.O.C. only with essentially defensive military equipment, Peking’s offensive capability would not be significantly increased by the acquisition of Taiwan, although China’s strategic position would undoubtedly be strengthened.
10. To sum up, I believe our China policy to date has served us well, but in developing our relations with Taiwan we should not lose sight of the main aim of our China policy—namely an accommodation with Peking if and when the regime indicates that it is ready to do business with the West. Nor should we rule out the possibility of an accommodation between Peking and Taipei which would remove one of the biggest obstacles to a general détente between China and the West. In the meantime, and in what we hope is the not unduly protracted task of containing Communism in Asia, we should not prejudice our main objective by supporting any move to integrate the R.O.C. into an Asian collective security system.2
[NAA: A1838, 519/3/1, x]
1 Here, Cooper footnoted Henry Albinski’s Australian Policies and Attitudes Towards China.
2 In a note to M.W.B. Smithies of the East Asia Section, M.D.P. Hill, of the same Section, wrote: ‘Could you discuss with me please? I’m not sure what this can be used for. It opens up some relevant and deep questions, but it doesn’t define them sufficiently closely. For example, it uses the same word—”accommodation”—both in a Taipei–Peking sense, & in a Canberra–Peking sense. But these are really very different things. And what is it that the writer thinks we should do: nothing, or prepare lines of retreat?’