Hong Kong, 5 December 1968
Secret
Visit to China of External Affairs Representative, Hong Kong
Not surprisingly after several months in Hong Kong my interest in making a visit to China has been greatly aroused and my earlier belief in the utility of such visits enhanced. I have tried to restrain this enthusiasm on the grounds that it has probably been proposed before by the Department’s Representative here but not approved because of circumstances at the time, the situation in China seemed hardly fortuitous for such a visit, and to a lesser extent in the light of the Australian commitment in Vietnam. Having looked at these and other factors, taken advantage of a chance meeting with Wheat Board Representatives and discussions with members of the Canadian Trade Commission here, I have thought it worthwhile to raise with you for serious consideration the possibility of a visit being made.
2. Looking at the factors involved there seem to me a number of considerations which might make a visit say within the next six months a more feasible proposition for the Department if not Ministers to consider than perhaps has been the case in recent times. While I am conscious of a number of counter arguments that might be raised and could point in the direction of a negative reaction, I am not certain that these should not be challenged, or at least re-examined.
3. One of the basic points that should be made in favour of such visits is that while we do not recognise China, we do trade with them, we have had various exchange visits and as the Minister has said in a press interview ‘Trade becomes an occasion for more frequent visits between our subjects and their (Chinese) subjects’. (I grant that this does not specify officials.) It is a fact that to all intents and purposes the only Australian officials (I understand that Callaghan2 is a government appointee) who have any kind of regular dealings with the Chinese on matters of substance have been members of the Wheat Board. It seems to me that this is not an entirely satisfactory situation since it means that only a very limited number of officials have any exposure to the Communist Chinese way of doing things on substantive matters. I have made this point in discussions with members of the Wheat Board including Dr Callaghan and found no significant disagreement from them, although of course we were speaking in general terms and I did not at the time make any specific proposal that might involve them. I wonder whether it is not time we should begin building up a group of personnel with some first hand acquaintance with China and experience in actual dealings with the Chinese. While it is beyond the purpose of this memorandum to consider moves that might be made towards recognition of Peking or the establishment of relations with the government of China, some further preparation for these eventualities would seem appropriate and serve to supplement the existing language training programme, etc.
4. On the general question of China’s foreign policy and the timing of a visit, there are several points that might be made. The most recent tendencies in Chinese foreign policy have been towards some modification of its more extreme positions and we have seen the interesting approach it has taken on the question of continuing discussions with the US (our memorandum 573).3 Furthermore although the Chinese attitude towards those foreigners it has detained during the Cultural Revolution has not become any more forthcoming, it is a fact that they have largely ceased their harassment of British, Indian and other diplomats who were under duress last year. Some discrimination still continues with local travel and there are local practices if not irritants which are uniquely Chinese, but for the most part diplomatic life if not practice in Peking has virtually returned to normal by Chinese standards. Indeed as mentioned in our memorandum 5404 it is the intention of the British to send the Assistant Political Adviser, Hong Kong, to Peking in the new year for a visit similar to those which were the practice prior to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. The British plan to do this in view of Chinese willingness to permit the British diplomats in Peking to visit Hong Kong from time to time, again a reversion to pre-excess practice. It might therefore be said that the British at least consider that there has been sufficient of a return to normal practice that their own officials are unlikely to be threatened and that a reversion to previous practice by themselves is in order.
5. One of the possible factors that may have mitigated against Australian officials visiting China in the last few years has been our involvement in Vietnam and the possibility that the Chinese might take advantage of the presence of such an official to hold some kind of public proceedings in which an official was forced under duress to make some adverse comments on government policy. In my view this possibility was never very real and in the present circumstances given the problems in Sino-Vietnamese relations, even more remote. The Chinese continue to view North Vietnamese actions in Paris with disfavour but in my assessment, have within limits resigned themselves to developments in Vietnam over which they ultimately have no control. In addition there is the more speculative point that as there is some prospect of progress towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict the Chinese themselves are not only interested in the outcome but also may wish to involve themselves in any wider proceedings that may bring this about. I do not propose to go into a more detailed analysis of recent Chinese foreign policy developments in this context but would refer to our recent reporting on this.
6. Turning to the Canadian precedent, which is I think relevant and many aspects of which will be known to the Department, the Canadian External Affairs Representative here, who goes under the local nom de plume of Trade Commissioner, paid a visit to the recently concluded Canton Trade Fair. He went with the Trade Commissioner who normally deals with wheat sales to China. The modalities of his travel and his situation are very relevant. First of all the External Affairs Representative has security clearances which provide him with access to the same materials as I have. Secondly he travelled on a diplomatic passport which identified him as a member of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. This has been the long standing Canadian practice which his predecessors like himself have followed. On this instance and I cannot speak for previous occasions, the Chinese gave him a visa which was on a slip of paper pinned to a page of his passport. He experienced no untoward difficulties.
7. A further point that I would like to suggest is that while there is no guarantee that the Chinese would give me a visa, at least if they refused the onus would be on them rather than on us and a slight move in our relations would have failed by China’s decision rather than from our failing to make it. Without wishing to hold out too rosy a prospect for US–Chinese relations, I do not rule out the possibility of some greater flexibility on the part of the US in its future policy towards China. Even if the Chinese do not respond this will have the effect of enhancing the US posture towards China and certainly would serve to cast it in a more favourable light. If some of the possibilities mentioned during the election campaign5 become realities in terms of specific and concrete US policies, the US would probably approach a situation of parity with our own but would be out in front through the significant additional factor of the 135 sessions of the Warsaw talks. I do not accept the argument fashionable in some circles that these are merely sterile occasions either in terms of the experience afforded those involved or of the content. The story of these talks as told to us by the Americans and part of which I have had to record and recount speaks for itself and to the contrary.
8. In view of these factors I would like to propose for your consideration that approval be given for me to apply for a Chinese visa for a visit associated with the next Wheat Board delegation trip to China. If this is too imminent and the prospects of an early visit are unknown to me, then on the next visit to be paid by a delegation. My reasons for suggesting it in this context are as follows. First, the Wheat Board visits involve substantive business with the Chinese and face to face discussions with Chinese officials; second, my association with the Wheat Board might be less of a shock to the Chinese than if I were suddenly to apply for a visa out of the blue. Third, it is my understanding that travel in socialist countries on security grounds should be done at least au pair. I might mention however that from all my discussions here with a wide range of visitors to China there has never been any suggestion that the Chinese attempt to get up to the mischief of their erstwhile Soviet friends and British officers travel in and out alone where necessary.
9. In putting forward this proposition I appreciate some complicating factors. It is possible that the Chinese would reject my visa application. If so in my view all would not be lost since the onus of responsibility would be on them rather than on ourselves. Second the Wheat Board may be upset by what they regard as potential involvement of a political factor into what they regard as essentially a commercial deal and might strenuously resist our endeavours. There has been a tendency to accept this view in the past, but I wonder how relevant it is when we have the advantage at present of an experienced official with many years experience of overseas service and dealings with External Affairs officers, such as Dr Callaghan as Chairman of the Wheat Board. I should have thought if ever there was an opportunity for us to derive a more meaningful contact with the Wheat Board on the China question it would be during his incumbency. As far as the Board’s argument that injection of a political factor might upset the possibility of concluding a contract, I do not find this acceptable since when we injected the political factor into contract negotiations in 1967,6 contracts were signed nevertheless. Furthermore contracts have gone through (except for the last one and that for price reasons) during the whole period of our involvement in the Vietnam war which would suggest that, not surprisingly, the Chinese have not permitted ideological niceties to overcome a pragmatic assessment of their necessities. I suppose it is not my place to raise the possibility of the domestic political backlash that might arise from a visit to China by a government official, but it is difficult for me to envisage how the Opposition might make much capital out of this given its own platform on China policy. Finally the problem of the attitude of the United States and here I think we should not have too many concerns. At least this would be my impression after working on the China question with the State Department for three years and having close contacts with the US officials here in Hong Kong. The US after some earlier noises have resigned themselves to our trade with China and indeed are making statements about the possibility of doing the same themselves. They have tolerated the Canadian practice over the years without any deep repercussions on US-Canadian relations, and certainly there are a number of members of the State Department who would find some initiative on our part in this regard a useful peg to hang further arguments on regarding the further rationalisation of US policy.
10. I have set out the case as clearly as I can and hope that it will be given careful and serious attention. I would be grateful if this memorandum could be brought to the attention of Mr Booker with whom I discussed the question during his recent visit.7
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38, viii]
1 R.S. Laurie, First Secretary (External Affairs Representative), Australian Trade Commission, Hong Kong.
2 A.R. Callaghan, Chairman of the Australian Wheat Board from 1965. He had visited Shanghai on 11 August.
3 28 November. Authored by Laurie, it related to the Chinese response to a US announcement, following a series of failed approaches to the Chinese, that the Warsaw talks were to be postponed. Laurie noted that the PRC statement ’succinctly sets out the Peking government’s view of developments in a calm and logical manner’. He continued: ‘This is quite a forthcoming Chinese response in our view since they hold out the prospect for further talks and indicate that the Chinese find it worthwhile for these to take place. The format and method involved in this Chinese response are clear evidence of a more normal situation prevailing at the Chinese Foreign Ministry and indicate that some of the normal machinery may be starting to tick over once again … Whether this is the beginning of a new trend in Chinese propaganda and foreign policy statements is too early to know but it may be a promising sign’.
4 Not published.
5 That is, the US Presidential campaign of 1968, which pitted Republican Richard Nixon against the Democrats’ Hubert Humphrey.
6 In May 1967, an Australian Wheat Board delegation was negotiating with PRC purchasing agents in Hong Kong while riots, seemingly connected with the Cultural Revolution (see footnote 6, Document 149), were occurring in that territory. The British raised with the Australian Government ‘the possibility of withholding wheat from China or at least threatening to withhold future supplies as a deterrent to the Chinese authorities’. The Government decided not to prevent the conclusion of a contract, but Prime Minister Holt instructed that, if an agreement were signed, the Wheat Board were to ‘let the Chinese know how the Government feels about developments in the area and that if threats to security and stability persist, the Australian Government would wish to review total export policies in relation to China’. The Wheat Board did so reluctantly, and were subjected to a broadside from the Chinese representatives.
7 In a memorandum to Plimsoll dated 9 January 1969, Laurie reported that his proposal to visit China had been overtaken by the recent arrival of a four-man Wheat Board mission which was visiting Hong Kong en route to the PRC. He requested Departmental views on whether he might make a later visit.