Canberra, 18 December 1970
Secret
I have, as you’ve no doubt noticed, been less than assiduous in maintaining my end of our spirited correspondence. This has been partly the result of competing demands (mainly on the South Pacific) and partly because I have been a bit doubtful about what to say. My discomfort has been somewhat eased by despatch of our telegram 841,1 into which, I note with relief, you have read as many implications as I intended you should. I was, in fact, somewhat surprised when Mick Shann cleared the reference to ‘far-reaching adjustments’, and felt that more predictable caution had reasserted itself when he deleted a rather similar phrase from the beginning of the second paragraph of our telegram of 11 December about your projected meeting with Dr Wei.2 In the meantime, however, you will have received a copy of the Policy Planning Group’s draft paper, 3 and will be as fully in the unexpectedly wide sweep of our thinking as I, or anybody else, at present is.
I am confident that you will be able to assess what has occurred without my spelling out the details, but, for the record, I should say that, on my return, I found the task of writing the paper had been assigned to the PPG, assisted and/or guided by East Asia, UN Branch and, last but far from least, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. I duly fed our joint draft to Roger Holdich but, although you may recognise one or two phrases in the paper, it had clearly been overtaken.
The basic rub is this—directly apropos the third paragraph of your useful and interesting letter of 8 December,4 the fear here is rather more that we may not be able to keep up with our ‘traditional friends’ (particularly Japan, I suppose, but also, quite emphatically in Sir Keith’s5 mind, the United States) than, by a dramatic change, we might desert or alienate them. Personally, I am not too convinced on this thesis either way, but we have suggested, and I believe had accepted at higher reaches, that the paper has at least one serious presentational fault—as part of the strategy of avoiding any irritating or unrealistic interpretations of our intent, the paper should do no more than open up a wide range of options for purposes of consultations with our friends; it should not leave any implication that the fairly dramatic philosophy it canvasses is intended for unilateral use. As I say, I think this has been accepted, subject, however, to the thought that it could be in our and the American interest for us, after consultation, to move ahead of them.
All of this is a bit academic and in a vacuum, however, pending some sort of a political lead, and this Messrs Waller and Shann are at present seeking. Meanwhile, as the Deputy Secretary has pointed out and I’m sure you appreciate, many of your questions are unanswerable, natural though they are. In short, I’m afraid that for some while we’ll only be able to leave you to play things by your own good judgment, guided only by the general consideration of steering between the two extremes of exhibiting any novel form of friendliness on the one hand, or discourtesy on the other.
On your letter about Sir Ian McLennan’s visit,6 I have obtained Mick Shann’s agreement that your line in (b) and your fall-back position in (c) are right in the circumstances, and that you can only be left to exercise your own discretion about including Mr Sun in your lunch, in the light of the position then obtaining. One final point I should make is that, in all of our adumbrations, there is no disposition to ignore the fact that Taiwan is just as much a reality as is the Mainland and that we have interests in regard to Taiwan also; nor to expect that, if we were to move, Peking should necessarily welcome us benevolently (although some passages in the paper as it at present stands suggest that its authors have this misconception). The area of debate remains how strenuously we should try to preserve something for Taiwan in a situation where the Gimo7 declines to acknowledge reality and thus to do anything to help others to help him.
In reply to the first paragraph of yours of 11 December,8 I can at the moment see no alternative to maintaining the flow of personal letters. Perhaps rejuvenated by ten days leave from today (with Jill and the children, spending Christmas with my parents), I shall do my best to keep you posted on what’s going on.
With best wishes to you both, and Sabina, for Christmas and the New Year.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ii]
1 8 December. It commented on the ideas put forward by Dunn (see Document 144), and his later message that he would, unless told otherwise, begin discussions with the US Embassy. The cablegram explained that his ideas were still being examined and that further action on them should be temporarily withheld, mainly because ‘to advance them now would have no compelling advantage in terms of timing and would to some extent prejudge and could conceivably prove inconsistent with the outcome of the overall review’. Continuing, it recorded, for Dunn’s ‘background information’, that the first draft of the review had been submitted to the policy levels of the Department, and had recommended ‘rather far reaching adjustments’. At the same time, however, it added that it was too early to predict the nature of recommendations that would eventually be made to ministers.
2 In a rejoinder to Canberra’s Cablegram 841 (see footnote 1), Dunn indicated that he had made no firm plans for further discussions with the US Embassy or the ROC Minister but noted that he was due to make a routine call on Wei. Proposing to speak along standard lines, Dunn asked for confirmation that the call would be permissible, and that it would be acceptable for him to suggest, in general terms, that the ROC improve its ‘international image’. The Departmental reply of 11 December gave approval, noting on the second request that remarks confined to the first ‘might seem a little bare, and be over-interpreted’. Shann had deleted the first part of sentence in the draft cable which read ‘Although possible scope of adjustments is still uncertain .. .’.
3 See Document 149.
4 In this paragraph, Dunn related comments he had made to Angus Paltridge, First Assistant Secretary, International Trade Relations Division, Department of Trade and Industry, that Australia had ‘various definable interests’ in Taiwan that ’should not be lightly thrown away’. He argued, moreover, that any dramatic change could produce repercussions with the United States and regional countries. Dunn added that he believed the gains associated with any change had to be calculated carefully.
5 Sir Keith Waller.
6 Sir I. H. McLennan, Chief General Manager, Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited. In a letter of 11 December, Dunn proposed in the second of three points that he would, in discussing investment, tell McLennan that he should be guided by commercial considerations, and that he, Dunn, had no advice to give (although the Ambassador then proceeded to outline in detail reasons why investment had sound prospects in Taiwan). In the last of his points—point (c)—Dunn said that if McLennan asked him about the chances of an Australian official mission remaining in Taipei and if it was not possible for him to be given a lead before he left Australia, he would be told that policy was constantly under review, though no plans to change the status quo were known.
7 That is, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
8 Dunn had asked Robertson to tell him if there was ‘any better way than personal letters to communicate on some subjects while the policy review proceeds and before I hear more officially from the Department’.