Washington, 29 December 1970
Secret
Australia’s Policy Towards China
[ matter omitted ]
Conclusion
28. In addition to foregoing comments related to particular paragraphs of the Planning Paper,2 the following general comments are made.
29. The longer the attempt to seek an accommodation is postponed, the less the chances of success, because in the meantime there could be such a rush by other U.N. members to scramble on the bandwagon of recognition that the R.O.C.’s majority in the United Nations could be lost before anything could be salvaged. Perhaps the Planning Paper does not convey sufficient sense of urgency.
30. Though Chiang Kai-shek remains opposed to compromise, his government could conceivably be more open now to persuasion to change its policy because its support in the U.N. is so rapidly eroding. The argument can be put to them that the Republic is more likely to secure satisfactory terms now than after most countries have ceased to recognize it. The United States Administration is also in a mood to explore an accommodation. The formerly powerful China lobby is not at the moment an effective political force. The State Department, fully aware that international support for the Republic of China on its present basis is fast disappearing, also sees advantages in trying to establish relations with Peking on a more logical basis. Consequently, as far as our side is concerned, the time for seeking some change is more propitious than it has been in the last twenty years.
31. The Planning Paper does not explore the situation that would exist if Peking was seated in the U.N. and if the Republic of China ceased to be a member, either because the U.N. would not approve a place for it or because it walked out rather than accept a place that denies its sovereignty over the mainland. Some people talk today as though things would go on very much as at present except for the shuffle in United Nations membership. I do not believe that that would be so. It would be very dangerous for any country to base its policies on that premise. The evaporation of support for the Republic of China would mean not simply an absence of recognition by the majority of countries of the world; it would mean in many cases a withdrawal of moral or other support of a separate status for Formosa. It would probably mean that not a finger would be lifted to help Formosa effectively if it was attacked. The United States, Australia and other countries now committed to the right of the Formosan population not to be absorbed against its will by Peking would have to consider whether they could realistically afford to continue to tie themselves by treaty or in other ways to the support of Taiwan against armed attack. An attack by the mainland on Formosa would not be regarded by many members of the U.N. as an act of aggression if Peking were a member of the U.N. and Formosa was not a member. As it stands at present, the Planning Paper does not consider adequately the argument of the Chinese Nationalists and others that it is better not to compromise but instead simply to fight in the U.N. till the last and then walk out.
32. It would be useful too, for the Department to examine the various forms of status that Formosa could take in the future. I believe that the best from our point of view would be an independent, sovereign government limited to Taiwan, and that conclusion is probably enough for the Planning Paper itself. But other suggestions will no doubt be made during discussions in the corning months, and it would be well to have thought about them.
33. The Planning Paper also, I believe, needs to tackle in more concrete form what might be done by Australia to secure that, if Peking [is] seated in the U.N., Taiwan also continues to be a member. The Paper and perhaps supporting papers should discuss in a concrete way:
(a) What consultations should take place with other countries, e.g. the United States of America, other members of ASPAC, other countries in South East Asia, and so on. At what stage should such discussion take place through what channels, and on what points?
(b) What should be said to the Republic of China? Should there be joint approaches, and why? At what stage should we be brutally frank with them, both about their prospects if they go on with their present policies and about the prospects of our own continuing support?
(c) What terms should we be prepared to agree to with Peking? We would not give Peking everything they are asking for, as that would mean recognition of their de jure sovereignty over Formosa and a free hand to try to take it by force. But can we go as far as the Canadian formula? My own view, as things stand at this moment, is that that would go too far. But I suggest we should look at other concessions to Peking, which have not at present been talked about and which would give them something more as an inducement while at the same time removing potential causes of friction with Peking in future on points where we would be on a base untenable militarily and otherwise. Under that heading I have in mind letting Peking have the offshore islands and also the off-shore oil resources that are at present in dispute between Taiwan, Peking, and Japan.
(d) It would be desirable to attempt to draft a possible resolution for the U.N. General Assembly. Sometimes it is only when a text is actually being drafted that some of the points come before notice. I have in the past tried my hand at such a resolution, which is set out again and argued in my talk with Mr Marshall Green on 15th October, 1970, contained in my memorandum No. 1688.3 That draft resolution tries to build on an argument that there are really two successor states to the ‘Republic of China’ mentioned in the Charter. It is also drafted to ensure that Taiwan remains in the U.N. with the seat in the Security Council until such time as Peking actually takes its seat and, by taking it, indicates acceptance of the resolution which preserves a seat for Taiwan. The Planning Paper also needs to examine the extent to which a resolution of the Security Council, as distinct from one of the General Assembly, would be required.
(e) An examination is also required of the idea that all four divided nations—China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam—be seated in the U.N. as separate members. Some persons believe that a package deal, reflecting the principle of universality of membership, would have a chance of being accepted, and would have the additional advantage of being an aid to the solution of problems of at any rate Korea and Germany.
(f) Some reference might be made in the Paper to the idea that the seating of Peking in the Security Council should be accompanied by a reform of the Council’s membership and that some others, particularly Japan, should become permanent members. Mr Dean Rusk, if I remember correctly, used to hold that view when he was Secretary of State. He argued that the international community could not afford to have Peking in the Security Council as the sole spokesman for Asia. The change would of course require an amendment to the Charter of the U.N., but that might not be impossible if there was general agreement on seating Peking. But the idea has many implications that need examination, such as whether we really want any more permanent members, all with the right of veto.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ii]
1 The memorandum was also sent to a number of posts.
2 Document 149.
3 Document 139.