Canberra, 8 January 1971
Secret
PPG Paper1 on Australia’s Policy Towards China
With reference to your minute of 7th December,2 I have noted in pencil on the attached copy of the draft3 a number of comments on particular passages.
2. Following are comments on more general points:—
(a) The logic of the international situation and of our national interests points to movement towards the recognition of Peking and towards our assent to its admission to UN. The only serious domestic obstacle to this is likely to be the Government’s sensitivity to DLP views. It is difficult to decide how directly such a sensitive point of domestic politics can be discussed in a Cabinet submission, but we may have to take more account of it than the present draft does. For this reason, as well as others, it may not be realistic to talk of Australian recognition of Peking not later than the time of its admission to UN, which may well be in twelve months’ time. But an argument which might weigh even with the DLP (and consequently with Cabinet) is that we cannot afford to lag behind the US;
(b) The paper might emphasize more clearly that, in terms of our national interests, the future of Taiwan is of only very secondary importance, the more so because of the rigidity and unrealism of the ROC’s attitude. (It may be of greater importance in relation to DLP attitudes);
(c) Because of its security commitment to Taiwan, the US has less freedom of movement than we have. We have to be careful that the US does not get out ahead of us. But must we hold ourselves back because, in the last resort, the US may be unable to ‘abandon’ Taiwan (even a completely recalcitrant and unco-operative Taiwan)?;
(d) In opposing Peking’s entry to UN we have in the past expressed (i) need for ‘good behaviour bond’ and (ii) need to protect rights of Taiwan. Paper might recognize that (i) is unrealistic (most we will get is Peking’s acceptance of membership, with whatever that may imply in regard to principles of Charter), and that (ii) is dependent on practicalities, and in particular co-operation of Taiwan;
(e) As indicated by my pencilled comments on several parts of the draft, I think that we might put the emphasis more clearly on what we have to lose by standing still rather than on what we can hope to gain by moving;
(f) Despite para. 4 of your covering note, I feel that paper does need to discuss, at least in general terms, the prospects of various formulae aiming at protecting the interests of Taiwan. Cabinet’s basic policy decision needs to be taken against the background of the strong probability that it will not be practicable to preserve a seat for Taiwan in the UN and that we may need to determine our continuing attitude towards a Taiwan which will be out of the UN, which will retain only the thinnest of international recognition (if any) but which may retain de facto control over its island only because Peking is prepared to wait for it to ‘drop’ rather than going to the bother of forcibly occupying it.
(g) Although we have to prepare Cabinet’s mind for future movement in our position, including possible future initiatives, we may assume that it will be months before they are likely to bring themselves to any very concrete decisions. They will want to wait until we have a much more certain measure of the movement in international attitudes and until they know more about US and Japanese intentions. Our immediate requirement is enough general elastic to enable us to participate profitably in consultations with these countries and N.Z.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ii]
1 Document 149.
2 Not found. In what appears to have been a similar minute of the same day to Shann, Holdich wrote that the paper attempted to re-examine Australia’s China policy in light of the national interest. He added that views expressed earlier by McMahon had been taken into account and that the paper was long because the subject was a major one and because a comprehensive review had not occurred since 1955. In paragraph four of the note, Holdich commented that an attempt had been made to stay with the generalities of the China question; it was not the intention to discuss ‘largely hypothetical particulars’, such as a ‘two-China’ solution or a ‘package’ deal.
3 Not published.