Taipei, 18 March 1971
Secret
China Policy
Further to my telegram 1871 of 18 March, the following is a record of my talk with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs James Shen on 17 March.
2. Shen first wanted to talk about recent governmental changes in Australia.2 (He had early asked me for advice about the composition of the new Cabinet, no doubt with the particular purpose of sending early greetings to the new Minister for Foreign Affairs if appointed at this stage.) He is, as you know, personally interested in and knowledgeable about Australia. In this part of our talk, I touched on our economic problems such as inflationary trends, declining prices for primary products and so on, and mentioned the elections due in 1972. I also said I knew the ROC also had domestic problems on the China question, and am sure he took the point that it should do its best to cooperate with sympathetic countries wishing to help it.
3. He then asked what I could say about present Australian views on the China problems. I put the points in paragraph 1 of your telegram 2403 to him, and his [comments]4 were as reported in my telegram 187. We then discussed the ROC’s thinking in general terms. At the end, Shen recapitulated and summed up as follows the ‘present limits of the ROC’s official position, although there are of course no conclusions so far’:
(a) As protection against passage of the Albanian resolution, the ROC wanted the IQ used again. It thought it could pass this year with sufficient support from important countries. Shen would not be drawn into discussion of the inevitable day when it failed to pass.
(b) As a tactical means of drawing votes from the Albanian resolution (and possibly winning more support for the IQ), the ROC could accept that some of its friends might, if necessary, put forward a third resolution. The ROC would of course vote against such a resolution. (‘The best result for us would be to have the IQ resolution pass and both other resolutions be defeated’).
(c) The ROC purpose remained not only to retain its own seat but to keep Peking out of the UN. (ROC worry about US thinking on dual representation was lest the American purpose be to create a means for Peking to enter. ‘There may be a difference with the US on this.’ Shen spoke without heat and spoke on stock lines about consequences within the UN as well as for ROC’s position.) The ROC would therefore want a third resolution to have the effect of keeping Peking out. And it would not want any of its close friends to be ‘too closely associated with a third resolution. We will want their names (particularly the US, Japan and Australia) on the IQ resolution. We can leave it to other countries such as Belgium to put forward a third resolution’.
4. Other points of interest were as follows:
(a) To my comment that we had to consider what would happen when the IQ resolution would certainly fail, whether it was this year or next, Shen said only that the ROC thought it could pass this year, given sufficient support by friendly countries; ‘we will think about next year next year’. ( Comment : I shall try to explore Yang’s thinking on the contingency that it might fail this year when I see him at dinner, at his invitation on 18 March.)
(b) I asked Shen whether his stress on ‘tactics’ as a reason for possible ROC acceptance, if necessary, of a third resolution was because of the domestic problem of presentation here. He said that this was partly the problem but restated the ROC’s policy objections to anything really aimed at bringing the PRC into the United Nations. He said that, given present policies, the ROC had only ‘very limited’ room for tactical manoeuvre on the question (but seemed careful to avoid implying that it had no room and was utterly rigid in its position).
(c) Shen had seen Winthrop Brown only socially while here. However, the ROC was aware of US thinking on ‘dual representation’, namely that the question was one for the Chinese to settle for themselves, but that there were two authorities within [China].5 ‘Whatever it may be called, to us it is a two-Chinas approach’. ( Comment : Although the ROC’s policy objections to ‘two-Chinas’ have been publicly stated here, Shen did not on this occasion mention them to me. His main stress was on the ROC’s policy aim of keeping the PRC out of the UN. This may well represent a ROC tendency to accept the inevitability of an increasing number of countries dealing with both the PRC and ROC, as Japan and we do on trade matters. The things the ROC wants to avoid for as long as possible are probably (a) formal recognition of Peking by its former strong supporters and (b) the increase in the PRC’s prestige and the diminution of, and danger to the ROC’s own international position that would follow from Peking’s admission to the UN.
(d) In speaking of the ROC assessment that the IQ resolution would pass again, Shen spoke of the illogical step it would be for countries which had long said the question was important to say now that it was not; he went on to say, before I did, that he knew that the UN was a political and not a logical body. He also seemed to accept my laboriously obvious point that the main object of UN exercises was to win votes for the most acceptable outcome one could hope to achieve, and to be in a position where votes in future years could be best assured.
(e) The question of the Security Council seat was not touched on, and I gave no response to Shen’s remark that Belgium might put forward a third resolution.
5. There was one point of interest in regard to China policy in an earlier social conversation that day with Dr Paul King (Director, 2nd Bureau, Executive Yuan, and adviser and close confidante of Vice President C.K. Yen).6 Other points will be reported separately. King seemed eager to find an opportunity to tell me that the recent statements by C.K. Yen when answering interpellations in the Legislative Yuan did not represent the Executive Yuan’s private thinking on the overall China problem. King, largely by indirection, clearly implied that, because of domestic political considerations here, Yen took a more orthodox and seemingly rigid line than he and other members of the Executive really favoured.
6. In regard to Dr Wei Tao-ming’s retirement as Foreign Minister, King confirmed that his resignation had been accepted. He expected that a new appointment would be made very soon, as the position could not remain vacant for long in view of its importance. He thought that Chou Shu-kai, the ROC Ambassador in Washington, was a strong possibility for the position. Shen, without mentioning a possible successor (he is in the running himself), said he thought the new Minister would be appointed by the end of March or early April.
7. I hope to offer some comments on the present ROC position after further conversations (e.g. with Yang, McConaughy and Itagaki) in the coming week. I shall speak to Chiang Ching-kuo if a casual opportunity occurs, but consult you if I think it might seem useful to arrange a talk with him, e.g. at lunch.
8. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Washington, UN New York and Tokyo.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, vi]
1 It reported Shen’s summary to Dunn of the ROC’s official position on future voting in the United Nations on the China issue.
2 McMahon had succeeded Gorton as Prime Minister on 10 March, the latter becoming Minister for Defence. Leslie Bury became Minister for Foreign Affairs on 22 March from which date B.M. Snedden succeeded Bury as Treasurer.
3 24 March. Dunn was instructed—if he believed it would aid in further discerning US and ROC thinking, and if it could be done ‘without our assuming too prominent a role’ —to approach ROC authorities and say that ‘under no circumstances should anything be accepted which would deprive the ROC of membership of the UN’.
4 On the original, this word was handwritten (apparently by Dunn).
5 See footnote 4.
6 Yen Chia-kan, Prime Minister and Vice President of the ROC.