Canberra, 12 May 1971
Secret
China Policy
I attach the following papers:
- A submission on China policy, to which is attached
- A ‘balance sheet’ of advantages and disadvantages of Australia’s moving towards recognition of the PRC. 1
- A draft statement for possible inclusion in a public speech by the Prime Minister. 2
2. The submission was prepared before the Senior Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong had been instructed to apply to visit China.3 Mr Bareham’s visit will enable some testing of the atmosphere, but its importance will be primarily in the economic sphere. In our view, a separate political initiative, as set out in paragraph 21 (b) of our submission, is still required. This view is reinforced by the consideration that it would be physically impossible in the time available adequately to brief Mr Bareham on the wider context we have in mind.
Keith Waller
Secretary
Attachment
For the Prime Minister and Minister
CHINA—POLICY
The purpose of this submission is to review how Australia might appropriately advance—and be seen to advance—towards recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), at the same time as the problem of Chinese representation in the UN is under examination.
Background
2. Copies of our Cabinet submission of 15 April on China policy, and the decision thereon,4 and of a supplementary submission of 21 April to the Acting Minister,5 are attached. In these submissions, which built upon material in the basic Cabinet submission of 9 February,6 we recommended that, concurrently with public reference to our concern for the rights and interests of Taiwan, we needed also to stress the more positive aspects of our policy towards the PRC.
UN Representation
3. The Government has taken the position that the question of Chinese representation in the UN needs to be settled before the question of normalization of relations with the PRC. This of course does not mean that steps towards normalization cannot or should not be taken now. Indeed, with a problem as fluid and as complex as the China issue, we need:
(a) to protect ourselves against the possibility that any international effort to sustain the position of the ROC may fail; and
(b) to advance our own positive interests in relations with the PRC.
4. There has already been a marked shift in the international community towards the normalization of relations with the PRC. Since Canadian recognition last October, Italy, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Chile, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Kuwait have extended recognition. Turkey and Austria have begun discussions with the PRC on recognition.
5. There has also been some apparent movement in the position of many other countries, although it is too early to say how far this will extend. As our submission of 21 April indicated, we are having to revise downwards our estimate of likely support for a dual representation formula in the UN. Apart from the changes resulting from recognition (paragraph 4 above), it is now thought that Bolivia, Peru, the Netherlands, Greece, Sierra Leone and Lebanon are more likely to abstain on than to support a dual representation formula. Our most recent estimate (21 April) on the prospects of a dual representation formula was that, if the vote were taken then, voting in the best case might be 70 in favour, 50 against and 7 abstentions. If foreseeable waverers defected, the vote would be 57 in favour, 51 against, and 19 abstentions.
6. The erosion in support for the ROC is still continuing. Contact between the PRC and countries which do not recognize it is increasing. This has possible implications for both the representation and the recognition questions. Thus, increased contact has occurred in the cases of Iran (visit of Shah’s sister to China), Colombia (visit of table tennis team) and Peru (conclusion of a trade agreement and announcement by the President that Peru is studying the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC). On 24 April, the West German Defence Minister7 said that, in the not too distant future, the German Government would make it known that it rightly estimated China’s significance in the world. Malaysia has taken positive steps to encourage trade with the PRC, while maintaining its established policy of avoiding offence to both the PRC and ROC. There has also been some expression of interest in better relations with the PRC by some other South-East Asian leaders, such as the Indonesian Foreign Minister.
Policy of Japan and the United States
7. Amongst the countries with which we have been consulting most closely, both Japan and the United States have given the appearance of wishing to develop relations with the PRC—while at the same time not jettisoning their commitments to the ROC. There have been no major developments regarding New Zealand policy.
8. The Japanese Government has instructed Mr Noda,8 Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Committee on the China question, to investigate the possibility of forming a goodwill mission from the mainstream of the party to visit Peking. Noda is a member of the Nakasone9 faction but is also close to Sato. There are domestic political reasons for this development, and even if the PRC were to accept such a mission the Japanese Government would not necessarily be committed by its activities. On the other hand, Chinese acceptance of any mission associated with the mainstream or Sato would have an impact on Sino-Japanese relations.
9. This development, and a reported relaxation in the Japanese Government’s instructions to its diplomats abroad regarding social contacts with PRC officials, are significant. Nevertheless, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials have stressed to our Embassy in Tokyo that Prime Minister Sato is essentially cautious, that there has been no indication of any Chinese response to warrant abandonment of Taiwan, and that any restoration of relations with the PRC would not happen overnight but would need at least one or perhaps two years stiff bargaining.
10. Developments in US policy, principally the visit of the table tennis team and President Nixon’s relaxation of some restrictions on trade and travel on 14 April, were set out in our submission of 21 April. Since then, there have been some rather contrary indications as to the future trend of US policy; but, on balance, it seems that there has been no concerted move to check the thaw.
11. The more conservative aspects of US policy have been evidenced in the announcement by a high-level Presidential Commission that it had recommended that the PRC should be admitted to the General Assembly and Security Council, but that the US should ‘under no circumstances’ agree to the expulsion of Taiwan China from the General Assembly. The Secretary of State, Mr Rogers, also referred publicly on 28 April to the continuing US treaty commitment to the Republic of China and to ROC representation in the UN. In the same category was President Nixon’s disavowal of remarks by a State Department spokesman on 28 April that direct negotiation between Peking and Taipei was one way to resolve the dispute concerning sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other hand, the Secretary of State has also said that he hoped ‘a new chapter’ would open in relations between the US and PRC.
12. Although there have been press hints that President Nixon may soon conclude his review of the China problem, the impression is growing (and the suggestion has crept into press commentaries) that, while the US will support Taiwan this year in the UN, it may be reinsuring itself against failure and preserving its options by stressing publicly its desire for dialogue and a modus vivendi with the PRC. Certainly, the absence of a strong US lead has resulted in some erosion of support for the ROC in the last few months.
13. The position regarding US and Japanese policies on the China issue thus remains essentially unresolved. To some extent, both the US and Japan are reacting to events, and it would be premature to foreclose options for the future course of their policy this year—in the direction either of movement to the PRC or of positive support for the ROC’s position.
ROC Policy
14. The prospects for a dual representation resolution have not been improved by ROC intransigence. Where flexibility has been evidenced at the official level, it has been with a view towards acquiescence in a third resolution whose purpose would be to defeat the Albanian Resolution, but not towards acceptance of any resolution genuinely intended to seat both Chinas in the General Assembly and the PRC in the Security Council. President Chiang Kai-shek has failed to show even this limited flexibility. While it is still possible that the ROC may be willing to acquiesce in a ‘dual representation’ resolution when the crunch comes—and just conceivably in one which would seat the PRC in the Security Council—it is also prudent to recognize that the ROC may not make any such concession at all and may prefer to walk out of the UN.
Australian Policy
15. If China is admitted to the UN, there is likely to be a scramble involving many countries to establish diplomatic relations with it. In view of Australia’s past policies towards the PRC, the latter is unlikely, as matters now stand, to give us any precedence in any queue that develops for the restoration of diplomatic relations.
16. In our Cabinet submission of 9 February, we set out the economic and political arguments in favour of movements towards normalization of Australia’s relations with the PRC. These arguments are further developed in the attachment to this submission. It takes the form of a balance of the advantages and disadvantages of Australian recognition of the PRC, preceded , on the one hand, by an exploratory dialogue with the PRC and, on the other, by proper notice and explanation to the US, Japan and friendly Asian governments. It is based on the assumption that, whatever non-diplomatic contacts (consular or commercial, official or unofficial) we may be able to maintain with Taiwan, recognition of the PRC will almost certainly entail the termination of diplomatic relations with the ROC. A reversal of policy of this kind would give rise to some diplomatic embarrassment, but embarrassment would be greater if we were to persevere in a policy that could lead to Australia’s isolation and prejudice the long-term development of relations with the PRC. The upshot of the balance sheet seems clearly to lie in favour of the early initiation of moves towards recognition of the PRC.
17. In paragraphs 7 to 13 above, we have indicated that the US and Japan have been able to assume positive attitudes on the China question, although their basic policies remain unresolved and their respective commitments to Taiwan so far unchanged. In paragraphs 15 and 16 above, and in the attachment, we have indicated our own long-term interest in relations with the PRC and, for this reason, in avoiding isolation. These considerations lead to the conclusion that we need now to make a more positive demonstration of our interest in the normalization of relations with the PRC.
18. For purposes of discussion of the next steps, public presentation can to some extent be treated separately from the substance.
19. Economic and political considerations, including our trading requirements, the likelihood that the PRC will before long attain the Security Council seat, and the further likelihood of accelerated recognitions of the PRC, in non-Communist Asia as well as elsewhere, indicate that Australia will also be obliged sooner or later to enter into a dialogue with Peking. There would be advantage therefore in our making an early public reference (as the US and Japan have already done) to our interest in beginning a dialogue with the PRC regarding the steps that might be taken towards our long-term objective of achieving a normalization of relations. A passage to this effect has been included in the more positive statement which, at Cabinet’s request, we have drafted and circulated to the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Trade and Industry, and Primary Industry.
20. The procedures and substance of the dialogue would clearly require further examination. On the face of it, initial contact could be made through Ambassadors in a capital where both Australia and the PRC are represented. The Chinese could be informed that we wished to discuss matters of interest to both countries. It needs to be recognized from the outset, however, that, although we might begin with such peripheral matters as the regularization of visa arrangements, the Francis James case,10 and procedures to be followed in the event of the hijacking into Chinese air-space of an Australian civil airliner, the Chinese would be unlikely to be interested in pursuing the conversation unless we were willing to tackle the central issue of recognition. On present indications, a dialogue on this issue would most probably result in the Chinese standing firm on their position, in the hope that public and parliamentary pressure would build up in Australia and cause the Government to make concessions.
21. Notwithstanding the balance of advantages and disadvantages indicated in the attachment and summarized in paragraph 16 above, we are publicly committed to doing what we can to protect the rights and separate existence of Taiwan. It is suggested, therefore, that the actual establishment of a dialogue should be approached slowly and cautiously. There seem to be two alternative initial steps:
(a) In order to test the atmosphere on wider issues, we could seek contacts at the commercial level by offering, without preliminaries, to send to Peking either a senior official of the Department of Trade & Industry or the Australian Government Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong (the then Trade Commissioner visited Peking in 1956). Given the impending announcement of the Government’s decision to revise the list of goods at present subject to export control, the Chinese might be responsive to such an offer. The main foreseeable problem is the indication given by the Chinese to Australian journalists and Dr Jackson11 that the Chinese Government’s assessment of our political attitudes will be a major factor in their future willingness to enter into commercial dealings with us.
(b) We could instruct our Ambassador in an appropriate capital to indicate to his PRC colleague that we are interested in a progressive normalization of relations. He would say that as a first step, we would like to expand our contacts with China in other areas, including the commercial. To this end, and with this understanding, we would be prepared to send a senior Trade official to the Mainland for talks. We should also like to see increased contacts through exchanges of visitors and in the cultural field.
The latter procedure seems to have the advantage of placing the preliminary contacts in a wider context from the outset. If (as discussed in paragraph 20 above) the Chinese prove reluctant to talk at all except on the subject of recognition, we would still, like the Japanese, have shown our interest in detente. This would have presentational advantages. It would also be the starting point if later we decided to pursue the question of recognition with a view to its speedy conclusion.
Recommendations
22. In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that:
(a) at the earliest appropriate opportunity, a public statement should be made indicating our interest in opening a dialogue with the PRC regarding the steps that might be taken towards our long-term objective of achieving a normalization of relations (a statement, including a passage to this effect, has already been drafted and circulated to interested Departments);
(b) the Department should prepare for urgent submission to Cabinet an examination of the possibilities and modalities of initiating a dialogue with the PRC on matters of mutual interest. Primary attention should be given to the cautious but broadly contexted approach outlined in paragraph 2l(b) above;
(c) the Department should prepare a submission to Cabinet, recommending that Australian representatives abroad should be authorized to make contact freely with Chinese (PRC) representatives at functions held by third parties, to accept invitations from Chinese (PRC) representatives abroad, and to extend invitations to Chinese (PRC) representatives to National Day or other social functions, with the same security provisos as apply to contact with Soviet officials;
(d) the Minister for Trade & Industry should be asked to examine the possibility of sending a trade mission to China, or inviting a Chinese trade mission here, at an early date, or of taking other relevant measures to improve trade, and make a submission to Cabinet thereon.
Keith Waller
Secretary
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, ix]
1 Not published. The paper is summarised in paragraph 16 of the submission.
2 The draft statement noted events that appeared to indicate the PRC’s growing willingness to engage on reasonable terms with the ‘rest of the world’ but cautioned against the assumption that this included Australia and its allies. Attention was drawn to Chinese propaganda against ‘US aggressors and all their running dogs’ and to the view that Chinese subversion and insurgency in the region had presented a major obstacle to the establishment of formal relations. However, the PRC’s importance was acknowledged and normalisation of relations was listed as a long-term goal. To this end, Australia would seek to explore the possibility of dialogue with the PRC without prejudicing the view that Taiwan’s status and rights had to be protected. Finally, hope was expressed that the Government’s examination of trade restrictions with China would result in expansion of trade, while also contributing to the objective of normalisation.
3 In Cablegram 692 (6 May) Anthony had instructed Bareham to apply for permission to enter the PRC in order to visit the Canton Trade Fair.
4 Document 172. For reference to the submission of 15 April, see footnote 1 of the same document.
5 Document 171.
6 Document 157.
7 Helmut Schmidt.
8 Noda Takeo.
9 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Chairman, Executive Council, Japanese Liberal–Democratic Party.
10 See footnote 6, Document 137.
11 R.G. Jackson, Senior Executive officer of CSR and Vice President of the Australia–Japan Business Co-operation Committee, had organised the visit of an Australian table tennis team to Japan. Cablegram 646 (10 May) from Hong Kong reported a conversation between the post and the former Australian diplomat, Gregory Clark, who had apparently persuaded Jackson in Japan to accept an invitation to the team to visit the PRC. Clark and journalists travelling to the PRC with the table tennis team had had impromptu discussions with Chou En-lai who remarked that China preferred to buy wheat from ‘its friends, which did not include Australia’.