Washington, 25 June 1971
3393. Secret
China
Today I asked Alexis Johnson (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) whether there had been any development in the United States Government’s thinking about the China question. He replied that there had been sounds1 of a number of Governments and these had been widened since the Americans had first spoken to Australia about their current approach. He thought that the United States might be able to talk to us again in a couple of weeks’ time. I asked whether he thought the United States would still be sticking then to the approach that they had already put to us and he replied that his current assessment was that they would be. He added the dilemma of the President was that if the proposal was likely to fail anyway there might be no advantage in the United States abandoning the line it had taken in previous years. By failing, Johnson means Communist China being seated and Taiwan going out of the United Nations.
2. I then said that I had seen some indication of official thinking in Canberra though it could not necessarily be taken as the view that the Government itself would settle on. I outlined in general terms the points that you asked in your telegram No. 3105 should be made to the Americans2 and I said that this would be outlined in more detail by an officer of the Embassy at a lower level in the State Department.
3. Johnson commented that he could understand our view about weakness resulting from no mention being made in the resolution to the Chinese seat on the Security Council. However Taiwan would not go along with a resolution which contained such a reference. The United States regarded it as important to find a position in which Nationalist China would acquiesce. The Americans would like your views on how this is to be achieved if there is to be a reference to the Security Council seat.
4. Johnson said it was an indisputable fact that the General Assembly had no authority to determine credentials for representatives on the Security Council. I replied that that was so but that the Assembly had power to make recommendations. I put to Johnson as my personal thoughts the view which I had expressed in memorandum No. 1360 to Canberra,3 namely that hitherto we had been able to hold the Security Council back by saying that each United Nations body should look to the General Assembly for a lead and should not act on its own but that if we emphasized that each body could decide credentials for itself the Security Council might seat Peking. Johnson replied that he had seen a lot of projections by experts in the United Nations sections of the State Department which showed that even if the General Assembly adopted the resolution which the Americans now had in mind, the subsequent seating of Peking in the Security Council would be a slow process and would not by any means follow automatically. Johnson felt convinced that Peking would not apply for membership of the Security Council and would wait to be invited to sit. It would be possible to delay its seating by saying that there was only one Government submitting credentials. There were many other delaying and obstructing devices. I commented that this might be so but that I did not think that public opinion in either Australia or the United States would remain patient if technicalities were persisted in to block the seating of Peking after it had a seat in the Assembly. Johnson replied that he knew that it would be only a question of time.
5. Looking back over my conversation with Johnson there seem to be two potential differences in approach between Australia and the United States. The first is the lesser one just mentioned that the United States is not really thinking of facilitating seating Peking on the Security Council even if the American resolution is adopted. The second could be more serious and needs careful weighing in Canberra. Paragraph 16 of Annex A of your memorandum 690 of 21 June4 (which of course I did not mention to Johnson) virtually implies that the Australian Government wants to be able to vote for the seating of Peking in the United Nations whether or not Taiwan remains a member. The United States on the other hand would make its vote for the continued membership of Taiwan the prime consideration and the United States would not see any advantage to itself in Peking becoming a member of the United Nations if Taiwan is not also a member. The United States does not at present have any intention of seeking to establish diplomatic relations with Mainland China if Peking makes it a condition that the United States should sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That may also be Australia’s view, and you may well feel that Peking should be in the United Nations even if Australia had no diplomatic relations with it and was still in diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The United States Government at present seems to believe that Australia would not be contemplating severing its diplomatic relations with Taiwan even if doing so was the only way to establish diplomatic relations with the Mainland. The United States would be unpleasantly impressed to hear, as you say in paragraph 16 of Annex A of your memorandum referred to, that Australia need not be unduly disturbed by defeat of the resolution to keep Taiwan in the United Nations since in effect we would have gone through the motions of voting for it.
6. It seems therefore that the United States desire to have a single resolution and your desire to have two separate resolutions reflect a real difference in objectives. The United States is prepared to vote for seating Peking only if it can simultaneously vote for seating Taiwan also. Your approach is designed to enable you to vote in favour of seating Peking whether or not Taiwan is also seated. This thinking has not been expressed by the Embassy to the United States but will emerge if we have to defend our ‘two-resolution’ approach against their ‘oneresolution’ approach.
Plimsoll.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xiv]
1 The word ’sounds’ should presumably read ’soundings’.
2 On 25 June, Plimsoll was instructed to put to the Americans the points contained in subparagraphs (i) to (v) of paragraph 20 (b), Document 198. He was also asked to broach a number of technical points with regard to the US draft resolution, including that Australia preferred two separate resolutions—one that would invite the PRC to take a seat in the Assembly and in the Security Council and another that would protect the ROC from expulsion. Plimsoll was informed that all points were to be made without commitment to the Government.
3 Not found.
4 Presumably, paragraph 16 of Annex A to Document 198. The paragraph argued that the advantages of a ‘two resolutions’ approach from Australia’s point of view were that the PRC and ROC would not be linked together in one resolution; it would therefore be easier for Australia to demonstrate that the positive aspect of its policy was to seat the PRC. It argued that a single resolution covering both the PRC’s entry into the United Nations and the ROC’s continuing membership would make it harder for Australia to demonstrate that its policy was not determined exclusively by the latter objective. A single resolution calling for the seating of the PRC was, moreover, assured of support and, if a separate resolution seeking to maintain the ROC in the United Nations failed, Australia could show by having voted for it, that it had not abandoned the ROC.