Manila, 16 July 1971
960. Confidential Priority
For Prime Minister from Bury.1
Chinese Representation
Japanese Position
The Japanese Delegation Leader (former Foreign Minister Aichi) called on me on 15th July to ask about Australian views on this question. He stressed that time was running out if any new approach were to be adopted and noted that the Albanians had already put in their resolution. Japan had not yet adopted any final position.
2. I outlined our present thinking, stressing that we regarded the entry of Peking and its accession to the Security Council seat as inevitable, if not this year then in 1972, and that we would not oppose this. At the same time I said that we wanted, if at all possible, to keep Taiwan as a member although it was not clear whether the ROC would acquiesce in the seating of Peking in the Security Council.
3. Aichi said that for Japan the most important consideration was to try everything possible to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. But Taiwan’s present position was that it would on no account agree to Peking’s getting the Security Council seat. Japan also felt that this would be undesirable and wanted if possible to prevent it.
4. In reply I said that we too would prefer not to see Peking in the Security Council but could not see how to stop it. It was in any case very difficult to complete our ideas on tactics until the United States had decided on its own approach. We had been urging the United States to come to a decision but we were still waiting and time was running short.
5. Aichi agreed that an early and firm United States decision was essential if effective joint action was to be taken with Japan, Australia and other like-minded countries. Japan had been considering as one practical possibility a resolution to declare the expulsion of Taiwan an important question. Asked for our view on this I said that we doubted whether such a resolution on its own would carry. It might succeed if the United States came in now and gave it strong support, but even then its success was by no means assured.
6. Aichi said he had mentioned this possibility only as an example. He had the impression that within the United States Administration there were a number of differing positions and that no final decision had been reached among the following possibilities:
(a) A simple dual representation resolution without reference to the Security Council seat.
(b) A DR resolution preserving the Security Council seat for Taiwan.
(c) A resolution providing for admission of the PRC but requiring a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of Taiwan.
In answer to my question Aichi said that Japan had reached no firm views but was inclined to prefer (a) above. He added that Vice Minister Hogen2 would shortly be visiting Canberra and would be briefed for detailed discussions of the problem with Australian officials.
ROC position
7. Aichi was followed by ROC Foreign Minister, Chow Shu-kai who argued strenuously and at length against any solution that would give the Security Council seat to Peking.
8. Chow argued that the PRC was losing momentum in its drive for international support through the establishment of bilateral relations. He asserted that the PRC had made no headway in its negotiations with Turkey and Iran, that its contact with Peru was limited to trade only and that Malaysia was now taking a more cautious attitude than two or three months ago. He mentioned parenthetically that his Government had told Turkey that it would like to maintain bilateral relations if possible after Turkey established relations with Peking but that if Turkey recognised the PRC as the sole legal government of China the ROC would have no choice but to break off.
9. Referring to the internal situation on the mainland Chow argued that it was far from stabilised. He referred to the purge of Chen Po-ta3 and to the fact that Party committees had not been established in four provinces in time for the Party’s 50th Anniversary on 1st July. The Party was not in control. During the Cultural Revolution the voting pattern at the UN had stabilised. There could be further disturbances on the mainland with the same effect on voting at the UN.
10. At the same time Chow accepted the possibility that the old ‘Important Question’ resolution might not succeed this year and that new tactics might be necessary. He said that the ROC could be flexible about a new approach and asked our views.
11. After outlining our approach to the normalisation of relations with the PRC and the stage now reached in the dialogue, I said that our assessment was that there would a large majority by 1972, if not this year, for the admission of the PRC to the UN with the Security Council seat. We thought this could not reasonably be avoided—the tide was too strong. Australia had so far thought that it would be in the interests of the ROC to stay on in the UN even without the Security Council seat. We were concerned at what we understood to be their position that if the PRC entered the Security Council the ROC would walk out.
12. Chow said that this was the firm position of his Government. The issue of the Security Council seat went to the whole raison d‘etre of the ROC and its domestic situation. If they were to acquiesce in the seating of Peking in the Security Council they would be discredited in the eyes of their own people on Taiwan, among the overseas Chinese, within the governing elite and on the mainland itself. The whole constitutional structure of the ROC would also be called in question. The ROC had now concluded at the highest level that they must walk out if the Security Council seat were lost. But if it could be kept they were willing to discuss possible formulas with their friends.
13. I said that we had been considering how to keep the ROC in the United Nations after Peking had come in, acceding to the Security Council. In the light of what Chow had said, was it vain for us to keep on trying. Chow said he was afraid so and reiterated that without the Security Council seat his Government’s domestic position would be untenable. He then said that he wondered whether it would be possible with the support of friendly countries to secure the passage of a resolution to the effect that the retention of the ROC’s position in the UN was an important question. He suggested that this might command reasonable support if others brought in a resolution for the simple admission of Peking or for dual representation.
14. Chou also said that in his farewell call on President Nixon he had stressed that the Security Council seat should not go to Peking. He added that Nixon was not convinced at that time that the old Important Question would fail. Chow believed that the United States would only make a proposal that the ROC could live with. Meanwhile they were awaiting advice of the final United States decision. Until this was forthcoming the ROC favoured pursuing quiet diplomacy and not making too many public statements.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38/18, xv]
1 Bury was attending a meeting of ASPAC, 14–16 July.
2 Hogen Shinsaku, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister.
3 This is a reference to the political campaign waged by supporters of Mao Tse-tung against Chen Po-ta (or Chen Boda), a member of the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee and ally of Lin Biao.