New York, 22 July 1971
UN547. Secret Eclipse
Chinese Representation
Your 729.1
In considering our tactics at the General Assembly, we think it important to bear in mind that for the majority of countries which have at no time played any real part in the private consultations between the co-sponsors of the traditional IQ and the Albanian resolutions respectively, the tactical situation must appear not much different from last year’s. They will have noted that the draft Albanian resolution has already been formally submitted, and will no doubt expect that, as on previous occasions, a procedural resolution making Chinese representation an important question will eventually be likewise submitted. In these circumstances, though they are aware that some official consideration has been given by the United States and others to the formulation of substantive and revised procedural resolutions aimed at preserving a seat for ROC, they will not have gone back to their capitals for instructions or guidance until these proposals take more concrete form. As a result we shall be faced, if we are to proceed with the tabling of draft resolutions different from the traditional IQ, with difficulties not only in lobbying for support, because of the shortage of time, but also because of the disadvantageous tactical situation in which we shall find ourselves at the Assembly.
2. In our earlier conversations with United States officials on tactical matters, we have noted their emphasis on 1) the need to start off with a clean slate, including inscription of a new item, 2) the possible benefits flowing from a state of ‘confusion’ in the Assembly’s consideration of this item, and 3) the necessity to secure priority for any initiative launched by our side. In view of the fact that there is still no agreed position between the co-sponsors of the traditional IQ on the number, contents or phrasing of new resolutions, that the co-sponsors of the PRC’s entry have already stolen a march with their substantive proposal, and that we are more than ever on the defensive, we are inclined to think that our prospects for successfully carrying through a campaign to win support will recede even further unless steps are taken in the near future to halt the drift in favour of seating the PRC on its own terms.
3. In the first place, it is no longer possible to start again from scratch, since the customary item has already been inscribed, and if an additional item on the same question were to be submitted we would face the possibility of a procedural tussle both in the General Committee and General Assembly, since it would be necessary to combine the items to ensure that our proposals were considered at the same time as the Albanian draft resolution. Secondly, confused procedural situations do not usually benefit delegations accustomed to an orderly and parliamentary conduct of business, but could be taken advantage of by any representative with maverick proclivities to produce a result which might be ultimately satisfactory to no one. Thirdly, the loss of automatic priority for any draft resolutions we may table puts us in a distinctly unfavourable position, because the Albanian resolution already at present can be assumed to command the support of a simple majority.
4. In order to have any substantive DR proposal taken up first the General Assembly would have to vote on a procedural resolution giving it priority. There clearly exists a risk that this attempt might fail. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a draft ‘Non–Expulsion’ IQ resolution would necessarily be considered a purely procedural proposal. It could be argued, as some representatives have already hinted to us, that since the Republic of China per se (underline two) is not a member of the United Nations (notwithstanding Articles 23 and 110 of the Charter)2 but is the government claiming to represent the member State of China, a resolution, whose objective was to make the expulsion of a government an important question had no legal and therefore no procedural justification, but by attempting to confer de facto (underline two) membership on a government was in fact a substantive proposal. In a case such as this it would be possible to imagine two courses for resolving this point, either by a ruling from the President or by a vote in the General Assembly on whether or not a ‘Non-Expulsion’ resolution was a matter of procedure. In either eventuality the chances of a vote going against us should not be discounted not the least because such a move could be construed and denounced as a gimmick to keep ROC in the United Nations.
5. For these reasons we share your view not only that any draft proposals submitted by our side should be straightforward and unambiguous and3 that we should at all costs avoid creating or finding ourselves associated with a disorderly procedural wrangle which could adversely affect the outcome of the debate as well as reflect unfavourably upon the Presidency of Foreign Minister Malik and backfire against us. Unless the co–sponsors of the traditional IQ find themselves able to draft agreed proposals in time for an energetic campaign for support to be mounted amongst the governments of member states, and for the chances of success to be evaluated, I think we would be wise to study carefully the desirability of initiating and being seen to sponsor any moves which might leave us in a position of some isolation through the risk that they would be decisively defeated.
6. Ogiso’s4 account to me yesterday, 21st July, of his meetings in Washington with Green and De Palma5 accorded with what you had received. In addition, Ogiso got the impression that De Palma showed more relish for a fight to save the ROC seat, and more optimism of success, than did Green. For example, De Palma seemed to believe that some form of IQ or ‘Non–Expulsion’ proposal should have a good chance of success if energetically worked for, and ought to be employed. Green on the other hand seemed to be sceptical and gave Ogiso the impression of being somewhat half–hearted about the whole exercise. (Ogiso, who is normally in charge of economic matters at the Japanese Mission, is at present pinch–hitting for new Ambassador Nakagawa,6 who is ill.)
7. As seen from here there is little question that President Nixon’s initiative, whatever its longer–term potentialities, has caused a further sharp erosion of the ROC’s prospects of remaining in the UN. First reactions of delegates tend to vary between smug satisfaction among all-out supporters of Peking and almost fatalistic acceptance of the inevitable by those who would like to help the ROC, to the point where it is hard to persuade them that the situation could still be saved by prompt action and energetic lobbying. Even the Belgian Ambassador expressed doubt to me yesterday whether there would in the end be any need for a debate on China this year.
The Soviet Mission remains very delphic.
Mcintyre.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, ii]
1 22 July. It gave details of a conversation between State Department and Japanese officials in Washington, during which tactics in the UN General Assembly were discussed.
2 Article 110(4) asserts that states signatory to the Charter of 1945 (which included the ROC) would, after they had ratified it, become original members of the United Nations.
3 Presumably, this should read ‘but’.
4 Ogiso Mooto, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, New York.
5 Samuel De Palma, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.
6 Nakagawa Toru succeeded Ogiso as Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, New York.