Washington, 3 August 1971
4180. Secret Priority
Chinese Representation
Our 4181.1
We put to Americans view that draft United States DR resolution seemed over–cluttered. They explained that introductory clauses had been intended as ‘catch–all’ to attract as wide sympathy as possible. It might be possible to exclude one or more later (see AUSTUNAT’S UN5712 just to hand). Equally, if useful support might accrue as a result, it was possible to conceive of additional points being added.
2. Americans said that reference to Security Council could be added later if this was generally desired. Feldman confirmed to us privately (please protect) that State Department was now strongly in favour of including reference to Security Council but had agreed to leave it out from initial draft under ROC pressure. ROC argued in effect that, if reference to Security Council had to be included, then it should be done by someone other than United States. Feldman’s implication was that, if Australia believed such reference desirable, then we should continue to press strongly for it.
3. Americans were firmly opposed to use of Albanian resolution, on ground that it was unnecessarily offensive, even without second half (for example, references to ‘restoration of legal rights’ of PRC, ‘restore all its rights’ to PRC etc.). They believed furthermore that first half taken by itself could be taken to imply expulsion of ROC, and agreed that there was a danger of action being taken in Credentials Committee to thrust out ROC representatives on these grounds. They also agreed that possibility of action against ROC being taken in any event in Credentials Committee would need to be watched.
4. Apart from these considerations, they did not believe that it would be possible to ’sell’ to the American people a vote in favour of Albanian resolution framed in its present offensive terms.
5. Speaking privately again (please continue to protect), Feldman said that he could not conceive of serious consideration being given to tactics involving use of Albanian resolution, except possibly as very last resort if everything else had failed, in which case it might be felt that effort to split up Albanian resolution was better than nothing.
6. Green and De Palma stressed that, stories about a ‘deal’ between Kissinger and Chou En–lai notwithstanding, United States intended to do everything it could to ensure continued ROC membership of United Nations.
7. Asked about United States sponsorship of resolutions, he implied that no firm decision had yet been taken on this and asked our views. We stressed strongly that we believed United States sponsorship absolutely essential since, apart from any other consideration, there were likely to be a number of missions who would not be prepared to come forward on their own account without protective umbrella which United States could provide. De Palma indicated that he understood this point.
8. In answer to his question as to whether we regarded Japanese sponsorship as also necessary, we said that this would no doubt be useful in regional terms, but not essential in sense that United States sponsorship was.
9. We drew attention to extreme brevity on3 draft IQ resolution, and reiterated our preference for ‘Non–Expulsion’ terminology. Americans took latter point, but said that brevity had been intentional, to keep resolution as simple as possible.
10. We asked Americans whether phraseology of operative clauses (1) and (2) were not open to interpretation that they did not actually seat (underlined) respective countries. However, Americans did not believe that, in practical terms, any member would raise this point.
11. In answer to question about status of two draft resolutions, De Palma said that they represented State Department’s ‘preferred position’, but that they were certainly open to amendment.
12. Americans indicated that final decision had not yet been taken as to whether separate new item should be inscribed, or whether discussion could be conducted under item already inscribed by Albania. Overall feeling however, seemed to be in favour of avoiding struggle in General Committee if possible. Fact that title of Albanian item was offensive was not regarded as necessarily decisive, since members had long since become used to item on topic and whatever the exact title, were most likely to refer to, and think of, it just as ‘the China item’.
13. It was agreed that it was better to deal with the issue in as straightforward a manner as possible, since confusion or excessive subtlety was most likely to end by enhancing Albanian prospects.
14. De Palma and Green anticipated that United States Mission in New York would be making main running on issue from this point.
15. Throughout discussion, we stressed tentative nature of our comments, and that they were being offered without commitment.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xviii]
1 3 August. It detailed part of the discussion Mcintyre had with State Department officials in Washington. Cablegram 4181 appears to have been sent before Cablegram 4180.
2 3 August. It indicated that the United States had changed its draft DR resolution (Document 227) by deleting the seventh preambular paragraph and by deleting from the third operative paragraph the words from ‘in accordance with’ up to and including ‘(14 December 1950)’.
3 The word ‘on’ should presumably read ‘of’.