New York, 7 August 1971
UN584. Secret
China—Representation
Your telegram 781.1
We went through your questions with United States Mission (Newlin)2 on 6 August. He made notes of all questions and is referring them to Washington for further examination. The following reflects his preliminary comments.
2. Your paragraph 1.
(i) United States have not attempted arithmetic since announcement of Nixon visit to Peking. Newlin expressed skepticism about some of the figures presented in the past, particularly the Japanese figures on the simple and complex DR’s, and thought there was little point in attempting more arithmetic until governments had had an opportunity to study draft resolutions carefully and until further bilateral consultations had taken place. Position is not so much a ‘belief’ that Albanian can be defeated and DR carried, as a feeling, based partly on consultations, partly on intuition, that a majority of members, while wanting to see PRC come in, want also to be able to preserve a seat for the ROC. Newlin mentioned Akwei3 of Ghana who, he said, had responded most sympathetically to the United States drafts. Mission recognises that for some the wish to have PRC come in will be stronger than wish to preserve place for ROC and that, in consequence, a series of uncompromising statements out of Peking could affect their votes. At same time he remarked that NCNA 4 August response could have been worse and that with hard lobbying, particularly by United States but also by all who strongly wished to keep option of place open for ROC, Mission hoped majority would be found.
(ii) Answer to this is related to above. Whether priority can be obtained for Non–Expulsion resolution will depend primarily on whether majority at time of voting wish to preserve a place for ROC if possible. Newlin considers that more members will be willing in advance to vote in accordance with their convictions on the Non–Expulsion resolution than on the DR, because with the latter they are likely to be less sure in advance of the result. Chances of getting a majority may thus be slightly strengthened by procedural nature of Non–Expulsion resolution. Mission recognises, however, that question of precedence will almost certainly have to come to a vote, that any ruling by the President on this would be challenged.
(iii) United States does not (underlined) acknowledge that DR cannot get priority over Albanian. They consider this will depend on whether or not at the time majority seems to exist for non–expulsion of ROC. That is, if the approach proposed in the United States resolutions seems to be a viable one, then priority should be sought for both resolutions. If Non–Expulsion resolution cannot get precedence, then certainly DR will not and position will be virtually lost. If, however, Non–Expulsion gets precedence and is adopted, they consider there is good reason to think DR might then get precedence over Albanian. In any case it is not being suggested at this stage that the opportunity of voting in parts on the Albanian be foregone in advance. That will be a matter of tactics to be decided on during the course of the debate. United States recognises that, if DR does not get precedence, request for ruling on status of Albanian (that is, in the event of prior adoption of the Non–Expulsion resolution), possible submission of amendments to Albanian, or request for separate vote on second or both parts will all have to be considered. United States accepts validity of your explanatory comment on this question.
(iv) Newlin admits that on this question Mission was engaging in what he described as ‘constructive ambiguity’. Reference to Article 30 left open (from ROC point of view) the question of how United States would act in the Security Council. Reference to Article 27.24 would pin them down. ICJ advisory opinion referred to was that of 20 July 1962 concerning ‘certain expenses of the United Nations’ in which Court held view that ‘each organ must, in the first place at least determine its own jurisdiction’. Security Council would be entitled to determine its own composition, although in making this determination, Council members would no doubt wish to take into account any recommendation made by the General Assembly.
3. Your paragraph 2.
(i) Mission considers that question of precedence will inevitably come to a vote, whether President is prepared to give ruling or not.
(ii) Newlin considered tactic might be that, if Non–Expulsion resolution had not obtained precedence and Albanian had been put to a vote and had obtained a majority, then after President had announced vote but before he had declared the resolution adopted, point of order should be taken seeking ruling on status of resolution in view of two–thirds majority requested in Non–Expulsion resolution still to be considered. Newlin recognised this would be ‘last desperate effort’ and, if solid majority obtained by Albanian, unlikely to succeed.
(iii) Newlin felt that this also depended essentially on what kind of solution there is a majority for. There seems to be no procedural reason why the Assembly should not itself decide to vote on the second part first. We would suggest however, that you consider whether there may not be advantages in voting on the first part first. Key voters of the kind you refer to in your para 1 (iii) may well want to demonstrate first (underlined) their readiness to admit the PRC and only afterwards (underlined) their feeling that a seat should be preserved for the ROC.
(iv) Newlin could only respond to this in a very preliminary way. On the one hand he felt that if there was a solid majority for the Albanian resolution, then that majority would be able to put through whatever course of action it chose. On the other, he thought it would be most unusual for a vote to begin on a resolution presented in a certain form and then, after a part had been voted on, to defer a vote on the remainder or have the remainder withdrawn by its sponsors. He felt such action would inevitably be challenged, though the result of the challenge would be dependent on the strength of the Albanian vote.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/19, ii]
1 Document 233.
2 M.H. Newlin, Counsellor, US Mission to the United Nations, New York.
3 R.M. Akwei, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, New York.
4 See footnote 3, Document 233.