New York, 18 August 1971
UN608. Secret
Chinese Representation
As forecast in my 605,1 I spoke yesterday, 17th August, with Scott (New Zealand)2 and canvassed the suggestions on draft resolutions and tactics in your 809.3 Scott gave me the essence of New Zealand views as conveyed to him by telegram supplemented by telephone conversation with Laking4 the previous evening. According to Scott, his Government felt:
(i) That with the Americans now clearly ‘off and running’ it might be best not to risk slowing them down by trying to dissuade them from their own proposals on drafts and tactics, except to propose amendments (e.g. reference to Security Council seat) which we would regard as essential,
(ii) that the Americans’ proposals were conceived in accordance with a line of calculation and reasoning to which they had become fairly firmly wedded and from which they would not find it easy to depart, and
(iii) that we would be better off fighting on our own ground than on the opposition’s (e.g. the AR).
2. I subsequently saw Bush (United States Permanent Representative) in company with two of his China advisers, Newlin and Miss McSweeney.5 I asked them first whether they really believed that priority could be got for a draft alternative to the AR. They said they believed it could—provided there was an identifiable majority in favour of retention of the ROC seat, and even allowing for possible slippage in a procedural battle. They firmly believed that the attempt must at any rate be made.
3. As regards your preference for living with the Albanian resolution provided the last portion could be defeated by separate vote, they all thought this would be highly dangerous. They believed that even in truncated form its repeated reference to ‘restoration of the lawful rights’, ‘only lawful representatives of China’ and ‘only legitimate representatives’ would seriously militate against preservation of ROC seat, even following adoption of IQ resolution. For one thing difficulties could arise in Credentials Committee. They did not see it as lending itself to acceptable amendments. The separate vote exercise should only be used as last resort.
4. We discussed your two draft resolutions as preferable alternatives to United States drafts. While fully acknowledging the care and thought that you have given them, they do not favour either ahead of their own. They feel that your draft NE savours too much of the approach of the old IQ. They want to approach the question in terms of a slightly different concept. They want to get away altogether from the word ‘expulsion’ and concentrate on ‘right of representation’ (having regard for ‘existing factual situation’), as in their draft DR. (This is one reason why they prefer to refer to ‘IQ’ rather than ‘NE’). Thus they see virtue in their own very simple draft, which avoids any mention of Article 6 (with its reference to ‘recommendation of Security Council’). Thus also, on the chance that our draft NE might not get a majority (which Newlin thought was quite possible), they would fear that your draft DR if adopted might leave the ROC seat unprotected.
5. Bush asked how hard Australia was pressing its preferences. I said that our drafts represented our preferred position at this stage, but we were not yet firmly committed to any drafts or tactics. Bush said that it was important that the United States and Australia should reach agreement on drafts as soon as possible, ignoring any consideration of pride of authorship. Tactics would have to be worked out as situation developed.
6. This morning I saw Nakagawa (Permanent Representative of Japan) and went over the same ground with him. He said he understood Tokyo’s view to be that the AR, even with last part deleted, would need much amendment before it could be regarded as safeguarding the ROC seat. In the circumstances his Government was disposed to think that some alternative to the AR should be submitted. I asked him what he thought of your two drafts as possibly preferable alternatives to the United States drafts. He volunteered that your drafts were ‘rather clever’, but said he believed that Tokyo was inclined towards using the United States drafts as a basis and trying to improve them. But he would consult Tokyo again in the light of what I had said.
7. Reflecting on yesterday’s meeting and subsequent consultations, there is no question of the energy and determination with which the Americans (and particularly their Mission here) are at present pursuing the campaign. Their decision to sponsor inscription of new item alone provides confirmation. Bush continues to assert forcefully that the entire administration is fully committed to an all–out effort to preserve the ROC seat, and is worried over some signs of scepticism among delegations. Ambassador Phillips told me last night that President Nixon has so many domestic critics of his overtures towards Peking that he cannot possibly afford to be less than whole–hearted in his defence of the ROC seat in UN.
8. While we have been consciously maintaining low profile, and have refrained from any active soliciting, you will appreciate that in the light of the Americans’ new–found activism the Australian position is going to seem surprising if we continue to be seen to be relatively inactive. The Americans are clearly expecting us to weigh in and support them as far as they are prepared to go. Other delegations which can be regarded as potential supporters of continued ROC seating, but which are still without instructions and evidently uncertain what course to recommend, are giving signs that they look to Australia, as a stalwart defender of ROC in past years and as a knowledgeable and closely interested party, to associate itself actively with the United States in giving a lead. The silence of the uncertain majority at yesterday’s meeting suggests that the period immediately ahead is the time for vigorous proselytising if the enterprise is to have any chance of success. Otherwise uncommitted governments, lacking a lead, are likely to be waiting on each other to see which is prepared to join the United States campaign. If of course it turns out nearer to the General Assembly opening that it is clearly unlikely that a majority to protect ROC seat can be mustered, we shall all have to reconsider our approach and tactics and perhaps give up trying too hard. In the meantime I suggest that suspected inactivity on Australia’s part, in respect of this issue which looks like being the principal focus of interest at the forthcoming Assembly, might not only help to weaken the prospects of the ROC seat but also raise some eyebrows. I am not suggesting that this need be substantially or permanently damaging to our reputation around the UN, but I think it should be taken fully into account among other considerations.
Mcintyre
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xx]
1 Not published.
2 J.V. Scott, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York.
3 Document 239.
4 G.R. Laking, Permanent Head of the New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs.
5 Katherine B. McSweeney, US Mission to the United Nations, New York.