Canberra, 14 September 1971
Secret
Possible Visit by Minister for the Army
Against
1. If the Minister for the Army were in China while Australian troops were still in Vietnam, this could have a bad effect on public opinion and Army morale.1
2. It is impossible for a Minister of the Crown to make such a visit in a private capacity.
3. Mr Peacock’s presence in China during the UN debate would be gravely mis–understood by our friends, especially the Japanese. It could make us look ridiculous at a time when we were fighting for the ROC seat and prejudice our efforts.
4. The fact that the Chinese have selected the Minister for the Army must give reason for caution.
5. A Ministerial visit on Chinese terms when we have been rebuffed in Paris and Belgrade might seem undignified.
6. A visit by a Minister unfamiliar with the complex China question would require lengthy briefing.
7. If a Minister makes one false step, it involves the Government in a measure of responsibility, with the possibility of wide adverse publicity.
8. We have been told that visits, Trade Missions etc. must await diplomatic relations. This must throw some doubt on the CRC initiative.
9. In spite of Kibei’s assurance of courteous treatment, we cannot disregard the possibility of a rebuff.
For
1. Visit by a Minister would be seen as an important step in our dialogue with Peking.
2. Selection of a junior Minister would be less of a commitment than say a visit by the Foreign Minister.
3. Our policy has been not to rebuff Chinese overtures but rather to encourage them.
4. It may be that the Chinese have decided that since a deadlock has been reached in diplomatic negotiations, they can renew the dialogue without loss of face through a Ministerial visit.
Trade Mission
We have reviewed the question of a Trade Mission and have concluded that there are no serious dangers or risks involved.
There need be no political gestures or discussions.
We have already suggested a Trade Mission to the Chinese.
Chinese acceptance of such a Mission would serve to confirm Kibel’s statements about a Ministerial visit, should the Government wish to return to this idea.
If the mission succeeds, the Government will have scored a substantial plus.
If it fails, no great harm will have been done as the onus will be clearly on the side of the Chinese.
Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines, none of whom recognise the PRC, have already sent secret official trade missions.
We therefore recommend:
(a) that Kibel should be told we should like to send a semi–official Trade Mission as soon as possible after the Canton Fair;
(b) that he should be told that there are practical difficulties in a Ministerial visit at this time;
(c) he should be authorised to tell the Chinese that we do not rule out the possibility of a Ministerial visit towards the end of the year.2
Keith Waller
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118/211, i]
1 See footnote 2, Document 254.
2 Bowen, McMahon and Anthony endorsed the recommendations.