Canberra, 16 September 1971
Secret Eclipse
Thank you for your letter of 16 August concerning China policy.1
Your views on possible formulae and lines of argument that we could seek to use concerning recognition of the PRC are interesting and could be valuable to our thinking should[/when]2 we come to negotiate recognition. No such decision has yet been taken, however.
For your own information only , I should add that the dialogue with the PRC is at present in suspense, although the Government is not saying as much publicly. You will have seen from the reports you have had that the Communist Chinese have made it clear to us that we could not have a dialogue which did not discuss recognition and diplomatic relations first and leave other matters for subsequent discussion.
For our part, we have no doubt that the PRC would not accept any formula from us other than on a basis of recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. This would be a minimum. Unlike countries more removed from the region, we could also face a PRC demand for explicitly noting (or endorsing) its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. This is not to say of course that we should not seek the best terms possible, in regard to our interests on Taiwan; but it would, I think, be unrealistic to expect that the PRC would be prepared to allow us more favourable terms than those accorded Canada or Kuwait—or even as favourable terms.
In these circumstances, it seems clear that, if the Government were to decide to seek recognition of the PRC, there might be very little that could be salvaged from our present diplomatic relationship with the ROC. We would do our best, of course, and we would hope that a trade link of some kind would still be possible with Taiwan. The suggestions made in your letter will be useful in this connection. I doubt, however, whether the PRC would agree to our opening a trade office on the Mainland in advance of recognition, attractive as this idea is for a number of reasons.
For the moment, of course, we are committed to maintaining relations with the ROC, while expressing what might be described as pious hopes for an improvement in our relations with the PRC, and ultimately normalization and recognition. But this does not mean that the changes evident in our policy over the last twelve months will cease. Clearly, the changing international scene could well require further movement. At present the Government does not seem likely to advance further on the question of recognition until the UN General Assembly has considered the Chinese representation issue. Thereafter, I am inclined to think that broad political considerations, including developments in the policy of the United States, will, in any policy consideration on recognition, be given greater weight than our relations with Taiwan.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxi]
1 Document 238.
2 The diagonal and the word ‘when’ were handwritten.