Taipei, 4 October 1971
Secret Eclipse
[ matter omitted ]
Apart from these questions,1 I might perhaps make some pretty speculative comments. There is, as you know from our reporting, some interesting thinking on broadening the base of government going on here at present. One publication has even advocated a Republic of China on Taiwan, and not, apparently, been jumped on by the Government. There will be changes here next year, through elections etc. The Government will be receptive to ideas for change. If we, with the US and Japan, come to some definition of what we would like to see emerge here, we could probably edge the ROC quite a long way (as we did over the DR question this year). Have we enough interest in Taiwan as such even to contemplate talking about this aspect with Japan and the US? It would be good in itself to see more representative government here, but I realize that any action by us could imply a continuing interest by us here.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38118, xxi]
1 Dunn’s questions to Anderson were (a) whether the Australian Government would, in the last resort, agree to the Canadian or Kuwait formula if it decided to negotiate recognition with the PRC; (b) whether Anderson agreed that the United States would not ‘dump’ the ROC in the short term; (c) whether Australia’s negotiation with the PRC on the basis of the Canadian or Kuwait formula would force the withdrawal of the ROC Embassy from Canberra; (d) whether it might be best ‘to go through a ritual of bargaining and negotiating’ about it before using one of the earlier formulae for recognition; and (d) whether Australia’s trade agreement with the ROC would be considered before using one of the stock formulae for recognition.