Canberra, 13 October 1971
Secret
Trade Mission to China
At the request of the Prime Minister, the Secretary this morning saw Mr. Jim Kibel in the office of Mr. Frank Hamilton at Eric White Associates rather than the Department. Mr. Kibel had just returned from Hong Kong.
The Secretary explained something of the circumstances of the parliamentary question by Mr. Whitlam yesterday.1 He told Mr. Kibel that he had been in touch with Mr. Bareham on the telephone yesterday afternoon to ask Mr. Bareham to ask China Resources for agreement to an early press release, if not of the names at least of the intention to send a private trade mission to Peking. A reply had been received from China Resources that they would give Mr. Bareham an answer at 3.30 Hong Kong time (4.30 p.m. Canberra time) today.
Mr. Kibel assumed that Mr. Bareham would have talked to Mr. T.M. Chou. He had had several conversations with Chou and Mao in the course of which he had warned them that it would be very difficult to avoid leakage of information in Australia for more than a week. The Chinese had therefore been made fully aware of the danger of a leak.
Mr. Kibel assumed that it was T.M. Chou that Mr. Bareham had spoken to because Mao and Wong2 had gone to Peking and Mao was then going to Canton and not expected to return to Hong Kong until about the 22nd.
Mr. Kibel said that the Chinese eyebrows shot up when they saw the Australian proposed list. They were obviously impressed with some of the big names on it and particularly B.H.P. He remarked that they seemed very interested in B.H.P. possibly, he thought, because they might be contemplating more purchases of raw materials from Australia. They also appreciated the gesture that none of the companies on the list were subsidiaries of American companies. They had raised no objection to the inclusion of an academic. They had accepted the idea of the wire services. Mr. Kibel recalled that originally the Chinese had not wanted press on the mission at all then had a volte face and when he suggested 6 they worked back to 3.
The Chinese were pressing for 20 or even more in total but accepted 18 as being the greatest number that Australians felt could be managed. They raised no demur about the Foreign Affairs officer but asked what he would be doing. Kibel had replied that he assumed he would be talking to the P.R.C. Foreign Affairs Department. Mr. McKay3 indicated that he would probably be relatively junior but a Chinese linguist.
Notwithstanding the proposed composition the Chinese still insisted that it was a private mission. It seems that their main concern is to avoid having a political figure in the mission.
They were rather surprised to see that the Wheat Board was not included in the list. Mr. McKay explained to Mr. Kibel that the Wheat Board have their own lines of communication with the Chinese and it was thought this was adequate thus making room for other industries to be represented on the mission.
The Chinese had propped a bit when it was indicated that it would be embarrassing to include Mr. Gray4 in the mission as the Chinese had wished. Kibel put it to them that he would be included if they insisted though it was hoped they would not but he made it clear to them that it was for them to choose thus, he said, leaving it to them to ’save their face’.
Mr. Kibel said that his brother, Brian Kibel, was leaving for Hong Kong on an Alitalia plane today (13th October). Chou had told him (Jim Kibel) to get his brother to come and see him (Chou) as soon as possible after arrival. He had asked his brother to get in touch with Mr. Bareham before going to see Chou. Mr. Kibel was also concerned that Mr. Bareham be fully informed of all developments here including the Financial Review article.
As for the announcement of the mission itself Mr. McKay thought that the Chinese could not object to the Prime Minister making the announcement and Mr. Kibel said that the Chinese understood that. Indeed, he said they gave the impression that what happened here with regard to publicity was Australia’s business so long as it was cleared as to the release and was not too political.
From that Mr. Kibel went on to say that he had told the Prime Minister that there was always a possibility—even though it may even only be a vague possibility—that the Chinese could back out of the whole arrangement. He did not think that was likely however.
He had made it clear to the Chinese on his most recent visit that Australia would stick to her policy in the U.N. He had gauged from the Chinese reaction that that would make no difference at this juncture. However, he reported that the Chinese had told Mr. Bareham (apparently in Mr. Kibel’s hearing) that if Australia wants to continue to trade with the P.R.C. she would have to change some of her policies in the future. When questioned as to what ‘in the future’ meant the Chinese had said ‘not this year but next year.’
Mr. Kibel said that the Chinese had shown some interest as to who would win the elections in Australia and Mr. Kibel had given his judgement of how they might come out.
Mr. Kibel said that it was clear that the Chinese wanted a mission to come back to Australia and they will want to talk about that when the mission goes to Peking.
Also, the Chinese had said they would welcome a visit from one of the more junior ministers and had mentioned Mr. Peacock’s name. When he had indicated to them that there was some resistance in Canberra to Mr. Peacock going they had said ‘Oh well, you can get someone else’.
[DFAT: CHINA PAPERS]
1 On 12 October Whitlam asked the Minister for Trade and Industry, J.D. Anthony, when he expected to be able to announce the full membership and itinerary of the projected trade mission to the PRC.
2 The reference is presumably to C.K. Wang.
3 D.H. McKay, Secretary, Australian Department of Overseas Trade.
4 R. Gray of Siliform Limited, an importer of Chinese glassware for laboratory equipment had apparently been nominated by the Chinese for the proposed trade mission. In Cablegram 1315 (5 October), the Australian Trade Commission in Hong Kong reported that it had drawn C.T. Mao’s attention to the fact that ‘[Gray] had shown a political interest, whereas the proposed members of the mission were entirely non–political, essentially trade, and would be concerned that any political interpretation might be placed on their membership of the mission. The inclusion of Gray would therefore jeopardise the effectiveness of the mission’.