Canberra, 14 October 1971
Secret Priority
Chinese Representation
Under the present circumstances we think we should plan for all eventualities. We could be faced with a straight vote on the AR. This situation would arise if the NE is not accorded priority or if the NE fails. As for the DR, our judgment is that it has no prospect whatever of taking precedence over the AR.
2. We thus consider it essential for the main co–sponsors of the NE and DR to agree now on a fall–back plan which could be brought into operation at short notice. You are already familiar with our ideas on such a plan (see for example our 809 to New York, 3979 to Washington).1 Our plan comprises (a) a call for separate votes on the two parts of the AR, or (b) amendments to the AR. You already have our suggested amendments to the AR (our 881 to New York, 4341 to Washington).2
3. There is also a third possibility: if the NE does not obtain priority in voting, and if the two fall–back plans are not employed (or are defeated), we could still seek a presidential ruling on the majority necessary for the adoption of the second part of the AR. This would almost certainly be put to the vote, and would in effect amount to a vote on the NE (having earlier been denied priority over the AR).
4. Washington has reported that the State Department has tentatively discussed fall–back positions with their United Nations Mission. The State Department indicated that these might be used (as we ourselves have been arguing) only if the NE is not accorded priority of if the NE itself fails. This is the first indication we have had that the Americans acknowledged the need to work out a contingency plan.
5. The State Department indicated that while no final decision on such a plan would be reached without consulting America’s partners, both the American Mission in New York and the State Department itself seemed to be generally agreed that it would probably be necessary to seek to amend the AR.
6. Now that the Americans have come forward with these views we wish to respond quickly and tell them that we continue to attach considerable importance to the development of a suitable plan.
7. At the same time we would wish to assure them that we will continue to work energetically for the two resolutions and that we agree that these contingency plans should not (underlined) be revealed to others (except Japan and New Zealand) lest knowledge of it weaken morale, and adversely affect support for the two resolutions.
8. We should perhaps make it quite clear (and you should stress this) that there has been no (underlined) change whatever in our current priorities which are:
(i) to gain priority in voting for the NE,
(ii) to have the NE adopted by a simple majority,
(iii) to vote on the AR, and argue that it requires for its adoption a two–thirds majority (that is, we would apply the NE to it),
(iv) this having been accomplished, move to a vote on the DR.
For UN New York and Washington
9. Glad if you would discuss this with the Americans urgently at an appropriately senior level and advise them that we are also raising the subject with the Japanese and New Zealanders.
For Tokyo and Wellington
10. Please discuss with Japanese/New Zealanders.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, xxi]
1 Document 239.
2 Document 250.