Hong Kong, 14 October 1971
1364. Secret Immediate
From Bareham.
China—Visit of Trade Mission
1. Following my telephone conversation with you, October 12, I rang C.R.C. at 1630 LT. In absence of Wang1 and Mao I spoke with T.M. Chow. He said he was unable to see me that day. I then told him of the question and answer in the House that day,2 said that we had no knowledge of how the subject came to be raised and were in no way a party to a breach of our agreement (not to publicise) with them. At the same time he would now be aware of the difficulties facing the Government. We would appreciate advice on progress of discussions in Peking. I said that if the list was not yet approved, could we say that discussions were proceeding.
2. Chow took note, and said he would contact his principals and would see me at 1530 LT October 13.
3. The meeting took place as arranged. This was my first meeting with Chow. His card describes him as Assistant Manager Industrial Products and Minerals Department (exactly [the]3 same as Wang and Mao) but Kibel believes him to be a wholly political operative. It came out in our conversation that he had visited Australia in 1965 for two months. The circumstances of the meeting differed from the earlier ones in that it took place in a small private room which I assume was equipped for recording. Earlier meetings have taken place in a large general area where several other groups were holding separate conversations at the same time.
4. The meeting was a long one, about 70 minutes, as Chow insisted on going over again everything which had happened up to date, though I have no doubt that he was already fully briefed on what had taken place. He paid little attention to the exchange in the House which had occasioned the meeting. He told me he had heard nothing yet from his principals and mentioned that Mao and Wang were still in Canton. I asked him what was the basis on which his principals were assessing the list we had passed to them: were they concerned about the individuals listed, their companies, or areas of industry represented? Chow left me in no doubt that the decision would be made on purely political grounds. I told him that I felt that there was not much time if the visit of the trade mission was in fact to go forward at the end of November. Members of the proposed mission were very busy people and it would not be easy for them to make or change their plans at the last minute. Chow did not appear to take this very seriously saying he thought there was still plenty of time. He could give me no indication when he was likely to hear from his principals but said he would contact me as soon as he heard anything. He offered to come to my office for this purpose.
5. During the conversation Chow asked me why the visit of the mission we were proposing was to be unofficial rather than official. I told him that as I saw it there could be no question of an official visit between countries that did not have diplomatic relations with each other, but because Kibel was a very busy man, the Department had acceded to Kibel’s request to organise the unofficial mission. Chow seemed satisfied with this.
6. During the meeting Chow referred to a statement made by Mr. Bowen in Tokyo the day before to the effect that Australia regarded trade as a separate matter from politics. Chow stressed that the P.R.C. held that trade and politics were inseparable, a standard Chinese argument which they have often laid down in their dealings with the Japanese. I had no sense that Chow was suggesting that Mr. Bowen’s statement could prove an impediment to the mission’s visit, or had delayed an answer. He had already told me that he had not heard from his principals and I had the feeling he had seized on this statement as something to berate me with in the interim.
7. Chow took up the question of Chinese Representation in the U.N. again, an issue which has been raised in all the meetings I have attended. He expressed dissatisfaction that Australia was following the United States position. I said that in this case our own independent assessment happened to coincide with that of the United States. We would be voting in favour of the P.R.C. corning into the U.N. and assuming a Security Council seat. Chow pointed out that we were also in favour of Taiwan maintaining a place in the U.N. whereas Taiwan was as much a part of China as was Tasmania of Australia.
8. Comment
Our feeling is that the Chinese are probably delaying their approval of the visit with an eye on the effect our announcement is likely to have on the U.N. debate though whether they would assess that an announcement during the debate would help their cause there (by suggesting that Australia was joining the Peking bandwagon) or hinder it (by suggesting that countries voting against Peking’s position would not necessarily earn the latter’s hostility) is open to question. One thing which does seem certain at this stage is that there is nothing to gain and probably a lot to lose, by trying to force an early decision from them by further representations. We continue to have the strong conviction that any obvious desire on our part to hurry things along will be interpreted as a sign of weakness which will result in further delay on the part of the Chinese.
9. I have given Mr. Bowen and Anderson a full account of this latest development.4
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2/l, i]
1 C.K. Wang.
2 See footnote 1, Document 271.
3 Editorial insert.
4 Bunting recorded on 16 October that James Kibel had informed McMahon that Brian Kibel was on his way to the Canton Trade fair. McMahon stressed to James Kibel that no one was to think that Brian Kibel was ‘our plenipotentiary’ or that the Australian Government was ‘exhibiting anxiety’ about a decision on the trade mission. On 18 October McMahon recorded from a telephone discussion with Bareham that: ‘The Chinese will play on our anxiety. They will hope we are sweating it out down here. They said they were very unhappy to hear what has happened to “our Socialist friends and Mr Whitlam” last week in Canberra. This has caused them very great unhappiness’. On 19 October McMahon recorded that James Kibel had advised him that the Chinese were awaiting the second Kissinger visit to the PRC and the outcome of the vote in the United Nations before approving the visit of an Australian trade mission.