New York, 14 October 1971
UN846. Secret
Chinese Representation
Your 1183.1
United States Mission (Newlin) informed us on 14 October that it had consciously refrained from examining in depth the possibility of fall–back positions because of the fears expressed in your paragraph 7. It had been felt necessary to maintain this attitude even amongst the main co–sponsors because of the extremely sensitive nature of this exercise for the Japanese Government, and particularly Prime Minister Sato. United States reluctance to proceed with the study of this question had also been reinforced by encouraging signs that increased support was being enlisted for our side’s proposals. Thinking on contingency plans was therefore in a preliminary and tentative stage, but the United States Mission now recognised the need to give more serious consideration to possible fall–back positions in the event that our proposals would not succeed.
2. Both Newlin (Counsellor, Political and Security Affairs) and Reis (Legal Advisor)2 expressed their personal preference for the idea of separate voting on the operative paragraph of the AR as the least unsatisfactory way of coping with the AR, should the priority motion and NE fail to pass. They pointed out that amendments to the AR would have several disadvantages, not only because their adoption would be much in doubt if the NE failed to win a majority, but because it would open up the prospect of sub–amendments, leading to a confused situation with unpredictable results. Tabling of amendments might also imply a degree of commitment to the AR as a proposal, which would not necessarily suit our interests best. Newlin and Reis also agreed that the prospect of any presidential rulings, let alone one on the majority necessary for adopting the second sentence of the AR operative paragraph,3 were remote, since Malik obviously intends to solicit and abide by the will of the majority on all matters, even of a procedural nature. The Japanese Mission, with whom we have discussed the question of possible fall–back positions, shares these views.
3. Newlin has undertaken to raise the subject with the State Department and we shall be pursing it with the mission at all levels. Newlin is concerned lest any hint that the United States is even thinking of contingency planning should get out and have undesirable effects on the activities of the co–sponsors or on the attitudes of those who are supporting our positions. We would request that this wish be fully respected.
[NAA: A6364, UN1971/09]
1Document 272.
2 Herbert Reis, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, US State Department.
3 ‘[The General Assembly decides] to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai–shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all organizations affiliated to it’.