Canberra, 7 January 1951
116. Top Secret Immediate
From Fadden to Prime Minister.
1. Spender and I have discussed your 761 and Watt’s 4.2
Our views conveyed in Spender’s 43 cover generally the field dealt with in the U.K.’s memorandum of policy and to these views we adhere.
2. Subject to those views we make the following particular observation on the U.K.’s memorandum.
3. The general statements set out in their ‘outline of general policy’ do not present any special difficulty, though the outline is not exhaustive, for example, it omits to mention that an important part of our policy is not only A24 but also not to reward aggression.
4. The U.K.’s memo has to be seen of course against the background of present events including—
(a) The People’s Government’s objective appears to be to drive U.N. forces out of Korea by force. What she proposes to do then in Korea is not disclosed.
(b) Its minimum conditions for settlement of Korea, where it is now engaged in aggression are—
(i) Withdrawal of all U.N. forces from Korea.
(ii) Admission of People’s Government to United Nations as the proper representative of China.
(iii) Cession of Formosa to China.
These conditions leave unanswered the question what is to become of the U.N. objective viz. a free unified and independent Korea.
(c) The United States is not prepared to submit to the People’s Government’s demands. Present U.S. administration is under great political pressure not to do so which will be increased by the recent speech by Senator Taft5 which you will have seen indicating the general view of the Republican Party. She is more likely to contemplate getting her forces out of Korea than of surrendering to what she consider to be the demands of Communist aggression in Korea.
5. As to the People’s Government’s conditions (ii) and (iii) in (b) supra we do not think we can usefully either add to or modify the views expressed in Spender’s 4. The proposal to accept the Cairo Declaration ‘in principle’, the precise meaning of which is not clear to us, does not meet the observation on Formosa made in 4.
[ matter omitted ]
Although the action in Korea is that of the United Nations it is well for us to realise that U.S.A. and Communist China and through latter Soviet Russia regard themselves as the principal antagonists as in fact they are. Whilst action on behalf of United Nations is apt to blur the issue, it is clear to us that no proposal (a) which People’s Government is satisfied will not [sic] be supported by U.S.A. (b) which U.S.A. regards as a reward to aggression has any hope of success in present circumstances even assuming People’s Government will be prepared to negotiate on something less than submission to all their conditions.
[ matter omitted ]
9. We desire to stress again the supreme importance, as we see it, of maintaining a united front with U.S.A. Australian interests are such that we must do all we can to maintain the firm association which exists between us.
10. As our Mission at United Nations is awaiting final instructions depending upon the result of your. deliberations, we would be glad to have your final views on your discussions as early as possible.
[NAA: A1838, TS852/20/4/2, i]
CONDEMNATION OF CHINA AS AN AGGRESSOR
In the shadow of growing US impatience at postponement of action in the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, further discussion of Korea and a Far East settlement occurred at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference on 7 and 8 January 1951. Notwithstanding disagreements on a final formula, and a proposal from Nehru which without preconditions offered China a cease–fire, membership of the United Nations, and control of Taiwan, Bevin proffered successfully a plan to condemn China as an aggressor and call for her withdrawal from Korea. Notably, however, no explicit demand was included for a cease–fire as a condition for negotiations. These suggestions were passed to the United States Government which later indicated that it was firmly opposed to discussions without a cease–fire, because these could only, given expanding and almost complete Chinese control in Korea, be ‘negotiations [which] would be concerned with such questions as whether the Chinese Communists … are to be rewarded with Formosa and a seat in the United Nations’. In fact, Canada’s Lester Pearson, who was chairman of the UN cease–fire group, had anticipated the US reaction. In co–operation with the Prime Ministers, he constructed a scheme which was accepted by the United States on 11 January. It envisaged a cease–fire followed by discussions between the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and PRC on Far Eastern problems, including Formosa and UN membership for China. Peking rejected these terms and, in doing so, allowed the United States to seize the initiative and push through a UN resolution, supported by Australia, which condemned China as an aggressor and reaffirmed UN determination to meet such aggression.
1 Document 29.
2 Watt’s cablegram contained the text of the UK memorandum described in footnote 1, Document 29.
3 Document 28.
4 That is, support for the United Nations in Korea in resisting aggression.
5 US Senator Robert A. Taft. The speech referred to has not been found, but its tenor was no doubt reflected in a vehement attack by Taft and other Republicans on the later proposals of the chairman of the cease–fire group and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (see following editorial note). Taft characterised these proposals as ‘complete appeasement’, adding that he would ‘prefer withdrawal from Korea, to keep our hands free in Formosa, because that has always been more important than Korea’.