Canberra, 24 February 1972
Secret
The Kibels
In the Secretary’s submission of 14 January 1972 (copy attached),1 he suggested that the activities of the Kibels—ostensibly on behalf of the Government—were fast becoming an embarrassment and should be brought to speedy end. But it was suggested also that this should be left until after the arrival of the promised letter from Peking (about a trade mission to China) or until it was clear a letter would not be forthcoming.
2. Mr Kibel’s original expectation had been that the letter would arrive soon after his return to Australia in late January. More recently, however, he has expressed the view that it is unlikely until after the Nixon visit is well over.
3. As the Kibels had returned to Australia, this delay had not been giving us major concern. But in the light of tel. 835 from Washington (copy attached),2 which reveals that the Kibels are in effect seeking to take business advantage of their activities and in a sense are holding themselves out to be virtually ‘agents’ of the Australian Government, we think the time may now have come to take the action proposed in para 6 of the submission of 14 January.
4. If a Minister or senior official were to talk to the Kibels, it would of course be necessary not to give the impression that we were uninterested in getting a copy of the Peking letter when (and if) it arrives. It would also be desirable to make it clear that we hoped they would not hold themselves out in any way as being ‘agents’ of the Australian Government. All this would, of course, call for delicate and tactful though firm handling.
5. I recommend that action now be taken along the lines proposed in para 6 of the submission of 14 January and para 4 of this submission. I attach an additional copy of this submission in case you wish to pass it to the Prime Minister.
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
Asia Division
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2/1, i]
NIXON’S VISIT TO CHINA, 21–28 FEBRUARY 1972
Nixon’s much–anticipated visit to China was, as predicted by the National Assessments Staff (Document 297), a tremendous spectacle of great symbolic importance. Scrupulous attention to detail was paid by both sides. For instance, Nixon, aware from Kissinger’s first–hand reports of Chou’s sensitivity to Dulles’ refusal to shake his hand in Geneva, 1954, ensured that he and his wife would descend the steps of Air Force One alone to give the Premier a hearty greeting. The Chinese, playing to the US media contingent, who beamed colour television pictures to American viewers, staged a series of magnificent parades, tours and banquets.
Aside from the fanfare, extensive discussions on issues of substance took place—most details of which have been revealed in recently released documents. In essence, Nixon reaffirmed the position taken by Kissinger in his visit of July 1971 (see related editorial note). The President said to Chou that there ‘is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China’, and he pledged to support ‘any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out’. Moreover, reinforcing Kissinger’s earlier comments on recognition, Nixon added that ‘the issue of Taiwan [was] a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework that I have … described we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it’. Two days later, he told Chou that he needed to return to Washington and say that no ’secret deals’ had been done on Taiwan, but his ‘goal’ was to solve the Taiwan problem and achieve normalisation in his second term. The Chinese agreed that a solution to Taiwan did not need to be found in the short–term and promised to ’strive for peaceful liberation’.
On the awkward matter of a communique, Nixon acknowledged that Chou had ‘a problem … [Taiwan was] an irritant and has a high emotional content and therefore he needs to show progress’. Meanwhile, personally, he faced ‘the very unholy alliance of the far right, the pro–Soviet left, and pro–Indian left’, all elements of which had an interest in the demise of any Sino–US rapprochement; there was a need to be ‘clever enough to find language which … does not stir up the animals so much that they gang up on Taiwan and thereby torpedo our initiative’. In the final document the two sides, having declared mutually that normalisation was in the interests of all countries, reflected separately on Taiwan. The PRC reviewed its stance in standard terms, declaring that Taiwan was a province of China, that the dispute was an internal affair, and that it opposed activities which encouraged a separate status for Taiwan. The United States said it would not challenge the view of Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits that there was ‘but one China and … Taiwan is a part of China’; it reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement; and announced its ultimate objective of withdrawing all military forces from the island—a process which would begin progressively as tension in the area diminished.
1 Document 296.
2 22 February. US officials informed Australian officials that Kibel had offered to make arrangements for a Hawaiian delegation to visit China. To prove his bona fides, Kibel had said that he had been in contact with the Australian Government and had ‘nearly arranged’ for an Australian minister to visit China.