Canberra, 30 June 1972
Confidential
China
There are signs that two Asian countries—Japan and the Philippines—could be in diplomatic relations with Peking before too long—probably not this year but perhaps next. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that both countries will have publicly opened negotiations with Peking before the end of the year.
2. Attached is a paper,1 prepared in the Department, on Japan’s likely position after Mr Sato steps down next week. It makes the point that, whoever the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the prospects are for an increased pace towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking—even though Japan already has most of the substance (e.g. very large trade, a semi–official mission in Peking) of normal relations. How long the process of full normalisation might take is impossible to foretell with any accuracy, but the sheer complexity of the matter for both Japan and the PRC suggest that it is improbable that full normalisation will be achieved this year. Moreover, much will depend on how strongly the USA tries to hold Japan back, how firmly Peking sticks to its position that its three conditions are pre–conditions to negotiations rather than conditions to be discussed during negotiations, and whether the new Japanese Government will feel as pressed by its public and party opinion once negotiations have actually begun as it will before then. The negotiations themselves could well begin within months of the new Government’s taking office.
3. The Philippines too is moving towards recognition of the PRC. Governor Romualdez (President Marcos’s brother–in–law) visited Peking earlier this year to talk about normalising relations; and early this month it was announced by President Marcos’s office that he planned to send Cabinet missions to Peking and Moscow to explore further the possibilities of opening up trade and diplomatic relations. It is not at all clear when the visits are to take place, but Foreign Minister Romulo2 (who is likely to lead the mission to Peking) told Mr Shann at the end of May that the Philippines will have recognised and established diplomatic relations with the PRC (and with the USSR) within twelve months.
4. Nevertheless, there are factors which will complicate and perhaps delay the establishment of Philippine/PRC relations. General Romulo himself, in his talk with Mr Shann, stressed the closeness of Philippine/ROC relations; the Republic of China has warned that there would be tension in the local Chinese community if the Philippine Government showed signs of shifting its policy towards recognition of the PRC; there is considerable opposition in the Philippine Congress to any relaxation of the Philippines’ traditional staunch anti–communism; and the Philippines can probably expect opposition from its ASEAN partners—especially Indonesia and Thailand—in view of the ASEAN countries’ agreement to keep in step in their China policies. On the other hand, President Marcos has shown that he wishes to be seen to be following an independent foreign policy, and China policy offers opportunities for bold initiatives that he clearly finds tempting.3
H.D. Anderson
First Assistant Secretary
Asia Division
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38, xi]
1 A reference to a paper by J.A. Benson (Head, Japan Section, North Asia Branch) dated 28 June and entitled ‘Japan’s China Policy’ . The paper outlined how pressures were emerging in Japan for the normalisation of relations with the PRC. In May, Sato had indicated that the Japanese Government was prepared to negotiate with the PRC on the basis that it was ‘the only lawful government of China’ . The PRC had imposed three prior conditions to the normalisation of relations with Japan: that the PRC must be acknowledged as the sole legitimate government of China; that Taiwan must be regarded as an integral part of China; and that the Japan–ROC peace treaty of 1952 be abrogated.
2 General Carlos P. Romulo, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
3 Bowen ‘noted’ the submission ‘with interest’ .