Taipei, 12 July 1972
Secret Personal
Thanks for your letter 3109/38118 of 3rd July.1 It was most helpful to have your comments.
This note does not call for a reply. I would however like to make one or two remarks deriving from the fourth paragraph on your page 22 and your reference (first paragraph on page 3) to there being a greater likelihood of revolutionary rather than an evolutionary change if one takes place.3 In doing so I hark back to what I called in one earlier letter the desirability of going through ‘ritualistic negotiations’ with the PRC. Such expertise on China as I have suggests that this approach would be regarded as completely understandable by the Chinese, that it would cost us nothing (except some time) with the PRC, and that it would ease a break with the ROC very considerably.
Some may argue that it would not be the Australian style and would be nonsense for us to be at all ritualistic by which I mean passing through the phase of a lower form of official relations with Taiwan (e.g. a Trade Office) on the way to formal relations with the PRC. It could be argued that when we know that we will have to break all official relations with the ROC to achieve this end, we should do so in one step; to do otherwise, it might be said, would risk antagonizing the PRC and expose us to domestic criticism for being ‘unrealistic’ and trying to have the best of both worlds.
The latter point might present real difficulties, but the former is not necessarily sound. The PRC knows we have had a long association with the ROC, that we value a reputation for loyalty to friends and that we have real difficulties in making the break they require. They are prepared to wait. They might think little less of us, and possibly more, if we went through the motions of trying to salvage some relationship with Taiwan before giving in, if only to save some face for our old friend. (I do not need to elaborate on my belief that an evolutionary rather than revolutionary change would be better from the point of view of our interests in Taiwan.)
As I see it, another point in favour of this approach is that our slide out of our present relationship with Taiwan and towards formal relations with Peking would then be more a matter of our own initiative, decision and timing than would otherwise be the case. I do not see why we should openly dance to Peking’s tune. It might appear better to be half a beat in front (while still listening to the music).
Perhaps my Chinese education makes me incline strongly towards indirection at the cost of speed. However, I do believe that the pros and cons of an evolutionary (or seemingly evolutionary) approach should be carefully weighed.
[NAA: Al838, 3107/38, xi]
1 See footnote 2, Document 336.
2 Anderson had commented on Dunn’s remark that having reached the point of defining closely Australia’s interests in Taiwan, ‘it would seem unfortunate if we did not continue to make progress towards our eventual goal’ . Anderson said that the Department could not see how this could be done. Diplomatic relations with Peking were not possible because the Government was not prepared to meet Peking’s conditions and the progressive approach to normalisation would not work because the PRC insisted, in effect, that diplomatic relations were not the last, but the first, step in such a process.
3 Anderson had remarked on the last paragraph of Dunn’s letter (Document 333) that little comfort could be offered; he could see no possibility of significant change in Australia’s ’static lukewarm friendship’ with the ROC. Similarly, Anderson believed a further evolution of Australian policies before the November election was impossible. Eventual change, given Peking’s attitude, would have to be revolutionary, either through a Labor victory or through a change in Coalition policy after the elections.