54

CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA

Washington, 3 May 1955

504. Top Secret

Formosa

For Menzies.

My 477.1

Dulles has communicated to me by informal note his written reply to your 332.2 It is as follows—

Begins—

Message for the Prime Minister of Australia ‘from the Secretary of State.

I appreciate the interest which prompted you to send the message reflecting certain views of the Australian Cabinet regarding Taiwan which the Ambassador handed me on 17th3 April. I realise the keen interest of Australia in the matter and wish to reaffirm our desire to continuing close consultation with you on it. I shall endeavour through the Ambassador to keep you informed as our thinking develops.

In my press conference4 on 26th April, I attempted to make our position clear on Chou En–Lai’s proposal to negotiate. I indicated that while it remains to be seen whether or not it was a sincere proposal we intended to try to find out. The President reiterated this in the statement of 27th April. I mentioned of course that in so doing we could not depart from the path of fidelity and honour toward our ally, the Republic of China. We are now giving most careful thought to what the best method may be of determining the bona fides of Chou’s proposal. In this process it may be possible also to evaluate whether questions broader than the off–shore islands and Taiwan could profitably be discussed.

As to the specific suggestion of yours of the possibility of inviting Chinese Communists to 4–Power Meeting, should one develop this summer, to participate in respect of Asian matters, I must say that this idea is one which we regard unfavourably. Public opinion in this country would be very much against extending to the Chinese Communists the prestige and international standing which their inclusion in the group, which would thus become a big five, would bring about. This matter was debated at length in Geneva when it was put forward by the Russians and we were able to have the proposal rejected at that time.

Also, it is our desire, if the 4–Power Foreign Ministers meeting develops this summer, to confine the agenda to a few rather specific European problems. Our experience over a long record of time indicates that if progress can be made in negotiating with the Russians it is best to approach matters subject by subject, working on those which appear to be susceptible to serious negotiation. It now appears as if the Austrian problem5 may have reached that stage. If this proves to be true it may well be that this summer we might hope to be able to begin a process of progress on the German question or perhaps even on general European Security. To have, however, at one meeting a broad general world–wide agenda would in my opinion create limitless opportunities for the Russians to revert to their long–standing practice of turning the meeting into a propaganda forum.

[NAA: A1838, TS519/3/1, v]

1 27 April. Spender reported a conversation with Dulles in which the latter expressed the view that the Australian proposal for a guarantee of Formosa was not worth pursuing during the period leading up to the general elections in the United Kingdom on 26 May. Dulles added that his ‘preliminary view on your present suggestion was that there would be great opposition in the United States to having Communist China included “as one of the big five so to speak”’.

2 Document 53.

3 ‘17th’ should presumably read ‘27th’.

4 On 26 April, Dulles said in a press conference of Chou’s offer to negotiate that: ‘Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists were merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China’. Foreign Relations of the United States , 1955—1957, vol. II, Washington, 1986, p. 519.

5 The Austrian State Treaty, the provisions of which had been in dispute between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II, was signed in Vienna on 15 May by the Foreign Ministers of the four occupying powers and by their Ambassadors. It re–established Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic state.