Canberra, 5 May 1955
[ matter omitted ]
4. Turning to the main purpose of his visit, Mr. Peterson said his Ambassador3 had asked him to say that he (the Ambassador) had been ‘astonished’ and ‘disturbed’ that the Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs had put forward to Mr. Dulles the recent proposal4 for negotiations with Communist China. In the Ambassador’s opinion this was the only occasion in the course of his stay in Australia on which the Australian Government ‘had been 180° off course’: and the Ambassador could have told us so. Mr. Peterson said that in Berlin last year the Russians had suggested that Communist China might be invited to take part in what would, in effect, be Big–Five talks and the United States had managed to defeat this proposal. It was surprising that the suggestion should now be made from Australia.
5. The Secretary said that while he understood that the Ambassador was astonished, we had not gathered that the Secretary of State was also of the same mind. At least he had not said so in his reply to the Prime Minister. Also while the Australian Government’s proposal might be 180° off line so far as administration policy was concerned, it was certainly not so from the point of view of Australian policy. There had been no reactions as yet by the Government to Mr. Dulles’s answer rejecting the Australian proposal. He did know, however, that the Government’s suggestion was the considered view of Cabinet and that it had been the Government’s decision to canvass it privately with the U.K. and U.S. Governments.
6. The Australian Government had decided to give no publicity to its proposal because it was anxious to avoid embarrassment to its friends. Up to the present, the Government had been extremely reticent on the Formosan situation. While there had been some pressure for Australia to define an attitude on the off–shore islands in particular, the Government had stuck to the course that it would be more helpful to avoid precise public statements as far as possible, and had defined its attitude only in broad general statements. How long this policy could be maintained was perhaps doubtful. In the Secretary’s view, a statement might become necessary. Surprisingly there had been no pressure as yet in Parliament on the off–shore islands, and what the Government would do would probably depend on the course of events in Parliament. As things stood, the last statement of Government policy had been given by the Prime Minister in his recent speech.5
7. Mr. Tange briefly reviewed the basis on which the Australian proposal had been made. After careful consideration, Cabinet had decided that the approach it suggested was well worth while considering. It would now review its position in the light of the U.S. Administration’s reactions. The Government’s approach had been based on a number of facts:
(a) The danger of fighting over the off–shore islands and the possibility that this could develop into a major war. (The position was further complicated by the fact that defence of the off–shore islands was an issue on which the Government could not be sure of public support.)
(b) The difficulty of doing anything about the off–shore islands while an atmosphere existed of Communist threats to attack the off–shore islands and Formosa.
(c) The necessity to take action to avoid a conflict in a way which would not seriously affect anti–Communist morale in Formosa and South–East Asia.
8. The Secretary thought that Australia and the United States were generally in agreement on the factors, although the weight given to them individually might be different. Mr. Peterson agreed but said that he thought the U.S. would put the question of morale first.
9. The Secretary said that Australia thought the safest course might be to enter into discussions with Communist China on a much wider field than Formosa. There was not much to give away on Formosa or the Pescadores and there was, therefore, little basis for negotiations limited to this subject. Australia also considered that efforts must be made to probe the sincerity of Chou En–lai’s offer which had commanded wide attention, particularly in South–East Asia. Clearly some response had to be made. The Secretary said that he gathered from Mr. Dulles’s reply6 that the United States did not favour discussions at this stage but wanted to reduce the heat and seek a de facto cease fire.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1209, 1957/5035]
1 T.K. Critchley, Assistant Secretary, Pacific and Americas Branch, Department of External Affairs.
2 Avery F. Peterson, Counsellor, US Embassy.
3 Amos J. Peaslee.
4 See Document 53.
5 The text of Menzies’ statement in the House of Representatives on 20 April 1955 is given in Current Notes , vol. 26, 1955, pp. 281–91, especially pp. 285–6. Menzies declared: ‘Our attitude has been and is that the problem of Formosa ought to be resolved by peaceful means, and that it ought not to be resolved by arms … Like other Prime Ministers, I have contributed some constructive ideas to the pool. But I beg leave to say that on matters of such importance and delicacy, discussions should as far as possible be conducted privately until they have been abandoned or produced agreement’.
6 Document 54.