Canberra, 9 October 1959
Top Secret Guard Austeo
[ matter omitted ]
Australian Policy
8. Australia fully supports the main lines of Western policy towards preventing the spread of Communist China’s influence; Korea, Formosa, Japan, SEATO, Colombo Plan etc.
9. In August (in the face of some public criticism of the policy) Mr. Casey gave a detailed explanation in Parliament of the Government’s non-recognition of Communist China. Mr. Casey emphasized2—
(i) the position of non-recognising countries in Asia;
(ii) the importance of not harming U.S. prestige in Asia; and
(iii) the problem of Formosa.
Important as the others are, the third point is probably the crucial question, in the last resort.
10. At the same time, Mr. Casey made it clear that we accepted the fact that Communist China was here to stay, that it was growing in importance, and that we had to do business with it internationally when our interests required this. No objection is placed in the way of non-strategic trade or visits by Australians.
11. All this amounts to something like a ‘Two Chinas’ approach on a pragmatic basis.
12. The main draw-back in the present position from the Australian viewpoint is that Communist China is outside the United Nations, and can exploit this isolation to thwart attempts to involve her in disarmament schemes.
13. United States policy towards Communist China is much more difficult and complex than Australian policy. There are certain differences between United States and Australian policies in that—
(i) United States public statements carry overtones that Communism is established only temporarily in China (this is not the view of United States Government Agencies);
(ii) there is an embargo on trade with Communist China and United States citizens may not visit Communist China.
Questions to raise at ANZUS
14. It would seem timely to use the ANZUS Council Meeting to sound out the Americans on their thinking about future policy. There are three main reasons why a discussion of broad policy considerations would be valuable at this time:—
(i) The present atmosphere of exchange of visits by world leaders etc.3 will inevitably focus public attention on Communist China and lead to some dissatisfaction at its exclusion from international negotiations;
(ii) The lines of policy being followed by Khrushchev would seem to give the United States opportunities to take relations with China beyond the present abortive Warsaw contacts;4
(iii) We see some danger that the United States might be forced by the Chinese to appear as a suppliant—unless preparations are begun now—at such time as the West may want to take up negotiations with them. We fully appreciate that Communist China has it in its power to obstruct any reasonable proposals for an amelioration, however modest, in U.S.-Communist China relations. Nevertheless, we believe there is a need for more elbow-room and flexibility within the broad framework of existing policy.
15. Questions which might be pursued, therefore, are whether the Americans agree that it is desirable that there should be some ‘easing’ in the present relationship with Communist China and whether they are contemplating any practical possibilities for achieving this. Broadly speaking, we would feel that the United States is in a position of strength, in the eyes of Asian countries, to take the initiative.5
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A 10576, xiv]
1 The meeting was held in Washington on 24 October 1959.
2 With reference to these points: on (i) Casey alluded to the presence of Chinese minorities and communist subversion as a disincentive for the accreditation of Peking’s representatives; he also claimed that Communist China had demanded that Japan should abandon its ‘general aims and direction’ in foreign policy, to which Japan would not accede; on (ii) he stated that recognition by Australia would adversely affect Asian attitudes toward, and confidence in, the United States; and on (iii) he stressed that recognition would involve the abandonment of ten million Formosans, and would result in a fundamental breach of policy with the United States. See Current Notes, vol. 30, 1959, pp. 447–51.
3 For example, the Soviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, visited the United States for three weeks in January for discussions with Dulles and Eisenhower; the UK Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, and his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, made a 10–day visit to the USSR in February; a four-power conference between the United States, United Kingdom, the USSR and France convened from May–June and July–August; US Vice-President Richard Nixon made an informal visit to the Soviet Union in July, after which he travelled to Poland; and the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, paid a 13–day visit to the United States in September.
4 See footnote 5, Document 78.
5 At the meeting, Casey commented that although Australian and US China policies were similar, he was conscious of growing criticism in the United States of the Administration’s policy. Herter replied that the US attitude was ‘by no means fixed’ and would be changed ‘at any time’ if it were in the national interest—yet he did not see that this was the case at present. Casey was also assured during the meeting that the ‘consensus of opinion’ in the State Department was that ‘there were no alternative means of dealing with the Chinese problem at present’. Responding to a question from Casey, Herter noted later that the United States had given no thought to the idea of a ‘two Chinas’ policy.