Canberra, 29 January 1961
235. Secret
China
For Shann.
Thank you for your telegram No. 282 of 19th January1 which was helpful and timely.
2. The following views and comments, which have been approved by the Minister, but should not be attributed to him, are indicative of our thinking and can be used as a basis for discussion with the Foreign Office, preferably with Hoyer-Millar.2 (Washington and New York should please note that this telegram is for their general background only. What we have in mind is first to clarify certain points with the United Kingdom before discussion with the United States):
(a) It is desirable that a generally agreed Western position on principle (in concert of course with the United States) should be reached around the time of the Prime Ministers’ Conference in March. We would expect that the United States would at an early stage be able to state the propositions on which her attitude would be based. The subject of China will undoubtedly be raised at the Conference and the Conference will also present an opportunity for influencing Afro-Asian attitudes. We think it is essential that the United States and her allies should have reached substantial agreement at least by the middle of the year. If by this time United States and United Kingdom could put proposals to Moscow and Peking, the risks of Afro-Asian initiatives and of Communist exploitation of Western differences and of Afro-Asian susceptibilities might be avoided.
(b) The preservation of an independent Formosa is essential. This requires continued Nationalist representation in United Nations but does not require the continued exclusion of Peking.
(c) We believe that disarmament could not be discussed fruitfully without Peking’s participation. The possibility exists of course that Peking might prefer not to enter the United Nations until she has a nuclear capacity and can bargain on both this and conventional weapons. The possibility that Peking might seize on excuses to delay her entry into the United Nations has the following aspects:
(i) The West would have placed itself in a good light vis-a-vis world opinion as a result of its willingness to see Communist China seated;
(ii) The U.S.S.R. as the self-styled champion of disarmament would be embarrassed if Communist China was not prepared to come into the United Nations and take part in disarmament discussions except on her own terms. On the other hand any movement towards seating Peking would strengthen the Soviet’s hand in pressing for her unconditional entry into the United Nations.
(d) The usefulness of maintaining the moratorium should not be overlooked. (The possibility of this would be much reduced if the United Kingdom did not work for its continuation). There might be some advantage in continuing the moratorium for say a year so that moves towards a Two-Chinas solution could be made without haste. Hasty moves in this direction could have serious effects on the morale of the Chinese Nationalists and on our Asian allies. Latin American and French African support might be gained for the moratorium by vigorous campaigning if some new elements were introduced whereby these states could justify their backing of. the moratorium. For example it might be justified on the basis that efforts were being made to secure a renunciation of force in the Formosa area on the part of the Communists and Nationalists and the demilitarization of the offshore islands entailing withdrawal of Nationalist forces. Our hope of course would be that in another year it might be possible to devise a workable approach to Two-Chinas solution.
(e) If Peking and Formosa are both to be seated in the United Nations it would be necessary to disregard precedents and legalities to avoid a Soviet veto in the Security Council of Formosa as a new member. However if a very large majority within the United Nations decided to seat the Nationalists and Communists, Peking and Taipeh would be presented with a fait accompli. Might this majority not be mustered if sufficient vigorous campaigning were done by the United States and United Kingdom, France and others to attract support from the non-committed countries?
(f) We think that once Peking is seated in the Assembly it would be difficult to object to her having the Security Council seat.
(g) What sort of relationship (e.g. recognition) does the United Kingdom envisage with an independent Formosa?
(h) United Kingdom support for the existence of an independent Formosa would carry with it the certainty of impairing her relations with Peking. Moreover an independent Formosa within or approved by the United Nations might well require a guarantee of its independence from that body, or the United States might ask for Allied commitments to guarantee the defence of the island. Since the United Kingdom supports a separate existence for Formosa, would her relations with Peking suffer much more damage if she supported Formosan membership of the United Nations?
(i) Which countries might follow the United Kingdom’s lead and switch to voting to seat Peking if the moratorium failed?
(j) When does Lord Home intend either by direct approach or through Caccia3 to broach the China problem with Kennedy and Rusk?
3. In any discussions you should make it clear that all our thinking is exploratory and that there must be no disclosure to the Press that we have been exchanging views on China.
[NAA: A6366, LH196l/01T]
1 It reported the UK Foreign Office view that the moratorium of the China issue in the United Nations was unlikely to last, and that, if the moratorium failed, the United Kingdom would have no alternative but to support the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations and further, the UK view that, ‘if Peking succeeds in being seated in the Assembly, Formosa cannot be seated as well and on this there is likely to be sharp differences in opinion with the United States’.
2 Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, Permanent UK Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
3 Sir Harold Caccia, UK Ambassador to the United States.