Washington, 17 June 1961
1587. Secret
For Menzies from Beale.
China
I went through the points in your telegram 9591 with Rusk on 17th June. After listening to these he said he had two points to pass to you, the first one in the greatest confidence.
2. The first point was that it was very difficult if not impossible for the United States to take any international initiative regarding the China problem until the foreign aid legislation had been disposed of.2 This would probably not be before August. He recognised that this was ‘rough’ and affected the United States’ ability to give leadership, but nevertheless it was an inescapable fact of life, which had been brought home to him very clearly in discussion all day yesterday with two Congressional Committees. Rusk said it was not so much a problem of a deep clash between Congress and the Administration but a difficulty for the Administration of being able to act and to persuade the Congress and the necessity to act with the necessary degree of sophistication that was required by the problem. Sophistication was needed to finding [sic] a way to move from the present position without letting Peking in and Rusk confirmed that it was the Administration’s first policy to block Peking. He said that the Administration had tried to put the problem squarely to Congress by asking them to suggest ways of handling the problem. Congress had been told that unless action was taken the outcome might be that Peking would get in and Formosa ousted. Congress however did not come up with any ideas. As for Nationalist China, it stuck to its comment that a juridical question should be met with a juridical answer (paragraph 5 of my 1354 ).3
3. Rusk said that the second point he wished to make was that the United States would find it very difficult to dicker in the General Assembly about the situation in the Security Council. Nationalist China had been in the Security Council for 15 years and the United States was not prepared to say that it should abandon its means of blocking Communist China. The General Assembly and Security Council were separate organs, despite the fact that many countries would want to link them in considering the question of the Chinese representation. If the Credentials Committee accepted the credentials of Peking it would have no bearing on the Security Council. Nationalist China could be expected to vote against Peking and whether this would represent a veto was a question which might go to the International Court and take years to settle. The issue could also get mixed up with Afro-Asian demands for a view of United Nations and the whole thing might take years. (Rusk wryly said that this would at least mean that some other Secretary of State would have to solve the issue. He also said he took a dim view of the fact that the Republicans in 1952 had won the right to solve the problem but had managed to shelve it for eight years and dump it on his lap).
4. As regards the moratorium, Rusk said that the result was at least likely to be so close as to be dangerous. He said that if Nationalist China vetoed Outer Mongolia, ten French African votes would be lost and the moratorium could be taken as defeated.4
5. Rusk said that in Vienna,5 Khrushchev had said that Peking could never come into the United Nations as long as Formosa was there. Rusk said he took this to mean that Peking would refuse to come in under those terms.
6. I asked Rusk whether in view of the problem of timing with Congress there was anything America’s friends could do to help matters in the meantime. Rusk said he had thought of this and would let us know if anything occurred to him.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, vii]
1 Document 90.
2 Congress was considering a draft bill intended to provide for the implementation of Kennedy’s key recommendations, as announced in a message of 22 March 1961, on military assistance and aid for international social and economic development.
3 That is, ‘there was no problem [for the ROC in the UN] because Formosa was in fact the Government of China and was seated in the United Nations pursuant to the Charter itself’.
4 See footnote 4, Document 92, and the associated paragraph in the document.
5 Kennedy had met with Khrushchev in Vienna on 3 and 4 June.