Canberra, 10 August 1961
1248. Secret
Chinese Representation-Washington’s 19151
We recognise that it is primarily for the United States to decide on a firm line of action in time to gather sufficient support for it, but we see disadvantages and even dangers in the current State Department proposal. Reliance on a blocking third will antagonise a great many members, perhaps most. There seems some doubt about whether a simple majority can be mustered to make it an ‘important’ question; this doubt would grow if the question were not proposed for inscription but left to come up simply as a matter of credentials. Moreover, the proposal even if successful would not really meet our major objectives in the United Nations, which are:—
(a) to put squarely on Peking the onus for its absence from the United Nations, and
(b) to ensure permanent Formosan representation.
2. One possible alternative course, which builds on the fact that neither the Administration nor even Congress have closed the door to a change in United States policy if Peking were to change its attitude, might be to adopt a procedure along the following lines:—
(i) If a separate agenda item is proposed, the United States and its friends argue strongly that neither inscription nor substantive debate would be warranted, emphasising Peking’s past actions and recent statements which bring into doubt her peace-loving character and particularly her refusal to renounce the use of force in the Formosa Straits.
(ii) It is then proposed (preferably by a country—but which?—recognising Peking, to establish that the proposal is bona fide) that Peking be enabled to put its own views to the Assembly at first hand by being invited to participate in the debate without vote— provided it first unequivocally undertakes to honour the principles of the Charter by renouncing (as Taipeh already has) the use of force in the Formosa Straits. (Before being launched, the proposal would have to be assured of adoption in its entirety, i.e. without deletion of the proviso. We should therefore need an assured simple majority to block amendments or votes by division and to ensure that the proposed invitation was not ruled an important item. This might not be easy if, as is likely, there were an Asian or African president; and there could be an additional difficulty if China had vetoed the admission of Outer Mongolia. Moreover, the United States could probably not play a leading role in mustering votes for an invitation (even though conditional) to Peking.)
(iii) If Peking refused to accept the proviso, or gave an ambiguous reply, the United States could argue with increased force that there should be no further debate, and could introduce a modified moratorium resolution with enhanced chances of success.
(iv) If Peking unexpectedly accepted the proviso, the item would be inscribed. In the ensuing substantive debate, stress would be laid on the entirely new situation which had been created, the value of Peking’s acceptance as almost a recognition of Formosa’s independence, and the continuing United States commitment to defend Formosa. The ‘Successor States’ proposal could be introduced (by whom?) not as a device put forward only because it was known Peking would refuse, but as an honest proposal which the West would be prepared to see accepted. There should be blocking third to prevent the passage of unwelcome amendments or counter-resolutions.
(v) If Chinese representation came up only in the Credentials Committee (because no separate item had been proposed) it would be necessary for someone to move for full Assembly discussion, during which the proposal could be introduced.
3. We appreciate that this alternative idea is by no means without its own difficulties and dangers. Much also remains to be filled in. Moreover, it might in any case now be too late to pursue the idea. We should nevertheless like you to canvass the idea at working level with the State Department, presenting it as a constructive alternative when expressing our dislike of the current American proposal.
4. You should make it abundantly clear that there is no possibility of Australia undertaking initiatives in the Assembly on Chinese representation .
5. Immediately following telegram contains for your background the text of portion of Mr. Menzies’ message of 3rd August to Mr. Macmillan.2
1 Document 94.
2 2 See Document 96.