Washington, 12 August 1961
2011. Secret
Chinese Representation
We have canvassed your 12481 with Buffum2 (Deputy Director United Nations Affairs) and several other officers dealing with the China question … Our contacts were anxious to assure us that the circular instruction (now approved and shortly to be sent to posts) did not spell out any rigid lines of United States policy. Rather it solicited comments and suggestions from friends and Australian views would rate highly. Your 1248 therefore was welcomed but none of our contacts held out any hope that it fell within what had now been established as limits of United States policy for the forthcoming Assembly.
2. It was again pointed out to us that United States tactics had to take into account not only whether they would be successful at the United Nations itself but whether the United States Congress and public and the G.R.C. would tolerate them. We were told that even though the Senate hearings on the question of Chinese representation (our memorandum 781)3 had been uncompromising (without a single vote or even voice opposed to a strident majority numbering 76 votes), the closed executive hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been even rougher. Bowles4 had had ’strips torn off him’ over some of his ideas and he and McConaughy5 had been told in no uncertain terms of the suspicion and opposition of various members of the Committee to any ‘funny business’ by way of devices at the United Nations. It was pointed out to us that even abandoning the moratorium this year was considered by many Congressmen as dangerous or worse, despite evidence of probable adverse voting results on the moratorium.
3. Our contacts could only speculate about what this meant for the future. This year the over-riding need had been to obtain Congressional approval of the Foreign Aid Bill, including its new and controversial provisions for long-term loan funding.6 Each Congressional vote had been up for bargaining, with the China question of considerable importance to many. The Administration had felt unable to hold to its idea of recognising Outer Mongolia. Moreover, events of recent months had not made Congress susceptible to deft manoeuvres on an issue such as Chinese representation: many Congressmen felt frustrated, impatient and in some instances even belligerent as a result of things such as Soviet space successes, Cuba, Laos and Berlin. It was anybody’s guess what the mood would be next year, what the issues would be, or how much the present Administration would be able to cope with the situation.
4. As to your plan itself, we were told that similar ideas had been considered. Our contacts questioned whether a majority (much less one predictable and stable enough) existed for the attachment of extensive conditions to an invitation to Peking. Many countries would be inclined to argue (as they had done with the somewhat similar Stevenson amendment on North Korean participation last April) that a country should only be required to accept the principles of the Charter without specific interpretations being spelled out. The provision presumably would be rejected outright by those who recognised Peking’s claim to Formosa. A further basic problem was who was to canvass and organise the plan, bearing in mind that no country had felt able to sponsor other devices, and that the United States itself could certainly not have played a role in organising an invitation for Peking, however conditional.
5. Our contacts hoped that present United States plans would not be considered too negative. They hoped that a clear-cut vote involving a blocking third might perhaps not arise if, after winning the ‘important question’ vote, the United States or others put up the Committee idea. We were told that the United States would greatly welcome views on detailed aspects of handling the item (within the established guide-lines) and the need or otherwise to pursue the Committee idea. State Department thinking on such details were still very tentative.
[NAA: A6364, WH1961/06]
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ‘IMPORTANT QUESTION’ (IQ)
RESOLUTION, DECEMBER 1961
In December 1961, the UN General Assembly considered two draft resolutions on Chinese representation, including one co-sponsored by the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy and Japan. In its preamble, this draft noted the serious divergence of views that existed among members of the United Nations, and recalled that the matter of Chinese representation had been repeatedly inscribed because it had been viewed as one of critical and urgent concern. It also recalled that, by a resolution of December 1950, the Assembly had recommended that ‘whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case’. Hence, by the operative paragraph of the five-power draft resolution, the Assembly would decide, in accordance with Article 19 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the representation of China was an important question requiring a two-thirds majority. On 15 December, the Assembly endorsed the ‘IQ’ resolution by a vote of 61 (Australia) to 34 with 7 abstentions. The alternative resolution, which sought to remove the ROC and replace it with the PRC, was, with a proposed amendment (that simply called for Peking’s seating), rejected.
1 Document 97.
2 William B. Buffum.
3 Not published.
4 Chester A. Bowles, US Under Secretary of State.
5 Walter P. McConaughy, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
6 On 25 May, Kennedy delivered a special message to a joint session of Congress on urgent national programs. In this message, he indicated that he would shortly submit draft legislation to implement the Administration’s foreign aid program. The basic concepts and principles underlying the legislation included the need for country plans to be carefully tailored to meet the needs of each country, and long-term financing and planning. The House of Representatives and the Senate passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 on 31 August.