London, 5 September 1962
4337. Confidential
Malaysia
Golds (C.R.O.) was not in a position to give us much detail on the Lansdowne Mission’s work since, although Lansdowne and British members returned here last week-end, they have been meeting together at Lansdowne’s house and there has been little opportunity to obtain their impressions. Lansdowne is to report to Sandys today.
2. Golds said that the main conclusion of the Mission was that Sarawak would present few problems but that there was still a substantial job of work to be done in North Borneo. Lansdowne had expressed the opinion in a report sent before his return to England that Razak1 had been rather startled to discover how strong the feeling was in North Borneo on a number of the points that remained to be settled. Lansdowne thought this was one of the most useful results of the Mission. Razak had previously tended to wave aside British assessments of the views of the Borneo peoples and claim that the Malayans understood these people much better than the British did. The leading example was the religious issue. When the British had told them there was opposition in North Borneo to the establishment of Islam as the state religion the Malayans had brushed this aside and said they would be able to persuade Donald Stephens2 and others that they had no cause for concern. It had therefore been salutary for Razak to find that Stephens really did take a strong line on this issue and that he would not be fobbed off with general assurances but wanted specific guarantees written into the constitution. On other points such as language and education Razak had had to face the fact that there was a real question of providing North Borneo with firm guarantees.
3. The Inter-Governmental Committee has been established by the holding of a ‘preparatory meeting’, and various working parties (finance, administration, judiciary etc.) have been set up. The first substantive meeting of the Committee is expected to take place about mid-October.
4. C.R.O. are of course very pleased with the result of the referendum in Singapore. Golds said it would ‘immensely strengthen’ Lee Kuan Yew’s position. A lot of doubters had climbed back onto his band-wagon and there was now room for confidence that he would be able to hold on until merger without too much difficulty. Golds however sees difficulties at the end of the road arising from the different interpretations placed on the citizenship solution by Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku.3 While this has been satisfactorily glossed over for the time being through the Tunku’s rather vague statements, there will have to be further clarification when it comes to the point of drafting the relevant article of the constitution. While the position on voting rights now seems clear Golds sees residual problems such as rights of Singapore Citizens to enter the Federal Public Service.
[NAA: A1945, 162/4/4]
Brunei Revolt
In Brunei’s first general elections held in August 1962, Sheikh A.M. Azahari’s People’s Party (Partai Rakyat) won a landslide victory. The party was the major political group in Brunei. Its platform was anti-Malaysia and pro-Brunei hegemony. It was also pro-Indonesian and generally believed to have links with the PKI. Following the election Azahari and his party immediately sought to challenge the Sultan’s autocratic rule and put forward plans fo r constitutional reforms. They also sought to address the disparity of wealth and poverty within the small state. Their aim was to restore Brunei to its former glory. But the Sultan of Brunei, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, strongly favoured the Malaysia proposal and a month after the election, and the release of the Cobbold Report, announced that Brunei also accepted the proposal in principle. The motivations behind subsequent events are complex and vague but, by early December, the Partai Rakyat was increasingly frustrated in its bid for power and in its efforts to prevent Brunei joining Malaysia. The party’s aims were backed by the communist North Borneo National Army (Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara, TNKU), which had been recruiting and training in and around Brunei since mid-1962. Without warning, in the early hours of 8 December, elements of the TNKU launched a number of attacks in Brunei and in nearby areas of Sarawak and North Borneo. From his base in Manila, Azahari, proclaimed the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara, an amalgamation of Brunei and the former territory the sultanate had relinquished over time to Sarawak and North Borneo. The TNKU units, however, were not well armed and the attacks were poorly-planned and in the main ineffectually implemented. British and Gurkha troops brought in from Singapore at the Sultan’s request, together with units of Sarawak’s Mobile Police Force, quickly and effectively put down the uprising, which was declared over on 16 December.
Indonesian public support for the rebels’ cause quickly emerged. Demonstrations were staged in Jakarta, Sukarno publicly declared Indonesia s sympathy and hopes for victory for the ‘emerging forces’, and an anti-Malaysia campaign quickly developed in the Indonesian press.
1 Razak, was the senior Malayan representative on the committee.
2 Newspaper owner-editor, and founder and spokesman for the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) in North Borneo. He later became Chief Minister of Sabah.
3 See Document 8.