Singapore, 20 August 1963
443. Confidential Priority
Malaysia
Lee Kuan Yew is leaving for North Borneo tomorrow. He will see Chief Minister (Ningkan) in Kuching on way although Governor1 does not favour visit to Sarawak.
2. Lee intends to declare Singapore independent on 31st of August and Selkirk doesn’t think he can be dissuaded unless new firm date for Malaysia is produced very quickly which seems unlikely. Visit to Borneo is intended to bring Sabah and Sarawak into line with him.2
3. Lee will also declare aim of joining Malaysia as soon as possible after Tunku has conformed to obligations he accepted in Manila.
4. There would be no constitutional validity for Lee’s action but he is not concerned over this and draws parallel with Algerian Provisional Governments.3 Lee also intends to seek recognition, at least from Afro-Asian Governments.
5. Selkirk and Moore are stressing importance of not taking action which would undermine the Tunku in any way. Lee says he will not do this but it is clear that he sees political and personal advantage to himself in adopting this line after Tunku has made concessions. He has stressed he is not looking for clash with U.K. or with Malaya and regards action as good way of ‘dealing back to Sukarno’. Lee has also suggested that if United Nations Commission were to find that Malaysia was not main issue he cannot see how Indonesia could prevent elected independent Governments of three territories exercising free choice to join Malaya subsequently.
6. Present feeling here is that he will be able to persuade Donald Stephens to declare independence of Sabah on same date but that he will have more difficulty with Ningkan in Sarawak. Latter may well agree also but would want to retain British Governor in intervening period. If both agree Lee is thinking of some line between three territories (he has used phrase ‘United States of Malaysia’) until they join Federation.4
7. Present and future rights to bases in Singapore are predicated on Defence Treaty with Alliance Government and problems which could arise if Malaysia is not established shortly and Singapore were to have declared itself independent will be obvious to you. On the other hand Selkirk and Moore seem convinced that Lee will go ahead with plan. He intends to outline his proposed action to Tunku and Razak on return from Borneo at weekend.5
[NAA: A9735, 221/5/5/4/2 part 2]
UN Malaysia Mission
In accordance with the Manila Joint Statement of 5 August 1963 the Foreign Ministers of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, requesting him to send teams to Sarawak and Sabah to ascertain, ‘by a fresh approach’, whether the elections in those territories had been properly conducted, and whether they had taken into account the wishes of the inhabitants regarding Malaysia. On 8 August, U Thant informed the three Foreign Ministers that he intended to appoint a representative to head a UN Malaysia Mission to carry out this task, who would be assisted by two working teams. He stipulated that he would only carry out the inquiry with British Government consent, and emphasised that his representative would be responsible to him alone. Moreover, the mission’s report, and his own conclusions, would not require confirmation or ratification by any of the governments concerned. U Thant later announced that he expected to publish his findings by 14 September.
Having gained the consent of the British, Sarawak and Sabah Governments, on 12 August U Thant announced that a ten-man mission of UN officials would visit the territories. Laurence Michelmore (USA) was nominated as the Secretary-General’s personal representative, and George Janacek (Czechoslovakia) as Michelmore’s deputy. The mission arrived in Kuching on 16 August, when Michelmore issued a statement to the people of the two territories explaining the purpose of the mission, and his fresh approach’. The latter was to invite opinions from all sections of the population, leaders, groups, and individuals who wished to express their views on the question of Malaysia. The plan had been to commence the ascertainment process as quickly as possible, with Michelmore heading the four-man team to remain in Sarawak, and Janacek to lead the team to go into Sabah. However, the UN officials did not begin their inquiries until 26 August, owing to dispute about the number and status of observers.
The UN’s initial agreement with Britain was that Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines should each be represented by four observers (two accompanying each team). But, on 19 August, Indonesia made a last-minute demand that it be allowed 30 observers. This figure was subsequently reduced to 12, and then 9. U Thant, who had threatened privately to withdraw the UN teams if agreement was not reached on the observers, intervened and suggested a compromise of four observers plus four subordinate officers. Britain accepted this suggestion on the understanding that the four additional observers be ‘junior assistants of clerical grade’. Malaya, the Philippines, and the Secretary-General agreed to this procedure, but Indonesia insisted that all its representatives have the status of full observers’.
Indonesia eventually accepted the two ‘observer’, two ‘clerical assistant’ formula for its observers’ status, but when the UN teams began their work on 26 August only the Malayan observers were present. Owing to visa difficulties—in Indonesia’s case because it sought to obtain visas for four ‘clerical assistants’, who in fact were officials of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry—the Philippine and Indonesian observers did not join the teams until 1 September. The UN teams spent three weeks in the territories, compiling evidence from individuals, and representatives of numerous organisations and political groups, in the many centres visited. Overall, the population welcomed the survey, with no Malays or indigenous Borneans taking part in two anti-Malaysia demonstrations staged in Sarawak on 27 and 30 August by Chinese youths. The mission left Kuching on 5 September.
In its report, the UN Malaysia Mission stated that it had found that Malaysia had been a major issue in the recent elections in the two territories; that electoral registers had been properly compiled, the elections freely and impartially conducted, and the votes properly polled and counted; and that the number of persons in detention was not sufficient to have affected the final results. It found that the majority of people in Sarawak and Sabah understood and were in favour of Malaysia. In carrying out its terms of reference, the mission was satisfied that it had reached a wide cross-section of the population of the territories, and that the opinion expressed by them represented the views of a sizable majority of the people. It was also satisfied that the time devoted to the hearings and the number of centres visited had been adequate. The report was published, and fully endorsed by U Thant on 14 September.
1 Sir Alexander Waddell.
2 See Document 97.
3 The National Liberation Front (FLN) headed Algeria’s struggle for independence from France from 1954 and in 1958, established the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) in Tunis. In 1962, the GPRA negotiated an agreement with the French Government, signed in March, which provided for an end to the fighting and for Algerian independence after a transition period. The GPRA came to power in July 1962.
4 On 31 August, Sarawak and Sabah assumed self-government in advance of the merger, confiding their federal powers in the interim to their respective governors. Lee’s idea of a ‘United States of Malaysia’ did not eventuate.
5 The plan was to declare Singapore independent within Malaysia on 31 August with all federal powers over defence and external affairs being reposed in the Singaporean Head of State until the date of the establishment of Malaysia.