Canberra, 27 August 1963
601. Secret Emergency
Reference Shann’s telegram 7621 which has just been repeated to you, please see Duncan Sandys2 immediately and tell him the substance of Shann’s telegram.
2. You should say that Sir Robert Menzies and I have considered Shann’s recommendation and support it. The Prime Minister pointed out to Mr Macmillan in his letter of 22nd August3 that we believed that the British Government had been reasonable about the matter of observers and we should have supported them whether or not they had agreed to the four additional clerical assistants.4
3. However, we do not think that having made these concessions it is reasonable to wreck the whole exercise by refusing the right to travel in their own civilian aircraft or requiring them to operate under unreasonable conditions. We also do not see why they should not be allowed to meet with Michelmore.5
4. If we were to come to the point when the ascertainment process were broken off as a result of Indonesian bad faith or unreasonable demands, it is essential that we should take any further decision on unexceptionable grounds which we can all publicly defend with a good conscience. If the Indonesian objections are as reported by Shann, then to allow the ascertainment process to be broken off on these grounds would leave us a much less defensible and perhaps indefensible position. We appreciate the pressures building up in Kuala Lumpur but we must keep in view how these matters will look in the United Nations and elsewhere.
5. You should also see the Tunku and speak to him in the same sense.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 9]
1 27 August, containing a request from Subandrio for Berwick’s support in persuading the British to permit an Indonesian plane to take the Indonesian observers and assistants direct to Sarawak. Britain was insisting that the Indonesians be sent to Singapore from where they would be taken in two groups by RAF aircraft to Sarawak and Sabah.
2 Sandys arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 24 August with wide discretionary powers to decide on all issues involved in the UN ascertainment process in North Borneo and Sarawak.
3 See Document 102. In the main, Menzies’ letter to Macmillan dealt with the possible approach Australia would take towards its future defence arrangements with Malaysia.
4 Shann’s recommendation was that, having achieved Indonesia’s agreement on the number of observers, Britain should meet the Indonesian request to undertake its own transport arrangements, so that the observers could be in place as soon as possible.
5 Laurence Michelmore, representative of the UN Secretary-General heading the UN Malaysia Mission.