Canberra, 29 August 1963
608. Secret Emergency
Reference your telegram No. 534.1
I want you to see Duncan Sandys again immediately and take up the very important issues which emerge from your report. You should know that I cannot share his satisfaction with the way the situation is working out. Nor can I accept the implication that a breaking-point will be inevitable come what may or that if it does it must come on a basis which we can all comfortably support.2
2. You should assure Sandys that I fully understand that prompt, firm and effective measures have been necessary to restore unity and confidence among the political elements within Malaysia. You may also repeat the view that indefensible Indonesian demands cannot be accepted or condoned. I am not quite satisfied, however, that our responses to their current requests have necessarily to be taken to the point where they could bring about a complete break with Indonesia. You should restate with Sandys the case for continuing with the effort represented by the Tunku/Sukarno talks in Tokyo (which the British supported) to bring Malaysia into existence with a minimum of regional friction and the maintenance of a basis for regional contacts with all that that may involve in Malay relationships generally. The maintenance of these contacts should not prevent any of us, but rather assist all of us, pursuing firm policies with Indonesia in the protection of our vital interests, difficult and involved as relations with Indonesia will continue to be. It would be difficult for me to accept the view that there is a better alternative in a continuing trial of strength with Indonesia with its consequences of stimulating extremist nationalism, pushing Indonesia back towards the Communist Powers, and removing the remaining restraints on Indonesian capacity to cause a great deal of damage. These are much more likely consequences than a passive Indonesian retreat.
3. On the particular question dealt with in your telegram3 you should say that the activities which Sandys fears the Indonesians are likely to engage in can surely be safeguarded against, by simple practical measures.
4. The Indonesians need not be given multiple entry visas4 but could not they be allowed as a group to meet Michelmore – which I understand them to desire.5 On the question of the announcement of a new date for Malaysia6 it is clearly important that the Malayans should make the attempt to explain in advance to the Indonesians the need for this decision.
5. In handling the interview Sandys should be left with a sense of responsibility to avoid (i) weakening the United Nations finding by some disputation about what is no more than a peripheral matter and (ii) damage to the Tunku’s position, having regard to the Tunku’s dealings so far with the other Malays, and (iii) jeopardising the continuing contact of the three Malay countries.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 9]
1 27 August, in which Critchley set out Sandys’ rejection of Barwick’s views (see Document 104), and the legalistic and security grounds he provided for doing so.
2 Sandys expected that the breaking point would come over the British refusal to accept senior intelligence officers being nominated as clerical assistants. He believed that the Indonesians did not intend to accept the UN’s report and that it was ‘preferable to break’ with them over observers ‘rather than have them criticize the scope, methods and reports of the United Nations teams’.
3 This dealt with the Indonesians travelling to Kuching in their own aircraft. Sandys contended that they could engage in subversive and terrorist activities, ferry in radio equipment, propaganda material, etc., and find excuses for delaying the plane in the territories, allowing the crew ‘to make a nuisance of themselves’. The Chief Ministers of Sarawak and Sabah also opposed an Indonesian plane flying into their territories on the ground that it would seriously affect morale in the territories.
4 The Indonesians had wanted multiple entry visas to enable them to move freely between Sabah and Sarawak.
5 Sandys contended that the Indonesians had not suggested that the observers should first meet Michelmore, and told Critchley, without giving any reasons, that he ‘hoped that they would not do so because he might feel obliged to meet this request’.
6 The Malayans were now standing firm on 16 September as the date for Malaysia.