106

Cablegram from Critchley to Barwick

Singapore, 29 August 1963

476. Secret Emergency

Your telegram 608.1

Sandys with Selkirk, Moore and Warner2 saw Woolcott and me early this morning. I went carefully through the points of your message.

2. Sandys said he fully agreed with your objectives, in particularly with the need, if possible, to bring to Malaysia into existence with a minimum of regional friction and with a basis for regional contacts. However, Indonesia seemed bent on a trial of strength and it appeared that the only concessions that would satisfy her would be to abandon Malaysia.

3. Sandys argued that far from damaging the Tunku’s position with the other Malays, the British objective was to build it up and to hope that a continuing contact of the three Malay countries would be possible. He agreed that continued Indonesian hostility would be deplorable but would not agree that Indonesia could be induced to accept Malaysia.

4. On the specific points mentioned in paragraph 4 of your telegram Sandys also agreed. The Indonesians had been told that the plane transporting the Indonesian teams would stop at Kuching and if all the Indonesians wanted to meet with Michelmore, there would be no objection. Ghazali was in Djakarta at present explaining in advance to the Indonesians the need for announcing new date for Malaysia in accordance with the Tokyo Agreement and despite Subandrio’s refusal to meet Razak here.3

5. Sandys then asked whether there was anything specific that we thought the British need or should do. I suggested that it would be a pity if the United Nations findings were weakened by a dispute over the individuals nominated by Indonesia and the Philippines as clerical assistants and asked whether Britain could accept their nominations at face value. Sandys backed by Selkirk, emphatically rejected this. Concessions on observers had already been made and Britain considered it necessary to stick to proposals that the Secretary-General himself had made. The Indonesians could not be satisfied. If further concessions were made another pretext would be found for obstructing the United Nations ascertainment. The Indonesians were trying to humiliate Britain and weaken morale in the territories. He asked how Australia would react to similar demands if the Indonesians were making similar raids across the border of New Guinea and Australians were being killed. He was already being accused of appeasement in the United Kingdom.

6. Selkirk claimed that there had been 43 incidents since April involving violence and stimulated from across the border.4 He asked whether it was not time that other governments stressed their disapproval to Indonesia. I assured him that Britain had our full support on this.

7. When we were leaving, Selkirk suggested that the main problem was to find ground on which the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and the Secretary-General could stand firm. He felt that the main Indonesian objective at present was to drive a wedge between Britain on the one hand and Australia and the United States on the other. This, he considered, part of a long term policy to eliminate Western bases and influence in the area which Indonesia hopes to dominate.

8. In concluding, Sandys stressed that he placed great store on Australian co-operation and hoped that you and the Prime Minister would understand that he was going as far as possible to meet the Indonesians. He asked me to assure you that he welcomed these frank exchanges and asked that you let him know specifically if there is anything further that you consider could reasonably be done. It is clear, however, that he does not think there is.

[NAA: A1838, 3034/11/51 part 2]

1 Document 105.

2 Frederick Warner, Head of the South-East Asian Department, Foreign Office, who was accompanying Sandys.

3 On 26 August, the Tunku had invited Subandrio to Kuala Lumpur for discussions of the issues concerning Indonesia. Subandrio declined the following day—citing ill-health—and suggested Razak come to Jakarta. Ghazali went in place of Razak on 28 August.

4 That is, the border between Indonesian Kalimantan and Sarawak.