Canberra, 4 October 1963
Secret
I think you should have some personal background information about recent developments over Malaysian defence. You are probably wondering about the precise significance of the Prime Minister’s pledge to assist in the defence of Malaysia. His final sentence was very carefully chosen and scrutinised by Cabinet as a carefully defined statement of intent to provide Malaysia with military assistance if certain circumstances arose. Beyond wanting it clearly understood that Britain has full responsibility with Malaysia for the defence of Malaysia and that any assistance given by Australia would be supplementary to that given by Britain, Cabinet did not give any clear leads as to the practical application of the commitment which very much remains to be worked out.
2. The Government’s views about British responsibility have in fact been formally conveyed to the British in a letter from Bunting to Kimber. You will recall that earlier in the year the Government took the view that Malaysian defence was the ‘primary responsibility’ of Britain. It became increasingly clear that this judgement could not be withheld from the British. The words ‘primary responsibility’ have gone out of use because of their lack of clarity and the governing thought is that Australian effort is ‘additional to’ the efforts of Malaysia and Britain. Bunting’s letter to Kimber contains the following passage—
On the authority of the Prime Minister I draw attention to the wording of the last paragraph of the statement in which it is said—
“…we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia’s territorial integrity and political independence.”1
By these words the Government wishes to convey or rather confirm that Australian participation is to be understood, especially by the Government of Britain, as being in addition to what Britain herself has undertaken to do, and not in substitution for British participation.’
3. The defence machinery will now prepare an early study on the present military situation in Malaysia and likely developments, and on the implications of acceptance by Australia of direct military responsibilities arising from the Prime Minister’s statement. The sorts of matters which obviously demand study include—
(a) estimate of the present threat in Malaysian Borneo and the capacity of the United Kingdom to contain it;
(b) assessment of Indonesia’s capability to step up this threat;
(c) likely forms of retaliation against Australia that might be considered by Indonesia;
(d) the military implications of committing our forces to Malaysian Borneo, especially in relation to S.E.A.T.O.;
(e) the implications of counting on our forces in plans for the external defence of Malaysia, in relation to S.E.A.T.O. commitments for these forces;
the extent to which Australia should engage in contingency planning with Britain for the defence of Malaysia.
4. As I have said, further interpretation and practical implementation of the Prime Minister’s statement remain to be worked out. The outcome will depend on the result of the planning studies, political developments, British pressures and the like. Further Cabinet consideration will be necessary.
5. Apart from the point in Bunting’s letter, there are two other aspects of particular concern to this Department which I would ask you to bear constantly in mind. They are—
(a) The Prime Minister’s statement lays stress on [assistance]2 to Malaysia. Any assistance is not to be, or seen to be, simply a part of British military effort or as deriving from British consultative and planning arrangements. It is important that Australian forces do not become regarded by other countries as assisting so-called imperialist or neo-colonialist purposes. Our actions are aimed to assist a sister (and Asian) Commonwealth country. Any assistance should be given at the specific request and with the co-operation of the Malaysian Government. This will require sensitive attention in view of the extensive nature of the British military machinery in Malaysia and Service procedures and methods (including the not always helpful effort of Service P.R.O.’s!)3
(b) Related to this is the need to ensure the recognition by the Services, both here and in Malaysia, that the Prime Minister’s announcement does not convert the issue into a (relatively) uncomplicated military question of preventing and dealing with border crossings. The main effort with the Indonesians is still at this stage a politico-diplomatic effort, just as, on the part of Indonesia, the main technique is the political discrediting of British Forces and bases in the region.
6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Cutts, Miss Dobson,4 Eastman (in New York),5 Hamilton,6 Loomes, Renouf,7 Shann and Woolcott.
[NAA: A1838, TS682/21/1 part 15]
1 Ellipsis in original document.
2 Word missing in original document.
3 Army, Navy and Air Force Public Relations Officers.
4 Ruth Dobson, Acting High Commissioner, Wellington.
5 Eastman was in New York as one of Australia’s representatives at the opening stages of the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly.
6 Robert Hamilton, Counsellor, London.
7 Alan Renouf, Minister, Washington.