Canberra, 11 November 1963
Secret
Current Developments Affecting Malaysia
Malayan Attitude
The Tunku believes that Indonesian bad faith has been clearly demonstrated and that new tripartite talks will only result in further meaningless promises. The task facing Malaysia in his view, is one of national consolidation and he has accordingly embarked upon a deliberate counter-confrontation campaign (burning of effigies, etc.). The effect of Indonesian confrontation has already been to unite the peoples of Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew, despite some disruptions of Singapore’s economy and employment by the Indonesian trade embargo, has stated publicly the need for unity and Singapore’s support for the Central Government. These developments have again caused the Tunku to toy with the idea of fragmenting the Indonesian archipelago.
2. The Minister feels that further tripartite talks would at present be unlikely to achieve any positive results. Since Sukarno would be unlikely to make concessions the Tunku would again be forced to be flexible, possibly to the detriment of his domestic position. Nevertheless we have been urging the Tunku to be responsive to Philippines overtures of recognition (see below) since this might facilitate isolation of Indonesia. Despite his expressions of loyalty there is a risk that economic consequences of Indonesian confrontation might tempt Lee Kuan Yew to put pressure on the Central Government to reach an early settlement with Indonesia. He has already alluded publicly to the eventual necessity of reaching a lasting solution to the problem of relations with Indonesia. We have suggested to the Tunku and Razak that it might be as well if Lee were denied the opportunity to say that the Tunku’s recalcitrance had unnecessarily prolonged the damage to Singapore. A difficulty, however, is that the vigour of the Tunku’s counter-confrontation campaign would seem to preclude the possibility of arriving at an early working relationship with Indonesia.
3. In this connection we have asked Critchley to support British arguments that it is against Malaysia’s own interests to go on talking about their ‘preconditions’ since in fact it is Sukarno who is setting intolerable conditions for talks. Similarly we have suggested to the Tunku that he might develop the argument that there is no evidence that the Indonesians want a conference. The evidence in fact is that Indonesia is still seeking to ‘crash’ Malaysia. Worked into this might be the inference that the Tunku is not against a conference if the prospects were reasonable. Critchley has reported that the Tunku seems to have accepted these arguments and this is reflected in his speech to Commonwealth Parliamentary Association on 4th November2 during which he expressed Malaysia’s willingness to come to terms with her neighbours ‘provided there is an honest attitude on their part for peace’.
4. We have also sought to discourage the Tunku from thinking that fragmentation of Indonesia is either possible or internationally defensible but we must expect the Tunku to be encouraged by the adverse effects within Indonesia of economic confrontation and Sukarno’s harsh strictures on listening to Radio Malaysia broadcasts.3
The Philippines Attitude
5. Macapagal, for domestic political reasons (Congressional elections are being held on 12th November) is on the verge of extending recognition to Malaysia. The principal Philippines aim is to ensure that Malaysia will agree beforehand to settle the Philippines claim to North Borneo. Malaysia has rebuffed recent Filipino moves for recognition by repeating their argument that the question of recognition does not arise as the Federation of Malaya and Malaysia are one and the same entity, that Malaysia has faithfully observed the Manila Agreements and that it expected the Philippines to do likewise, by accepting U Thant’s report, and that while Malaysia did not recognise the Philippines claim it was prepared to discuss it.
Indonesian Attitude
6. The Indonesians do not appear to be showing any great enthusiasm for talks with the Malaysians and have been wary of committing themselves to Thanat’s initiative.4 They are still maintaining a position that talks should be without ‘preconditions’ thus enabling them to maintain confrontation and press for Malaysian concessions. This would make talks completely unacceptable to the Malaysians. At the same time all our evidence indicates that they intend to maintain their military and economic confrontation.
7. In Borneo Indonesia is building up its resources in the border area although we believe the present security forces will be able to handle any forces the Indonesians can deploy in the next six months. Indonesia is likely to avoid any major incidents during GANEFO5 this month (beginning 10th November). Indonesia also appears to intend to continue its economic embargo of Malaysia and the diversion of its trade from Malaysian merchants and processors. While Indonesia has had some minor success in establishing direct trade relations with interested countries it still has serious problems in disposing of its export products. There are already indications that the economic embargo and confrontation is having a detrimental effect on the Indonesian economy and consequently on public morale.
8. The Indonesians are also revealing signs of sensitivity and apprehension about internal security and concern with6 Malaysia and its Western allies may attempt to engage in activities in the outer islands. A new decree imposes heavy penalties on a wide variety of acts which are defined as subversion, espionage and sabotage. A recent report states that heavy penalties will be imposed on Indonesians found listening to Radio Malaysia. Previously an Information spokesman had said Indonesia did not care about this Radio’s propaganda and did not prevent its nationals listening to it.
9. In the present atmosphere of tension and change it is difficult to anticipate, with confidence, the likely course of Indonesian action. There appears to be a tendency at the higher level to rationalise and believe in the inevitability of Indonesian success. Economic confrontation is described as ‘a blessing in disguise’ and offers of aid are expected from many countries. The Indonesians apparently expect to suffer initial setbacks and hardships but believe that in the end the British influence will be forced out of the region and Malaysia will be cased in their own mould. The Indonesians appear to have assessed that they must carry through this confrontation in order to maintain their momentum and break out of the sphere of Western influence.
10. It is probably for this reason that Indonesia does not seem anxious to reach an accommodation with Malaysia and appears to be preparing for a drawn-out struggle.
11. It is not clear that the United States has accepted this assessment of Indonesian actions and is now prepared to adopt an uncompromising attitude to Sukarno and make full use of its power to restrain him. There is a danger that our position may be eroded by Indonesian pressure regarded by the United States as minor. An example is the current Indonesian pressure on the United States for rice supplies and assistance to increase kerosene production. We have argued that if the United States yields to this pressure the Indonesians will draw unfortunate conclusions about the strength of United States resolve and future United States threats to withdraw aid will have no influence on Indonesia. The primary concern of the United States appears to be to keep Indonesia from going communist and other issues are marginal to this. The United States is also probably not fully convinced that its interests are best served by splitting the Philippines from Indonesia apparently having some sympathy for the Philippines argument that they are acting as a brake on Indonesian action.
Prospects for Bangkok
12. During the Colombo Plan Officials’ Meetings there were persistent but relatively moderate exchanges between Indonesian and Malaysian delegates. There have so far (11th November) been only oblique references to Malaysia in the Minister’s meetings. Tun Razak, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister who is leading the Malaysian delegation, has in his public statements denied any intention of entering into informal talks on Malaysia with the Philippines and Indonesia during the Conference.7 If, however, he is unable to avoid some discussions he seems likely to take a hard uncompromising line with Lopez and Subandrio.
13. Thanat Khoman’s informal soundings, encouraged by the Americans, of prospects for a further tripartite meeting have not made much progress. The Indonesian Government has not responded to his suggestions that as a basis for a settlement there should be agreement on the resumption of normal diplomatic relations, that the Manila Agreements should remain in force and that other differences should be settled by peaceful discussions. The Tunku replied that as a prior condition verbal attacks by Indonesia should cease and that Indonesian forces be withdrawn from Sarawak border areas. The Philippines, while not opposed to Thanat’s proposals have tended to concentrate on the problem of recognition of Malaysia.
14. In pursuing his objectives Thanat has been much influenced by the Minister’s arguments that a further tripartite meeting in the present circumstances would be unlikely to achieve positive results and might weaken the Tunku’s position and that of Malaysia.8
15. Lopez (Foreign Secretary, Philippines) and Razak (Malayan Deputy Prime Minister) will be leading their respective delegations at Bangkok. Lopez has requested Australian assistance in securing top level bilateral talks with Malayans. He does not know that we have in fact been urging the Tunku to be receptive to Filipino overtures. There may be value in bringing Lopez and Razak together at the Colombo Plan Conference.
16. The United States Embassy in Bangkok is under instructions to desist from any attempts to reconcile the three parties. The State Department has accepted for the time being the Minister’s arguments against a further tripartite meeting at present.
17. Indonesia will see Ministerial representation at Bangkok for the Colombo Plan meeting not so much as an opportunity to arrange a reconciliation by accommodation but as necessary to ensure that the Philippines do not yield to Western pressures and to assess whether they can force Malaysia into a less favourable international position by appearing flexible. They may also use the meeting to further assess the degree of commitment and resolve of the supporters of Malaysia. The reasons for the recent decision of Dr. Subandrio, who is now also First Minister,9 to visit Bangkok at the time of (but not for) the Colombo Plan Conference,10 is not entirely clear. Indonesia may be seeking to ensure that her position is not undermined by diplomatic activity taking place in Bangkok in the absence of her Foreign Minister. However, Subandrio’s visit may presage an attempt by Indonesia to change her public tactics from confrontation to Maphilindo. This possibility was hinted at by Nasution in a recent conversation with the Australian Embassy.11
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1 part 6]
1 Prepared for Tange’s visit to Southeast Asia, 16–28 November, following his attendance at the Ministerial Meeting of the 15th Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, 11–15 November in Bangkok. From there, he was to visit Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Saigon. Copies of this paper, with covering memorandum No. 687, dated 12 November, were sent to London, Washington, New York, Jakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Wellington, Bangkok, New Delhi, and Tokyo.
2 The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) consists of the national, provincial and state parliaments and legislatures of the countries of the Commonwealth. It meets annually and provides a forum for an independent exchange of views between members. The 9th CPA Conference was held in Kuala Lumpur, 4–9 November 1963.
3 On 6 November, Sukarno had decreed that any Indonesian caught listening to Radio Malaysia became liable to one-year imprisonment.
4 See Document 123.
5 The Games of the New Emerging Forces, hosted by Indonesia and held 10–23 November. GANEFO was inspired originally by Indonesia’s suspension from the International Olympics Committee following its action in debarring Israel and Formosa from attending the Asian Games of 1962. The major international amateur sporting bodies did not participate.
6 Possibly, ‘that’.
7 The Colombo Plan was a cooperative venture in economic and social development in southern and south-eastern Asia, established in 1950 by seven Commonwealth countries—Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the UK. Membership of the plan was soon extended and by 1963 included a further twelve countries from South and Southeast Asia, the US, Japan and South Korea. Indonesia joined in 1953; the Philippines and Thailand in 1954; and Malaysia (as Malaya) in 1957. The Officials’ Meeting of the 15th Consultative Committee was held in Bangkok 30 October – 8 November 1963.
8 See Document 125.
9 This information was possibly a late addition to the paper on 12 November, the day Sukarno announced Subandrio’s appointment as First Minister.
10 Subandrio arrived in Bangkok for talks with the Philippine and Thai foreign ministers on 15 November, the day after Razak had returned to Kuala Lumpur.
11 On 7 November, Jakarta reported that Nasution had said Indonesia wanted to solve the problem of Malaysia in the spirit of musjawarah (deliberation, discussion) and not by ‘legal procedures’ and that he thought ‘the brightest future of Indonesia lay with Maphilindo’. The remarks were made during the Naval Attache’s farewell call on General Nasution on 6 November.