Canberra, 18 December 1963
Top Secret
Military Implications for Australia of the Malaysian Situation
Introduction
Attached at Appendix A is an extract from a British paper listing the additional forces in eastern Malaysia which Britain considers would be the most useful Australian and New Zealand contributions if a request for help were made by the Government of Malaysia.2 No such request has yet been made.
2. This report is concerned with the military implications of a possible commitment of Australian forces in eastern Malaysia in support of the British/Malaysian forces. Political aspects, in particular the most effective way in which Australia can at this stage bring influence to bear on Indonesia to modify her policies, are being examined separately by the Department of External Affairs.3
The Threat
3. The Anzam Joint Intelligence Committee, at meetings in Canberra last week4 which were attended by two British representatives from Singapore and a New Zealand representative, reached an agreed assessment of the military threat from Indonesia to the Malaysian area up to the end of March 1964. The conclusions of this assessment are at Appendix B.5
4. In summary, the Anzam JIC concluded that major acts of overt aggression against British or Malaysian armed forces are unlikely, but there could be some overt military activities which might lead to incidents between Indonesian and British or Malaysian armed forces. Border raids will increase in frequency from their present rate of 10 per month, and deep penetrations (beyond 15 miles) will become more likely. Many of the border raids will continue to be ineffective. The overall number of raiders available could reach a maximum of 2,400 by March 1964. Attempts may be made to use the CCO military potential in Sarawak but the CCO is not yet ready to mount a major insurrection. In summary, the Indonesian covert threat will not get markedly worse in the next few months but could build up gradually, as Indonesian capability improves.
British/Malaysian Forces
5. The British Chiefs of Staff paper shows the following forces deployed in eastern Malaysia now:—
(a) six British battalions (three white and three Gurkha) and two Malaysian battalions (a third Malaysian battalion will be available for operations by February 1964);
(b) one escort, two coastal minesweepers and one Royal Malaysian Navy fast patrol boat;
(c) sufficient air forces in all categories to meet the current situation. Fighter and strike aircraft are not required or deployed.
6. The Malaysian army has a further five battalions in Malaya/Singapore. These are not in a high state of readiness or training and are earmarked primarily for anti-terrorist operations and internal security. Additional British battalions for the theatre would have to be drawn from Western Europe, the Middle East, or the Strategic Reserve in the United Kingdom.
Present Situation
7. In the light of the assessed threat, the British/Malaysian forces available are broadly able to deal with the present situation.
8. The ground forces are adequate to deal with the present level of border raids and internal unrest, particularly having regard to the availability of a third Malaysian battalion in February. Forces in the theatre are adequate to provide rotation and relief for units deployed in eastern Malaysia while the threat remains at its present level. While Australian forces would undoubtedly be useful, there is no immediate and urgent military requirement for the committal of these forces. Moreover the committal of the Australian forces sought by the United Kingdom would not materially affect the military course of events in eastern Malaysia at this time.
Nature Of Possible Australian Contribution
9. Australia already provides sizeable forces to the defence of Malaysia:—
(a) permission was given earlier this year for the use of two RAN escorts of the Strategic Reserve for general patrol duties, protection of Allied forces in the area and the prevention of infiltration of insurgents by sea.6 These have not yet been used in this role;
(b) the two fighter squadrons and the radar unit at Butterworth have been placed on air defence alert and are available for use in this role in accordance with agreed rules of procedure.7 This has required an increase in our radar personnel.
10. If Australia were to offer a contribution in due course to meet an increase in the scale of the Indonesian threat, it should be from our forces already stationed in Malaysia for the following reasons:—
(a) the defence and security of Malaysia have always been a role of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (although it was originally envisaged that this would be only against a Communist threat);
(b) our forces in Malaysia are trained and available for the type of operations required;
(c) any forces sent from Australia would weaken our ability to send forces to a SEATO situation or to meet any emergency requirement for the defence of Australian territories;
(d) forces sent from Australia would have to be relieved after four to six months in the area; this would involve additional commitments which we may not be able to meet;
(e) sending forces from Australia could be the beginning of ever-increasing commitments to Malaysian defence;
(f) our naval and air force elements in the Strategic Reserve are already committed in part; it is logical that any extension of our support to the present situation should be from the Strategic Reserve;
(g) sending forces from Australia whilst the AMF8 element of the Strategic Reserve was uncommitted would adversely affect the morale of these troops.
11. As our naval and air elements of the Strategic Reserve are already committed to eastern Malaysia to the maximum extent necessary at this stage, any further contribution should be from our Army element of the Strategic Reserve. This could best be by the use of our battalion in 28 Commonwealth Brigade9 in rotation with the British and New Zealand battalions. The military requirement for this however will not arise unless the Indonesian threat increases beyond its present level.
Detailed Comments On British Requests
12. As indicated in Appendix A, Britain has suggested that the following are the types of assistance which Australia could best provide to meet the present covert threat:—
(a) two complete light anti-aircraft batteries;
(b) one Special Air Service squadron;
(c) an airfield construction unit or personnel and plant for the improvement of airfields;
(d) permission for the use of Cocos Island by V bombers and long range transport aircraft.
13. Regarding (a), it would be possible for Australia to provide a LAA battery but this could only be for a maximum period of six months, as we could not relieve it from our existing strength. Air defence, however, is not a prime requirement in the present covert situation, but might suddenly arise.
14. Our SAS Company is a highly trained unit and it would be practicable to provide a squadron and arrange for its relief from within the Company. It would not however be used for its primary purpose if, as envisaged in the British Chiefs of Staff paper, it were required to train police and border scouts in border surveillance.
15. Regarding (c) our airfield construction squadron could only be deployed to Malaysia to the detriment of the urgent tasks of constructing the new airfield at Tindal10 and improving the airfield at Amber!ey for the B–47 aircraft.11 In any event an airfield construction squadron should not be required for building the small jungle strips which are required in eastern Malaysia. This task could be better performed by Army engineer units which it would be difficult for Australia to supply.
16. As the result of the Indonesians’ policy of confrontation the Cocos Island airfield has assumed increased importance for aircraft staging, and it would be of considerable assistance to the United Kingdom if it could be made available for occasional use by their V bombers and long range transports. Currently, Department of Civil Aviation have prohibited its continued use by these aircraft because of possible damage resulting from high tyre pressures and the limited repair facilities in situ. It is probable, however, that intermittent landings as envisaged by Britain would not result in damage to the airstrip.
17. Department of Air would consider the use of some Hercules effort to transport Department of Works personnel and equipment to carry out repairs if any damage is caused by these aircraft during the infrequent use of Cocos envisaged by the United Kingdom. Materials could be prepositioned for this work by ship. If Department of Civil Aviation are prepared to accept an assurance from Department of Air in the above terms, Cocos could then be made available for transit of long range transports and V bombers of the Royal Air Force.
Additional Support To Meet The Present Covert Threat Or a Possible Increase In The Threat
18. In item (b) of Appendix A Britain has suggested that the following additional types of support would be of great assistance to meet the present covert threat and would assume added importance if this threat were to increase:—
(a) use of the Australian battalion of 28 Commonwealth Brigade on the understanding that it would not have to be replaced from Britain;
(b) use of Hercules transport aircraft;
(c) a RAAF Iroquois helicopter squadron;
(d) the use of RAN ships for transporting troops;
(e) provision of Army logistic support personnel;
(f) administrative and technical personnel to support RAAF aircraft.
19. The use of our battalion in 28 Commonwealth Brigade is commented on in paragraphs 7 and 8.
20. Hercules type aircraft are not necessary for supply operations in the jungle; there is a greater requirement for these aircraft for RAAF transport and Army support operations and they should be reserved for these purposes. Movement of heavy equipment from Singapore to Borneo can more efficiently be carried out by ship.
21. Australia is not in a position to supply a squadron of Iroquois helicopters. At most we could provide four aircraft and crews about April 1964. This would be detrimental to the working up of our recently formed operational squadron and could only be at the expense of much needed Army training.
22. It would be uneconomical, and a wrongful use of war vessels, to employ our frigates on transporting troops. At present, owing to Indonesian economic confrontation of Malaysia, there are some 150 small merchantmen idle in Singapore harbour which could be better used for this work.
23. It is doubtful if there is a pressing need for Australian assistance to the logistic support tasks listed by the British Chiefs of Staff. Malaysia herself should be able to supply the unskilled and semi-skilled labour required. If Australia were to provide soldiers for logistic support they would become integrated in British or Malaysian units and would not be an identifiable or appropriate Australian contribution to Malaysian defence.
24. The RAAF has no surplus administrative and technical personnel to help in maintaining aircraft. We are already heavily committed in the air defence of Malaysia. It is not proposed that we offer further RAAF aircraft and we could not provide any additional RAAF ground staff support without adverse effects on our home commitments.
[ matter ommited ]
Possible Indonesian Retaliatory Measures Against Australia
27. Indonesian retaliation against Australia if our forces were to be committed in anti-insurgency operations on the present scale in eastern Malaysia may take several forms, which are discussed below.
28. Action Against Eastern New Guinea. Indonesia might engineer retaliatory and diversionary incidents along the Papua New Guinea (PNG) border. These incidents might take the form of:—
(a) attacks by ‘volunteers’ against soft targets near the border;
(b) infiltration by both Indonesians and pro-Indonesian Papuans for the purpose of subversion;
(c) subversion by more indirect methods such as propaganda, penetration of trade unions, youth groups and so on by local communists, perhaps with links to the PKI. While some pro-Indonesian groups might develop among the natives, these would not constitute an indigenous insurgent threat.
29. Although these incidents would not constitute a military threat in themselves, the Indonesians would probably assess that these would force Australia to disperse her efforts by sending troops to eastern New Guinea.
30. Action Against Sea Communications. Indonesia might deny free passage to ships by the closure of her claimed territorial waters, including the international straits. This would necessitate major sea route diversions. It is also possible although unlikely that Indonesia would lay mines in these waters.
31. Denial of the right of transit through Indonesian territorial waters to all shipping bound from or to Australia would have little effect on the Australian economy, and no effect on shipping routes between Australia and her three most important trading partners, the United Kingdom, United States and Japan (except between West Australian ports and Japan).
32. Action Against Air Communications. The Indonesians could be expected to deny overflying rights to military aircraft supporting the land forces in eastern Malaysia. The most suitable diversion for these aircraft would be via Pearce12 or Learmonth,13 Cocos and round northern Sumatra to Butterworth. This highlights the importance of the airfield at Cocos.
33. If there is a requirement to operate Dakota aircraft14 in Malaysia the only suitable diversionary route would be through eastern New Guinea and the Philippines. Its availability for ferrying between Australia and Malaysia would therefore be dependent on the good-will of the Philippines.
34. If all flying over the Indonesian archipelago were prohibited, civil air communications between Australia and some destinations in South East Asia and the Far East would have to be re-routed. It is understood that Qantas would use the alternative route around the north of Sumatra from Perth or Darwin to Singapore.
Conclusions
35. It is concluded that:—
(a) Australia is already making a sizeable contribution to Malaysian defence. There is no pressing military need at present for Australian military assistance in eastern Malaysia;
(b) Although they may be useful and desirable there is no urgent military necessity for a light anti-aircraft artillery battery, a SAS squadron, or an airfield construction squadron which Britain has suggested Australia could provide now to meet the present covert threat;
(c) Australia could provide the elements in (b) above only with detriment to our ability to mount a force from Australia to meet our SEATO commitments or to our ability to meet some known (airfield construction) or possible future commitments for defence of Australian territories;
(d) The use of Cocos Island for intermittent landings of British V bombers and long range transport aircraft could be agreed as suggested in paragraphs 16 and 17 above;
(e) For the reasons stated in paragraphs 19 to 24 above Australia should not offer to provide assistance to meet the additional requests by Britain stated in paragraph 18;
(f) If any commitment is made by Australia in due course to the defence of eastern Malaysia in a deteriorating covert situation it should be from our elements in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve;
(g) As our naval and air elements of the Strategic Reserve are already committed to the maximum extent necessary, the next contribution should be our battalion of 28 Commonwealth Brigade, on rotation with the British and New Zealand battalions;
[ matter omitted ]
(i) if our forces were to be committed to anti-insurgency operations in eastern Malaysia, Indonesia might engineer diversionary incidents against the Papua/New Guinea border and take obstructive action against our sea and air communications.15
[NAA: A4940, C1473]
1 Defence Committee Meeting No. 84/1963. The report was submitted to Cabinet for consideration by the new Minister for Defence, Paul Hasluck, on 19 December. Hasluck had assumed the portfolio the previous day, on Townley’s retirement due to ill-health.
2 See Documents 135 and 136.
3 Document 136.
4 Meetings were held 11–12 December.
5 Not published.
6 On 26 January 1963, the Australian Government had agreed to a British request for the use of the two escort vessels serving with the Strategic Reserve on the Far East Station–HMAS Vampire and HMAS Voyager–in patrolling territorial waters off the North Borneo coast or on the high seas.
7 See footnote 3, Document 136.
8 Australian Military Forces.
9 At the time, this was the 3rd battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 3 RAR, based at Terendak.
10 In 1963 Tindal, a World War II airbase located in the Katherine region of the Northern Territory, was in the process of being reconstructed as a ‘bare base’, designed to be used as a back-up to the RAAF base at Darwin, and for exercises.
11 An RAAF base near Ipswich in southeast Queensland. In October, Australia had accepted the loan of US B–47 bombers as an interim arrangement until delivery was taken of the new F–111 aircraft for the RAAF. B–47 aircraft subsequently visited Australia, but the loan arrangement was cancelled in June 1964.
12 RAAF base 30 km north of Perth, Western Australia.
13 RAAF bare base at North West Cape, Western Australia.
14 Transport aircraft.
15 Cabinet Decision No. 3 (FAD) of 19 December accepted the Defence Committee’s view that there was no pressing need at that stage for Australian military assistance in Eastern Malaysia, and decided that additional forces at that time ‘would be ahead of need’. The request for the use of Cocos Island by V-bombers and LRT aircraft was approved, however, as was the possible diversion of the Australian Engineers’ Squadron with the CSR from its proposed project at Mukdahan (on the Thai-Laos border, north of Ubon) to Eastern Malaysia.