Canberra, 9 January 1964
31. Secret Priority
Indonesian Attitudes
The Malaysian Government may have seen recent public references in Djakarta to the personal message which the Minister sent to Subandrio last week.1 They will also have seen the specious commentary of the Indonesian ‘Herald’ referred to in our telegram No. 17.2
2. You might show the Tunku and Razak the text of the Minister’s message to Subandrio as contained in telegram No. 1447 to Djakarta3. Shann has had lengthy discussions with Subandrio arising out of this message and it would be valuable if you gave the Tunku and Razak a confidential account of what we believe to be the main points emerging from these discussions. A summary follows and there would be no objection to your going over these points with them. Summary begins:—
(a) Subandrio recalled Indonesia’s efforts of Tokyo and Manila to find a solution and he kept reverting to ideas of regional association.4 While he said that the Malaysians should accept the Maphilindo concept, he also talked at considerable length about wider regional arrangements in South East Asia. Subandrio stressed that the Malaysians should show genuine regional co-operativeness. It was not enough for the Malaysians to be apostles of anti-communism.
(b) He referred with elaboration to Macapagal’s desire for ‘technical talks’ between the three countries. Indonesia had no objection, but would not recognize Malaysia in advance.
(c) Subandrio several times said that Indonesia was not ‘reckless’ and would not take action which would plunge the area into hostilities. At the same time Indonesia would not ‘capitulate’.
(d) Indonesia did want a way out of the present problems, but they were complex and would not be solved quickly. When pressed concerning Indonesian behaviour on the Borneo borders, Subandrio would not commit himself, but recalled that at the time of Tokyo and at Manila he looked for a way out of the border difficulties. If there were prospects of a settlement then things would become clearer. Questioned on this, he said he saw some chances of a settlement.
3. While Subandrio went over much old ground, Shann’s general impression is that the Indonesians are considerably worried by the situation into which they are getting themselves, although they will not accept a solution which they would regard as imposed upon them.
4. There is nothing novel or especially encouraging about these discussions, but at least frank and useful contacts have been re-opened which the Minister intends to maintain. If the Indonesians are reaching the point of thinking again about their current policies, there is all the more need for sensitive and responsible conduct on the part of the Malaysian leaders. We shall repeat to you as they come to hand Cutts’ reports from Manila on Sukarno’s visit and it will be important to ensure that any statements by the Malaysians are made after full and careful deliberation.5
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 2]
The Kennedy Mediation Talks
The threat to the peace of Southeast Asia posed by Indonesia’s continued policy of confrontation towards Malaysia heightened international concern for the situation. The US, increasingly pre-occupied with Vietnam, was particularly worried that guerrilla operations in the Borneo states could quickly escalate into a major conflict. On 13 January 1964, it was announced in Washington that the US Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, acting as the personal representative of President Johnson, would confer with President Sukarno in Tokyo in ‘a last effort at preventative diplomacy’. Kennedy was charged with ensuring that Sukarno understood the serious view taken by the US of Indonesia’s confrontation policy towards Malaysia, and to emphasise the policy’s adverse effect on Indonesia’s prospects of continued US aid.
The first talks took place in Tokyo on 17–18 January while Sukarno was making an unofficial visit to Japan. Kennedy’s aim was to end armed hostilities and to initiate negotiations towards a political settlement of the dispute. The outcome was to be left to the parties concerned: ‘an Asian solution ’. A brief statement issued at the end of what were described officially as cordial and friendly talks said that it had been agreed that the problem of Malaysia should be worked out in consultations between the three countries concerned – Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. In order that ‘a favourable climate for the consultations should be created’, Sukarno agreed to call off hostilities by the end of January provided the Malaysian Government agreed to take part in the talks.
After stopping in Manila to inform President Macapagal of the talks, Kennedy arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 21 January for discussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Tunku agreed to participate in a Maphilindo ministerial meeting to be held in early February, and to a summit meeting which would follow at a later date. The Tunku’s only stipulation was that a meeting between himself and Macapagal proposed by Prince Sihanouk take place in Phnom Penh before any summit.
On 22 January, Kennedy had a further meeting with Sukarno in Jakarta. The following day, it was officially announced that Sukarno had issued a cease-fire order to the Indonesian forces on the Malaysian border; that the heads of government of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia had agreed to meet in an effort to improve relations in the region; and that a tripartite summit meeting would be preceded by a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries.
Within hours of Kennedy’s departure for Thailandfor discussions with Thanat Khoman on the holding of the proposed tripartite talks in Bangkok, Sukarno and Subandrio told a mass rally that Indonesia would continue her confrontation policy against Malaysia. Neither mentioned the cease-fire.
Following his brief visit to Bangkok, Kennedy travelled to London where on 24–26 January he held talks with Sir Alec Douglas-Home, R.A. ‘Rab’ Butler, Duncan Sandys and other British ministers on the situation. His objective was to gain an assurance from the British Government that it and the Malaysian Government would make a ‘sincere and genuine attempt’ to obtain a negotiated solution. However, he was not prepared to discuss possible bases for such a settlement, maintaining his position that the three parties concerned must resolve the issue themselves.
Kennedy’s mediatory efforts finished in New York on 28 January when, at the request of the Indonesian, Philippine and Malaysian Governments, he saw UN Secretary-General U Thant regarding UN assistance in maintaining the cease-fire.
1 Document 142.
2 The Herald editorial suggested Australia’s decision not to send troops to the Borneo states at this stage showed that Australia was now seeing Malaysia as a ‘neo-colonialist project in Asia manipulated from London’.
3 That is, No. 1477 (see Document 142).
4 See editorial note, 1963 Tripartite Talks.
5 Sukarno and Subandrio had talks with Macapagal in Manila 7–11 January, during which they reiterated that Indonesia’s confrontation policy would continue against Malaysia in its existing form. A communique issued at the end of the talks expressed the view that the Malaysian question could be resolved within the framework of Maphilindo and referred to a future tripartite summit meeting between the three countries. Razak responded to the communique saying that Malaysia would attend a summit meeting provided that Malaysia was recognised as a sovereign state, that Indonesia ceased its confrontation policy, and that Indonesian troops were withdrawn from the Borneo states and their border areas.