Washington, 22 January 1964
177. Secret Guard
You will have gathered from my messages that I have not been enthusiastic about Robert Kennedy’s intervention in the Malaysian matter. One reason for this was my feeling that those responsible for this trip had not been sufficiently aware of or had ignored the danger that the trip might result in weakening the Tunku’s position and, conversely, strengthening Soekarno’s.
2. I have spoken recently to Rusk, McNamara,1 William Bundy (Assistant Secretary of Defense)2 and Dean Acheson,3 as well as to McGeorge Bundy4—see my 103.5 It seems clear that there were two main motives behind Kennedy’s trip. Firstly, the President6 was alarmed lest Soekarno’s confrontation should result in serious hostilities into which the United States would inevitably be drawn, and he felt that there should be a last attempt to warn Soekarno bluntly of the consequences of his present policy. Secondly, the President wanted to be able to meet Congressional criticism if he certified that the giving of aid to Indonesia was in the best interests of the United States by saying that he had persuaded Soekarno to stop confrontation.7 Someone (probably McGeorge Bundy) then suggested, and the President agreed, that Kennedy be sent to Soekarno to give him a stiff warning.
3. According to McNamara, these matters were discussed at a National Security Council meeting, so that it is not true to say that Rusk did not know of the decision. But I have little doubt that he disliked the fact that Kennedy was being sent. I found him defensive and, as it seemed to me, a little unhappy. He and the others all say that it was never intended that Kennedy should try to negotiate another tripartite meeting, Rusk going so far as to say that this had previously been suggested by Addis8 in Manila. I cannot quite believe these disclaimers, and Kennedy has himself just announced in Kuala Lumpur that one of his reasons for going was to get the three parties together again.
4. You will remember that at the quadripartite talks last October9 a good deal was said about the Tunku’s political difficulties if he was pushed into making concessions to placate Soekarno, and this was one of the reasons why it was agreed that there was no point in a further tripartite meeting for the time being. I was surprised therefore to find that McNamara seemed to be unaware of these political difficulties which the Tunku faced and I suspect that the President and Kennedy may also have been unaware of them.
5. There is in addition another aspect to this matter. I suspect that this trip is also partly motivated by domestic politics and Kennedy’s own ambitions. Having now recovered from the shock of his brother’s assassination (a profound threat to his political prospects as well as a deep emotional shock), Kennedy is now thinking of his own political future, including his chances of obtaining the Vice Presidential nomination.10 With this in view, he would be willing to take this assignment which, if it could be presented as being successful, would enhance his stature. The propaganda machine is already hard at work praising his last mission and exhibiting photographs and other build-up material in the press about the activities of his wife and himself on the present trip. For Johnson’s part, it has been suggested that he would welcome Kennedy on the ticket with him so as to gain the electoral benefit of the Kennedy name next November. (Dean Acheson jolted me a little yesterday by suggesting another motive behind the trip, namely, that there might be a long range plan afoot to install Kennedy as Secretary of State after the next Presidential elections.)
6. If Kennedy succeeds, as he seems to have done, in persuading Soekarno publicly to renounce confrontation, he will certainly improve his political stature here; and if thereafter the Tunku (or Razak) rejects any conditions which Soekarno may impose either before or at some tripartite meeting, the blame will be put on the Tunku and not on Kennedy.
7. Perhaps the foregoing does not do justice to the President and those about him, but after nearly six years in Washington observing the way politics are conducted and the American passion for gimmicks, I cannot help feeling a little uneasy. In all the circumstances I think the Australian Government would do well to continue to regard the Kennedy exercise and its ultimate outcome with considerable reserve.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 2]
1 Robert McNamara, US Secretary of State for Defense.
2 William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
3 Dean Acheson, former US Secretary of State 1949–53.
4 President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
5 14 January. Beale informed Barwick that Bundy had told him that Kennedy had been instructed by the President ‘to take a very strong line’ and that there was ‘no thought of anything in the way of compromise’. Beale told Barwick that he was anxious about the mission and that if it was motivated by domestic politics, ‘the temptation to offer inducements to Sukarno might be greater’.
6 Lyndon Baines Johnson, who had been sworn in as President after the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963.
7 There was growing domestic reaction in the US to continuing aid to Indonesia without any change in Sukarno’s policy towards Malaysia.
8 John Mansfield Addis, UK Ambassador to the Philippines.
9 See Document 129.
10 US Presidential elections were due to be held in November 1964.