Canberra, 4 February 1964
91. Secret Immediate
Please deliver this message from me to Dr. Subandrio immediately. It is important that he should receive it before the Tripartite meetings begin:1
Begins:—
I have studied your letter of 6th January, 1964,2 with great care and I am grateful to you for your frankness in replying to me. I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by my traversing in detail your arguments about past events. It is clear that we see many of these events in a different light. My main concern is that you should fully understand my point of view and I can assure you that I am always anxious to know yours, to which I shall naturally give the closest attention. We may often be obliged to disagree but there is still merit in our comprehending fully each other’s point of view.
One thing which disturbs me is a reference in your letter to Malaysian leaders seeking the ‘collapse or surrender of Indonesia’. I am as you know closely in touch with Malaysian leaders and I can assure you that this is not their aim. Their aim, like that of Australia, is the peace and prosperity of our region. May I suggest to you that so long as Indonesian-controlled forces remain on Malaysian territory, the region cannot have either peace or prosperity. I was happy to have your assurance again that you would do your utmost to find a peaceful solution to this problem. This has always been my understanding of your position and I was glad to know that recent events have not changed your resolution in this matter. To me, it seems that the first step is the withdrawal of Indonesian-controlled or inspired forces, followed by a prolongation of the cease fire, and then further discussions in the spirit of Musjawarah.3
Australia welcomed the initiative of the United States Government in sending Mr. Robert Kennedy to Tokyo for discussions with President Sukarno and we earnestly hope that the meeting in Bangkok will be productive. If it is not, I am coming to the conclusion that there may be no alternative to the reference of the question of the presence of Indonesian forces in Eastern Malaysia to the United Nations.
You refer in your letter to Indonesian unwillingness to accept the imposition of power politics from outside and Indonesian spokesmen have referred to an ‘Asia for the Asians’ solution. I do not myself see any attempt in the present situation to introduce power politics from outside. Nor would I wish to see ‘power politics’ in the region at all. After all, British and Malaysian forces are only in the area in response to Indonesia’s admitted intrusion of guerrilla forces into Malaysia. The aggressive use of forces as an instrument of policy, or, to use your phrase, the imposition of power politics comes from inside the region. So far as Asian solution of the current situation is concerned all friends of Indonesia and Malaysia believe that in present circumstances it is best for Indonesia and Malaysia to get together and solve their differences themselves without outside interference. But I hope this belief will not become liable to misinterpretation and to erection into the doctrine that there is no place in this region or in the decision of matters concerning it and its security for non-Asians. Not only are there two non-Asian countries in the region, Australia and New Zealand, each with a vital interest in the security and manner of the development for this region including Indonesia, lies in the attraction of foreign capital and foreign technical assistance.4 This must come mainly from non-Asian sources. I assume that Indonesia with her ‘production sharing’ scheme is seeking to interest foreign capital and obtain foreign expert assistance. To me this seems a matter of some importance and if it were to be in any way hindered by the development of an idea that there was no place in Asia or in the consideration of its affairs for anyone but Asians, we should all be the poorer and those noble aims of improving the lot of our peoples would be still further postponed.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 20]
1 The meetings were set to begin on 5 February.
2 Subandrio’s letter was in response to Barwick’s letter to him, delivered by Shann on 31 December (Document 142). In it he wrote at length of Indonesia’s distrust of British intentions in the region, stressing that Indonesia could never ‘capitulate in this Malaysia affair’ as a consequence.
3 See footnote 2, Document 25.
4 Presumably, a number of words are missing in the transmission here.