Canberra, 5 February 1964
I agree with the need for some caution in the way in which we express our reaction to paragraph 7.2
2. For the rest, I would like to see a stronger expression of an Australian view
(i) that Malaysia cannot be expected to make any concessions;
(ii) that the survival of Malaysia is essential;
(iii) that Malaysia has to be protected against Indonesian hostility;
(iv) that we are quite unconvinced that there has been any change in Indonesian ambition and purpose; and
(v) that it seems to us that Kennedy has been more concerned in making a ‘success’ of his mission than in trying to examine the probable consequences of the ‘solution’ he has promoted. From my reading of the cablegrams I think we have a duty to ourselves first and to our Allies to try to shake the Americans into some awareness of what they are really doing. In departmental discussions you will have my support for a stronger line.
P.S. I have a feeling that support for the British view and, indirectly, a strengthening of Rusk may help to bring the U.S. back to a more comprehensive and more realistic view of issues in South East Asia.
[NAA: A1945, 245/3/9]
1 Hasluck was commenting on a draft reply for the Prime Minister, prepared by Defence, in response to Douglas-Home’s message of 31 January about Indonesia and his talks with Robert Kennedy. Not published.
2 Paragraph 7 canvassed Australian willingness to share the ‘strategic burden’ should the Kennedy-brokered negotiations break down. This would include being prepared for the resumption of fighting and taking ‘immediate and active steps’ to ensure that President Sukarno understands the strength of Western opposition to his course of action.