Canberra, 5 February 1964
Secret Priority
Please pass the following message urgently to Rusk:
Begins:
Thank you very much for your letter of 9th January.1 I am glad that there is such a degree of understanding between us on the policies we respectively follow towards Indonesia. Allow me to say that I too realise that the trade diversion, probably long contemplated, is irreversible, certainly in whole, and that we must make the best of it.2 I also agree that Indonesia’s mounting difficulties offer the West an opportunity for long term economic advantages. Whether or not any attempt to exploit this opportunity can be made without encouraging Sukarno’s continued belief that the West is willing to bail him out is, to my mind, very much a matter of timing. No doubt, the extent of the belief that economic pressures permitted to mount against him will goad Sukarno into greater irrationality will be a considerable factor in judgment as to the time – the latest time – at which the opportunity should be seized. I have not believed that these pressures of themselves would check him or necessarily cause his downfall; though I cannot believe that they are not highly significant in both directions. On the other hand, I have not believed that he would engage in open hostilities and I have thought that he would ultimately resile from any activity which he could see was about to involve him in them. But, of course, the provocative incident may come by mischance or miscalculation. Summing up all the information at my disposal the inclination of my mind would have been to avoid any action by the West which would defer Sukarno’s moment of choice. This inclination was behind my earlier note to you.
Since our exchange of letters, however, events have rapidly moved on. We have followed with the closest attention the efforts of your Government in recent weeks to damp down Indonesia’s hostility towards Malaysia. I think we would both agree that while the Indonesian leadership may now wish to bring to an end the policy of physical intimidation of Malaysia, there is no evidence of a realistic reappraisal on their part that Malaysia has an assured future. There are no signs of their willingness to accept Malaysia as an accomplished fact and of their readiness to live with Malaysia. However, if they are seeking to pursue their aims through political and diplomatic means rather than by armed invasion, we can, I suppose, regard this as a step forward, though with my inclination of mind, I think we have deferred Sukarno’s moment of choice. None of us I am sure can be very sanguine about the prospects for the coming talks. Compared with the state of affairs in the middle months of 1963 the prospects now are a good deal less favourable than at that time when there was such a change in Indonesian policy. In the months since then we consider that the capacity of the Indonesian leadership for bringing about some modicum of external and internal stability has been weakened. It seems to us that
(a) the economy has deteriorated and the moderates have further lost influence;
(b) effective leadership and positive decision-making in the Government are missing;
(c) economic and social policy is full of uncertainty and confusion;
(d) the planning and organisation of border raids has involved the armed forces more deeply and has led to deeper Indonesian commitments to the Malaysian dissident elements.
Thus my colleagues and I entertain strong doubts whether Djakarta can stick to a coherent and moderate policy. The internal pressures upon them will be severe, especially as their efforts will be conducted against a background of mounting social and economic dissatisfaction. Perhaps they may be shocked into assuming firm authority through a realisation of their progressive loss of control, but there are few signs of this.
The relevance of such assessments for our consideration of policy is that we would be much readier to accept risks and ambiguities in negotiations if there were real prospects that the Indonesians could benefit from a conciliatory approach. But what we fear is that they would interpret such a course as weakness and that, in consequence, their general conduct in the period ahead would be such as to arouse further suspicion and hostility against Indonesia (not only in Malaysia, Britain and Australia but in your Congress as well) with the end result being marked deterioration of the overall position. I realise that the possible assistance to the Communist cause of continuing political decay and absence of real government in the country on the one hand, and the certain repercussions upon the Malaysian scene of any unintended but apparent encouragement of the Indonesians on the other make the decision as to the acceptance of further unprecise and tentative solutions most difficult. But I have come to think that unless the initial movement in the Indonesian position is followed up with firmness we stand to lose the advance that has been made and much more. You know my view that our long term prospects with Indonesia are better served if in the short run we resist Indonesian pressures against the political and territorial integrity of Malaysia. Nor can we ask the Malaysians for further concessions. The Tunku has made remarkable concessions already in agreeing to the ‘ascertainment’ processes, in postponing the date for the inauguration of Malaysia, and now agreeing to talks while members of the Indonesian armed forces remain posed3 and armed within Malaysian territory.
I understand that, like ourselves, your authorities believe that a ‘cease-fire’ which does not provide for the withdrawal of Indonesians irregulars can only be of very short duration. If the Indonesians do not agree at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting to withdraw the infiltrators, it is difficult to see an alternative for the Malaysians other than to have recourse to the Security Council. The Indonesian authorities have officially acknowledged, both in public statements and in diplomatic exchanges, that Indonesians from the armed forces are fighting on Malaysian soil. They also admit to the training and reinfiltration of dissidents. These activities clearly violate the United Nations Charter and the point is being reached where Malaysia cannot afford to let this strong case go by default. Nor can we permit the Indonesians to develop the attitude that they may freely flout the accepted norms of international conduct. I am asking the Embassy to suggest to your officials that the question of recourse to the United Nations should be put under urgent study in anticipation of the possible failure of the talks.
As to our approach to the tripartite discussions, we believe it is in the best interests of the Malaysians to try to concentrate discussion on a few essential practical points which can be made the test of Indonesia’s intentions, and. on which the Filipinos will not be able to support Indonesia strongly. I hope the Malaysians will maintain that the securing and maintenance of a cease-fire, including the withdrawal of Indonesian personnel from Malaysia, is an essential beginning to the discussion of all the other matters at issue. We greatly doubt whether a cease-fire should be part of the uncertain package deal.There are quite a number of practical points to be decided in devising a continuing cease-fire which can well take the time available. As to other questions, such as the resumption of diplomatic relations and reaffirmation of ‘Maphilindo’, the Malaysians, it seems to me, should be prepared to agree to subsequent consultations, but the first matter for consultation on the settlement of differences should in my view be the cease-fire.
Garfield Barwick.
Ends.
[NAA: A183B, 3006/4/9 part 3]
1 Rusk had replied to a letter from Barwick of 16 December on Indonesia’s economic difficulties and the question of continued foreign aid. Barwick believed that there was ‘no prospect’ of ‘rational thinking about the problems of internal development coining into the ascendant in Indonesia … while the regime can grasp at straws of foreign aid and live in an atmosphere of self-deception’.
2 A reference to Indonesia’s effort to divert its trade from Singapore and eliminate its economic dependence on the Singapore entrepot.
3 Possibly, ‘positioned’ or ‘poised’