Canberra, 6 February 1964
AP15. Secret
The Problem of Indonesian Hostility towards Malaysia
The following points on Australian general policy objectives in respect of Malaysia and Indonesia have been drawn from a slightly longer submission approved by the Prime Minister and Sir Garfield Barwick1:—
(1) Our primary consideration is the stability and territorial integrity of Malaysia. We should continue to work towards ending or at least diminishing Indonesian hostility. As long as this continues, the peace of the area is threatened and serious internal strains are imposed on Malaysia. If however, confrontation and Indonesian attacks on Malaysian territory continue, we must face the consequences, including the military consequences, for Australia.
(2) Patient diplomatic efforts with the Philippines may succeed. Indonesia is much more erratic and we must exploit such points of influence and pressure as we can find.
(3) Preservation of British and Australian bases in Malaysia is essential if Australia is to play any part in the defence of South East Asia. It is also essential at the present and for some time to come for the preservation of Malaysian security. Hence any bargain which weakened the British position in Malaysia in an attempt to buy off Indonesian hostility would not be acceptable to Australia.
(4) We must, however, be prepared to contemplate an ultimate future in which neither British nor American bases exist in South East Asia and the region must to some extent rely on its own resources in dealing with China. We should therefore seek to avoid inflicting avoidable scars in our relations with Indonesia and the Philippines since we may ultimately be obliged to seek to win the co-operation of both nations.
(5) With respect to co-ordination of policy with the British and American policies we must be guided by our own special interests. If Indonesian attacks escalated sharply (which we at present consider to be unlikely) it would be to the Americans that we should turn for support. It is therefore important for Australia to avoid policies which Washington may properly regard as obstructing or prejudicing a negotiated settlement fair to Malaysia, and realistic in its terms. Any obstruction must be clearly shown to come from Indonesia. At the same time, Britain is bearing the main burden of the defence of Malaysia. We must also protect her interests and do nothing which might begin a process of disillusionment with Australia’s role.
(6) We do not consider that economic pressures alone can change Indonesian policies. Hence complete economic isolation is not needed nor is it desirable since it is important that Australia and America should retain what influence they can in Djakarta. It is equally important that Indonesia should not be allowed to profit by her attacks on Malaysia and that efforts should be made to prevent American efforts to buy off Indonesian hostility by promising aid. To do so would be to place a premium on brigandage.
(7) Our immediate task should be:—
(a) to continue the cease-fire;
(b) to ensure the expulsion of all Indonesian forces in Eastern Malaysia and the cessation of Indonesian covert activity in Singapore and Malaya;
(c) to keep clearly before world opinion the fact that Indonesia has attacked and invaded Malaysia;
(d) to keep before the Americans the seriousness of the Kennedy initiatives and the responsibilities they have incurred through them.
(8) The American belief that a solution is most likely to be found in a fuzzy Maphilindo agreement should not be directly opposed since some such arrangement may indeed be necessary. We should, however, argue that the basis of a Maphilindo settlement depends on mutual good faith. Indonesia has still to demonstrate this good faith and until she does so, by deeds, not words, any Maphilindo arrangement is premature.
(9) If a solution through some Maphilindo arrangement is likely, we should work to remove from its earlier form, the objectionable implications for the continuance of the bases.2
(10) We should lend no support to such an idea as ‘Asia for the Asians’ as excludes or denigrates Australia’s interest in the region and in its security and development.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 3]
1 The submission was a brief, ‘General Policy Objectives in Respect of Malaysia and Indonesia’, prepared for further quadripartite talks on Indonesia in Washington, set down for 11-12 February. The objectives set out were thought to bring Australian policy ‘into fairly close alignment’ with Britain, which was considered ‘essential’ in order ‘to encourage the US to take a firm stand’. Barwick, with Menzies’ approval, sent a message to Rusk outlining the policy (Document 156).
2 See editorial note, 1963 Tripartite Talks , and Documents 98 and 103.