Canberra, 12 February 1964
164. Secret Priority
Reference your telegram No. 199.1
You will have seen from our telegram No. 3712 to Washington that we think Malaysians did well in the difficult situation in which they were placed by the Kennedy Mission. Lopez in Bangkok was putting it about that the Malaysians were ‘rigid’ while the Indonesians showed signs of being ‘conciliatory’. Malaysians should vigorously seek to impress their reasonableness on the Americans. We have the impression they have not pressed their interests as much as they might with the Americans in the past and now they have a strong case.
2. We are glad the Malaysian delegation including Goh were satisfied with talks.3 A repetition of the aftermath of the Manila talks last year is to be avoided.4
3. For the reasons outlined in your paragraph 2 we agree that strong continuing efforts must be made to get the Indonesian infiltrators withdrawn. Another point is that Indonesia might try and exploit the cease-fire machinery to exaggerate the T.N.K.U. and C.C.O. activity and get behind the U Thant report. A long-term danger is that Indonesia will work up to or be drawn into creating an ‘insurgency’ situation. But we are not dissatisfied with the tactical handling of the matter by the Malaysians at Bangkok.5
4. Whatever Subandrio says about putting a new formula on the withdrawal of the infiltrators to his Government on his return to Djakarta6 there can, of course, be no illusions about the Indonesians continuing to squeeze what they can out of the situation. You will recall Shann’s talk with Nasution on 7th January in which, after saying that Indonesia did not wish to have military action on the border, Nasution frankly admitted to the training of North Kalimantan freedom fighters and said that he had had a number of secret contacts with Azahari who was an old friend of his. This training was nearly complete but, if necessary, it would go on. He had impressed on Azahari the need for a political organisation supported by cadres trained in Indonesia for territorial warfare and this was the pattern which Azahari was following as he now had a political organisation and considerable support in Sarawak as well as in Brunei.
[NAA: A183B, 3006/4/7 part 21]
1 11 February, in which Critchley reported that Malaysian Cabinet members were ‘unhappy’ about the final communique and the press reports (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ). He also reported that, in response to a request for his views, he had listed a number of disadvantages of a cease-fire without the withdrawal of Indonesian forces: (a) it implied Malaysian acquiescence in the violation of her territorial integrity; (b) it weakened any Malaysian case to the UN based on Indonesian armed presence; (c) it could affect Malaysian morale adversely; (d) it could place the security forces in a difficult position; (e) it could affect security action against the CCO; and (f) it could endanger the Thai cease-fire observers.
2 11 February. It dealt with Australia’s view that Indonesian infiltrators should be withdrawn from Malaysia as part of the terms of the cease-fire.
3 Critchley also reported, however, that there were concerns among the Malaysian delegates that Razak in the ministerial meetings may have retreated from the position of ‘no sanctuary’ for Indonesian armed groups in Malaysia – a stance that the delegates had ‘categorically insisted’ upon in the official meetings.
4 See Documents 101 and 107.
5 DEA believed that the Malaysians had ‘argued robustly and [had] concentrated on exposing the Indonesian vulnerability in wanting to force concessions in the political field by maintaining their military pressure inside Malaysia’.
6 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.